Archives For January 2012

Riggio, Adam. [2012]. Right Thinking for Right Science?
On the Pitt-Collier Exchange Over the Purpose of STS
(PDF)
The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.
social-epistemology.com/

Right Thinking for Right Science?
On the Pitt-Collier Exchange Over the Purpose of STS

Adam Riggio, McMaster University, SERRC

(Editor’s Note: Adam Riggio’s synthesis refers both to Joseph Pitt’s article, ‘Standards in Science and Technology Studies’ and James Collier’s reply ‘Normativity and Nostalgia: A Reply to Pitt’.)

The two separate essays by James Collier and I were originally planned to be a single work, jointly written between us. But as our collaboration evolved, our reactions to what Joseph Pitt wrote in November diverged. Since our original plan was to write together, my perspective remains more critical of Pitt than Collier, but my goal is to call attention to ideas that may have gone unnoticed in the heat of their exchange. As it happened, my task became to synthesize the two perspectives. Although I am not sure what such a synthesis would look like (having written this essay I still have no idea) I hope that I have written something that will show what can be learned from their conversation.

Two Visions of Truth

The conflict Collier and Pitt articulate in the Science and Technology Studies (STS) community is a conflict of ideals. Curiously, they conflict over the same ideal: truth. The conflict is constituted from their differences in how they each conceive the nature of that truth. Pitt perceives the conflict within STS starkly. There are those, the community he calls STS-1, who understand science as the only mode of human knowledge with self-correcting processes in its very structure. Those people work to instill similar methods of self-correction in the humanities, because such methods are the best path to discovering the truth. The STS-1 community fights against the relativistic tendencies of STS-2, thinkers influenced too heavily by post-modernism and Capital-T Theory. STS-2 thinkers, says Pitt, analyze all positions, even the scientific, as pursuing not the truth above all else, but partisan political goals. With all knowledge politically compromised, no account of the world or mode of building knowledge is better than any other. Evaluation is useless to rank a proliferation of incommensurable and incomparable differences. This is nihilism, belief in the worthlessness of any decision. To attack the universality of the scientific method is to attack truth itself, says Pitt. And truth must be defended.

The path to truth is the scientific method, according to Pitt, and the scholars of STS-1 are the safeguards of that method, while the scientists practice it. This is the method of self-correction, the design of research with objectivity and repeatability in mind, so that one’s results can be checked, referenced, and confirmed or disconfirmed by the scientific community as a whole. This is Pitt’s ideal: a community of researchers working with their self-correcting methods toward the truth about the world itself. The scientific realism he defends is built upon this ideal, and that ideal is required if science is to be defended from the relativistic attacks of post-modernist theory.

But relativism is not truly the only result of a critical attitude toward scientific practice. Collier’s inquiry into the nature of science is based on a messier, but no less powerful, concept of truth: empirical truth. STS animated by an ideal of empirical truth is research into the institutions and practices of science that describe accurately what goes on in laboratories and research centres. Scientific research is expensive, and that expense results in pervasive bureaucracy, as scientists are often driven by the priorities of their corporate and government sponsors rather than pure idealism to discover truths. Truths are discovered, because scientific research still continues successfully. But scientific research is not purely neutral, instead being politically and corporately influenced.

Real scientists often compromise their ideals of pure research for the sake of being able to work at all. When that compromise is displayed, as in, for example, the landmark studies of Bruno Latour[1] and Steve Woolgar,[2] it can make one doubt the ideal of disinterested and self-correcting scientific research. The self-correction of the enterprise that Pitt takes as an ideal rarely happens, because few scientists have the spare time or the spare money to investigate the claims of others in the rigorous manner the ideal suggests. Ironically, it may be easier to develop self-correction methods for humanities fields, if only because our research is so much less expensive than the physical sciences. The mistake lies in taking compromise for absolute corruption, and taking the socially constructed to be unreal.[3]

The World Is Always More Complex than We First Assume

These mistakes can encourage a polemical attitude that can cause one to miss important nuances in ideas as they actually developed. Pitt begins the conversation in a polemic mode, taking for his historical predecessor Alan Sokal, and what I facetiously call the latter’s act of intellectual terrorism in 1996. However effective his hoax may have been, it was still a deceit, a complete slap in the face to the norms of peer review and academic honesty. Sokal wrote a text he knew to be nonsense, misrepresented himself to the editors of Social Text, and publicly humiliated them when he unmasked himself to expose their mistake. He disregarded every moral norm upon which the humanities rely for their reputation as upstanding academic disciplines. Sokal’s was a con game, and it was an exquisite one. It was as if the editors of Social Text were strolling through Paris one day, and were swindled by a well-spoken fellow on the street into buying the Eiffel Tower for the low cost of two thousand euros. Sokal was a cheat and a liar, but in the name of truth.

Pitt cites a story about Gottfried Leibniz, paralleling with Sokal’s an apparent hoax that the inventor of calculus pulled off on an alchemy society as a young man. It gives credence to Sokal’s activity to imagine his hoax as having such a pedigree. Yet a more careful look at the real events of history gives further evidence that the world is not so cleanly divided into right and wrong as Pitt suggests. Reading the story of Leibniz and the alchemists in 2012, it is clear to us who the true winner is. But in the 1600s, the boundaries of what we today call hard science and alchemical tartuffery were quite hazy, to the point of non-existence.

One of Leibniz’s projects was what he called characteristica universalis, which Nikolay Milkov has cited as a historical forerunner to the universal symbolic logics of Gottlob Frege, Giuseppe Peano, and Bertrand Russell. The logic developed in the Cambridge philosophy department in the early twentieth century was an important influence in contemporary computer science. Much successful science and technology can trace its roots to Leibniz’s characteristica universalis project. One of the resources Leibniz consulted for this work was the Kabbalah.[4] The seventeenth century was a time when mysticism, physics, experimental science, the occult, philosophy, theology, and logic were all part of one community of inquirers too diverse to give a single name. Modern empirical science only exists today thanks to a complex social evolution as diverse tendencies and directions grew in influence and disappeared.

We Are All Too Human

And yet, Sokal failed. He threw away every moral norm that keeps the humanities regulated, all that one could call the self-correcting methods of the humanities and social sciences. Yet for all that, science conversations today are not dominated by scientists themselves, but conservative media forces allied with corporate money who have a vested interest in, for example, denying climate change. Collier quotes Latour as an example of a supposed relativist who today stands against the relativization of science.

But Latour’s words slip away from Collier’s point. Having joined the polemic in defense of STS that studies science as it is truly, messily, practiced, Collier does not notice that Latour’s words reflect his own regret at having caused widespread doubt that the ideal of science as the one path to truth ever survives its difficult practice. Latour asks, “Was I wrong to participate in the invention of this field we call science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we meant?[5]

Latour’s work only showed that the practitioners of science were human. They tried their best in difficult circumstances, but were limited by the conditions of their times. They were as careful as possible, but could not always be as careful as was required, and they sometimes made mistakes. Pitt implies that science is only valid when it is believed in with the strength and zeal of a perfect ideal. If one shows that ideal to be impossible, then faith in science disappears. Showing the empirical truth of what scientists actually do, Collier’s ideal of truth that motivates his approach to STS, has politically damaging effects. Science has lost its power to win over skeptics of widespread scientific conclusions, because the skeptics have evidence that the scientists are just as human as they are.

This is precisely the situation Sokal was afraid of, why he went to the lengths he did to discredit post-modernism-influenced scholars. Pitt quotes him: “Theorizing about ‘the social construction of reality’ won’t help us find an effective cure for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics, and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.”[6] But here Pitt too is caught up in the polemics of his purpose. He proceeds to build grounds for discrediting what he calls STS-2, instead of seeing the political content of Sokal’s motivations.

Sokal, in advocating for a view of science as a means to truth beyond the reach of political or corporate compromise, does so for a political goal. That goal is the alleviation of human suffering. He talks about devising ways to prevent or better deal with the ecological catastrophes of global climate change, and curing deadly diseases. This political goal of improving the lot of humanity is the purpose for his abandonment of all academic morality in defense of the belief in an ideal of disinterested, apolitical science and truth.

Conclusion: Freeing Thought From Polemics

Pitt misses the most intriguing element of his own essay: the political motivation of an idealized image of apolitical science. Collier also misses the most intriguing element of his own writing: merely showing the empirical fallibility of scientists and scientific institutions has had exactly the political ramifications that critics like Pitt and Sokal were afraid of. They have both ignored the social power of the concepts and discourses in which they work.

The reason why is because of their motivations in writing. Pitt wrote to delineate what he took to be good STS (the Sokal-inspired kind that reinforced the ideal of science as the disinterested pursuit of truth) from bad STS (the kind that allowed too many entry points for nihilistic relativism). This delineation made, it was the task of good STS to shut down bad STS. Collier, in response, wrote to defend warts-and-all empirical studies of scientists and scientific institutions from what he took to be poorly justified attacks. And Pitt did not justify his attacks well, because he focussed on his polemics against the styles of STS he did not like, and a polemic cannot justify itself on polemical grounds alone. But Collier focussed on point-by-point rebuttals and responses to Pitt’s polemic, and missed the more profound implications of what they were both writing.

As thinkers, our ideas are effective when we understand their full implications, and all the possibilities for thinking that are enfolded within them. We can explicate the more complex, deeper understanding of our words and ideas when we leave the single-minded focus of our polemical motivations behind to understand the convergences within our divergences, and the productive power of our various lines of thought. Only in letting go of our polemical intentions can we begin to understand all that our ideas can do.

Contact details: adamriggio@gmail.com

References

Collier, J.H. 2012. Normativity and Nostalgia: A Reply to Pitt. The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. Accessed January 29, 2012. http://social-epistemology.com/2012/01/29/

Hacking, I. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Latour, B. 1987. Science in Action: How to Follow Engineers and Scientists Through Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Latour, B, and S Woolgar. 1979. Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Milkov, N. 2006. Leibniz’s Project for Characteristica Universalis in Relation to the Early Analytic Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Leibniz Congress. Hannover: 606-614.

Pitt, J.C. 2011. Standards in Science and Technology Studies. The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. Accessed January 24, 2012. http://social-epistemology.com/2011/11/23/413/

[1] Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Engineers and Scientists Through Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

[2] Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).

[3] This is an important point that Ian Hacking makes in The Social Construction of What? The most frequent ways that social construction theory is oversimplified is with the presumption that when a phenomenon is discovered to be socially constructed, then it is therefore unreal. So if scientific institutions are socially constructed, they are unreal, or cannot genuinely access the real. Hacking, throughout this book, gives ample evidence of how laughable this oversimplification is.

[4] Nikolay Milkov, “Leibniz’s Project for Characteristica Universalis in Relation to the Early Analytic Philosophy,” Proceedings of the Eighth International Leibniz Congress (Hannover, 2006): 609.

[5] Quoted in James H. Collier, “Normativity and Nostalgia: A Reply to Pitt,” The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 29 January 2012, http://social-epistemology.com. My emphasis.

[6] Joseph C. Pitt, “Standards in Science and Technology Studies,” The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 23 November 2011, http://social-epistemology.com.

Collier, James H. [2012]. ‘Normativity and Nostalgia: A Reply to Pitt.’ (PDF)
The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
social-epistemology.com/

 

Normativity and Nostalgia: A Reply to Pitt

James H. Collier, Virginia Tech, SERRC

(Editor’s Note: Please see Joseph Pitt’s article Standards in Science and Technology Studies and Adam Riggio’s synthesis “Right Thinking for Right Science? On the Pitt-Collier Exchange Over the Purpose of STS”.)

On behalf of the Collective, we thank Professor Pitt for his contribution to our venture and willingness to develop and exchange meaningful ideas on the conduct of Science and Technology Studies (STS). We hope this reply encourages additional discussion about the important issues Pitt raises.

You Cannot Be Serious [1]

Sokal’s most critical charge here is that there is a lack of seriousness on the part of literary theory types and anyone else who endorses relativism and subjectivity. (original emphasis)

Professor Pitt’s polemic begins with a test. Pitt tests the seriousness of our commitments to scientific inquiry. As a manner of test preparation, Pitt primes our philosophical intuitions by inviting questions regarding what we would risk, and ignore, to expose intellectual and academic malpractice. Would we endorse the deliberate use of deception, through hoaxes, to uncover malpractice? If not deception, would a proper scientific experiment uncover quackery?[2] Given your intuitions on these questions what, then, does Leibniz demonstrate in punking a secret society of alchemists? And what does Alan Sokal demonstrate in punking a group of “social scientists/literary theorists?” How we, and Pitt, frame and answer these questions affords a sense of how we may regard the place and purpose of scientific inquiry.

For Pitt, scientific inquiry tends to be a rather cut and dried affair. Sokal’s self-proclaimed “experiment” would not pass scientific muster. Nevertheless, Sokal is right. Any ambiguity surrounding using a hoax to reveal fraud gets instantly clarified by understanding the righteous anger one should feel over the pretense and preening of pretenders to the throne of knowledge. Pitt shows the clever Leibniz and the cunning Sokal unveiling the respective arrogance of alchemists and “social scientists/literary theorists.” Both Leibniz and Sokal, knowing little more about alchemy or postmodern theory than how to ape the bombastic linguistic mannerisms of educated fools, gained acceptance, even money, from these intellectual imposters.[3] Leibniz and Sokal admitted to writing gibberish. By accepting, praising and, in Sokal’s case, publishing gibberish, these hapless alchemists and literary theorists confessed their fraud.

Given his instruction on how to identify, and feel about, revelations of apparent fraud, Pitt proceeds to test directly our notions of scientific inquiry.

To gauge how seriously you take scientific inquiry, Pitt weds two assertions and requires a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ reply to both of them: 1) Scientific inquiry, undeniably, “ … has produced and continues to produce the best and most successful methods we have for understanding the world and universe around us.” 2) Scientific inquiry corrects itself. On replying to the two assertions, your scientific disposition stands as follows:

Affirming both assertions means you take science seriously indeed. Your seriousness entails a commitment to the epistemic privilege and authority of science. Defending and enhancing science’s privilege and authority, even if you fail being scientific in the process (e.g., Sokal’s “experiment”, Gross and Levitt’s “data”), honors that commitment. For STS — or STS-1 on Pitt’s account — affirming both assertions means affirming, and fully describing, scientific exceptionalism through an apolitical, epistemic agenda.

Denying both assertions means you are decidedly unserious.[4] Your sympathies lie with the postmodernist “gang”. Your unseriousness leads you to treat science “just like” other social institutions. Questioning and undermining science’s privilege and authority, even if you get punked by a hoax (e.g., Sokal) and become the object of derision (e.g., Gross and Levitt), exhibits your distain. For STS — or STS-2 on Pitt’s account— denying both assertions means denying, and proliferating contextual accounts regarding, scientific hegemony through a political, exploitative agenda.

Self-Correction

One of the strongest features of scientific inquiry is its self-correcting nature. Faulty assumptions are exposed and rejected, new procedures are tested and new instruments are calibrated and retested, theories are proposed, explored, elaborated, and tested, only to be finally rejected or replaced by a new set of conjectures and methods.

Pitt depicts science’s self-correction as both a settled matter and a desirable feature of inquiry.[1] Does scientific inquiry self-correct? Pitt’s argument by assertion notwithstanding, the answer remains a firm “yes and no”. One can point to historical instances where science corrected along the lines Pitt describes.[6] Yet social studies of science, of contemporary scientific inquiry in particular, render more accurately our understanding of the process.[7] Scientific inquiry has become so complex, specialized and beholden to funding and publishing priorities that the opportunity for experimental replication, the basis for self-correction, stands virtually nonexistent. As Carl Zimmer points out, quoting John Helmann (a microbiologist at Cornell), scientists have their own science to perform.[8] Generally, scientists do not have the time, funding, and/or resources to reproduce the experiments of others. Science’s incentive structure actively discourages regular replication. Helmann’s sentiments are echoed by Rosie Redfield (a microbiologist at the University of British Columbia) who adds “ … trying to replicate the claimed results is a waste of time.”

Technology, as Pitt well knows,[9] further complicates replication. The technologies necessary for cutting edge experiments conducted in unusual environments (e.g., nominal gravity) do not reside in common laboratories.[10] Less exotically, technologies readily available and commonly used in well-funded research universities defeat the budgets of less well-endowed universities, colleges and some private labs. Practically speaking, experimental replication requires specific conditions belying objective, universal standards.

Despite the impracticalities of replication and self-correction, Pitt goes a step further:

And despite this dynamic constant reassessment and reconfiguration, science continues to produce results which give us greater and greater control over our lives, giving us the ability to improve our life styles and our understanding of how it all hangs together.

Let’s make plain Pitt’s teleology. On Pitt’s account science, unceasingly, reassesses, self-corrects, produces results, “gives” understanding and control, and makes life better. Pitt’s characterization of science at once strains credulity and reduces the study of science to an arid form of accountancy. For what, other than scoring instances of inevitable progress, and correctly entering them in the historical balance sheet, remains? Moreover, accepting Pitt’s idea, why do we need STS practitioners, of any type, to perform this task? If science corrects itself, science can account for itself. Pitt makes no case for the particular methods of STS, or history, other than extreme scrupulousness — and, for Pitt, science has that in abundance — and self-correction — a feature originating in science itself — in studying science.

Pitt persists in claiming the virtues of self-correction for STS. He makes a closing case for the self-correction of STS in five instances occurring in the early- to mid- 1990’s. In these emblematic exchanges, standard bearers of STS done poorly (STS-2) — Mario Biagioli, Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer — have their historical knuckles rapped by STS-1 stalwarts — Pitt, Moti Feingold and, among others, an unidentified “younger scholar.” In case you miss the obvious didacticism, these exchanges show members of the STS pantheon (with their privileged, if not canonical, accounts) being leveled by intrepid, if lesser known, interlocutors. Pitt declares: “We may take a bit longer than scientists do, but we too police our own, which is what makes what we do self-correcting.” Is “policing”, then, self-correction?

Here, if I understand Pitt correctly, self-correction in STS is a process whereby right-minded (STS-1) practitioners offer charges, counter-arguments, or differing evidence to existing historical accounts given by wrong-headed practitioners (STS-2).[11] Such encounters result in the “irrefutable”, take down of either a part, or the whole, of the argument or book (Pitt does not note the particulars). STS-2 types try rebuttals or responses, but seem mortally wounded in the exchange. STS-1 declares victory.

Pitt’s self-congratulatory, deterministic tales of STS-1 triumphs lack detail and dimension.[12] On Pitt’s account, an historical dispute ends and results in self-correction when the bad guys (STS-2) lose to the good guys (STS-1). A host of questions follow, including: Are the disputes that Pitt describes representative cases (is hearsay, in example 4, a “conclusive” refutation)? Did the disputes end, (fifteen to twenty years ago) with a permanent correction to the historical record? Did Shapin, for example, admit to a correction? Would such an admission matter? Can self-appointed referees, like Pitt, simply declare that correction happened absent evidence?[13]

In an earlier article, Pitt argues “ … that even very good case studies do no philosophical work.” Why? Pitt reasons that case studies “ … give the false impression that history is on our side, sort of the history and philosophy of science version of Manifest Destiny.”[14] Pitt’s own cases of self-correction illustrate just this problem.

Normativity, Didacticism and Nostalgia

We can give our students theories of right and wrong, pointing out their strengths and weaknesses, and we can explain the science and the technology with its possible ramifications. But we must leave it to them to draw out and defend their own conclusions about value.

At the root of Pitt’s self-contradiction, one finds his didacticism. Pitt’s overwhelming desire to impart an unmistakable moral lesson leads to heedless oversimplifications. Tracing these oversimplifications — among them the blithe characterization of postmodernism, the brushing aside of political concerns,[15] the facile bifurcation of STS — we find Pitt’s paternal leanings in wanting to rein in an STS that does not respect, and may threaten, its scientific betters. We also find a nostalgia that undermines a goal we both seek — a renewed place for philosophy in STS.

Pitt longs for an era before the Edinburgh School’s founding. Pitt locates the beginning of this era — the historicist movement in the philosophy of science — in, roughly, 1956 corresponding with the founding of Indiana University’s History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) department by Norwood Russell Hanson. Hanson, not Thomas Kuhn, serves as a patron saint of HPS and of STS-1 (on Pitt’s schema STS-1 corresponds to HPS). Kuhn, for Pitt, “ … can perhaps be seen as the first popular Anglo-American postmodernist”[16] and thus resigned to the STS-2 side of the ledger. Seduced by the siren call of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions nascent STS (-2) seized an opportunity to “ … attack … the universality of scientific method” and “ … take science down off its pedestal.” Of course, we might tell this story quite differently locating the “take down” of science with earlier philosophical attacks on the unity of science movement. George A. Reisch notes:

Nostalgia, of course, carries little philosophical weight. Most contemporary philosophers, however much they may appreciate logical empiricism as their profession’s founding movement, agree that in the 1950s and ‘60s logical empiricism was revealed to be a catalog of mistakes, misjudgments and oversimplifications about science and epistemology. (2005, 1)

I accuse Pitt of also making oversimplifications about STS.

Moreover, we might tell quite a different story of Kuhn’s conservative, cold war influence.[17] Yet, for Pitt, Kuhn marks the beginning of the postmodern tragedy.

On Pitt’s telling the Sokal Hoax marks the apogee of the postmodern tragedy, and the culture war, precipitating the diminution of science. Now, we must live with the right-wing consequences.[18] However, in examining these consequences, Pitt’s account pulls up short. The essay ends with five “corrective encounters” (if you will) dating roughly from 1992 to 1996. Pitt does not (and perhaps need not) show how the sins of the “academic left”[19] infect the political right. In fact the academic, or postmodern, left in none other than the personage of Bruno Latour, bemoans right-wing anti-science. Latour may well succeed, on Pitt’s measure, in a bit of self-correction, declaring:

Was I wrong to participate in the invention of this field known as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we meant? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact whether you like it or not? Why can’t I simply say that the argument is closed for good?[20]

Despite Latour’s self-admonition, Pitt’s conception of postmodernism, and of STS-2, leaves little room for correction.

Given the local, idiosyncratic, historically contingent cases Pitt cites, one wonders what inferences we might draw about not only the continued prevalence of STS-1’s self-correction, but also, if self-correction is not just the province of STS-1, how we identify it if conducted by STS-2. Pitt’s nostalgia for the way STS ought to be, found in his examples and idea of STS-1 (which is, to say, HPS with a dash of “the social”[21] ) does not allow the possibility that STS-2 may have changed, so, taken on aspects of the criticism he levels.

Conclusion

Normative arguments can emit an odor of despotism. We all want to tell others what they should do, particularly with regard to something about which we care deeply. We care deeply about knowledge — how we recognize it, who holds it, how we get it, how we can give it to others, and how we use it. We care deeply about science in relation to knowledge. Pitt wants to tell us how we should relate to science. We, those who study science and technology in particular, should be respectful if not reverential. We should use the means and methods of other disciplines, such as history and philosophy, to make science understood more fully and cogently. To not take science seriously by promulgating radical views derived from unconventional theories and demonstrably wrong claims promotes ignorance and ill-logic.

Pitt struggles to avoid normative despotism. STS, for Pitt, should have methodological and dispositional standards. However, he mentions “normative” just once — in relation to what “many people” want from STS-2 studies. Pitt worries that STS-2 practitioners seek to coerce us into how we ought to think about science. The example of the Humanities, Science and Technology program at Virginia Tech, the purpose of which Pitt depicts as offering intellectual tools for the uncoerced evaluation of science and technology, illustrates what the thinks the true aim of STS should be.

In trying to avoid normative despotism, Pitt resorts to a kind of paternalism. The moral lessons, posed as unambiguous examples of when STS goes wrong, deterministically reinforce his assertions. We, too, should support the assertion of science’s epistemic privilege and emulate science’s ceaseless, implacable self- examination and correction.

Ultimately, Pitt’s views are anachronistic. Pitt must, or should, contend with the function of philosophy in the “intellectual maintenance”[22] of contemporary STS. Pitt recognizes, and too easily pushes aside, relevant STS problems — the constant stream of idiosyncratic case studies that offer little hope shared knowledge, let alone self-correction; the infinite, irreconcilable contexts of critique; and the complex dynamic between the study of science and science itself. These problems cannot be, and should not be, addressed through reclaiming a disciplinary past. Rather, STS needs the resources of philosophy unbowed by scientism. I urge Professor Pitt’s help with this project.

Contact details: jim.collier@vt.edu

References

Ashmore, M. 1993. The Theatre of the Blind: Starring a Promethean Prankster, a Phoney Phenomenon, a Prism, a Pocket, and a Piece of Wood. Social Studies of Science 23: 67-106.

Fuller, S. 2001. Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

Gross, P and N. Levitt, 1994. Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Latour, B. 2004. Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. Critical Inquiry 30. Accessed January 18, 2012. http://www.uchicago.edu/research/jnl-crit-inq/issues/v30/30n2.Latour.html

McEnroe, J. 2003. You Cannot Be Serious. New York: Berkley Publishing.

Pitt, J. C. 2011. Standards in STS. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. Accessed January 18, 2012. http://social-epistemology.com/2011/11/23/413/

Pitt, J. C. 2001. The Dilemma of Case Studies: Toward a Heraclitian Philosophy of Science. Perspectives on Science 9: 373-382.

Pitt, J. C. 1999. Thinking About Technology: Foundations of the Philosophy of Technology. New York: Seven Bridges Press.

Reisch, G. A. 2005. How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sokal, A. and J. Bricmont. 1998. Intellectual Impostures. London: Profile Books.

[1] An exclamation (and title of his book, 2002) shouted by tennis player John McEnroe in disputing a line call with a referee during a match at the 1981 Wimbledon championship. Pitt brings to mind McEnroe’s temperament given his attributions of relative seriousness, personal calls as to which inquiry is in- or out-of-bounds, and reference to justified anger.

[2] I am reminded of Malcolm Ashmore’s (1993) retelling of the N-ray saga and the controversial “experiment” used to expose French physicist Prosper-René Blondlot’s malpractice.

[3] Here, I refer to Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont’s Intellectual Impostures.

[4] Further, you may be decidedly unserious about Sokal’s work. Pitt asks us to “hear” — take seriously — Sokal’s complaint over the inane observation that: “Theorizing about ‘the social construction of reality’ won’t help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming.” Of course, neither will theorizing about the social construction of reality hurt science. Either science is a self-correcting, epistemic engine, or it’s not. If so, social interests — postmodern silliness or fights over research dollars — ultimately do not matter. If not, social interests do matter. Defenders of science, like Sokal and Pitt, want it both ways. For them, science is not social in any way other than the way scientists say it is — when funding is at stake, for example.

[5] We certainly wish to correct error. Pitt posits self-correction as a unique, and perhaps defining, feature of science. However, Pitt fails to confront the complexities of self-correction and further confuses the issue in his concluding examples. In these examples, self-correction becomes an exercise in having a self-appointed referee (Pitt) declare a winner in a debate with an ideologically preordained outcome. Keeping Pitt’s examples in mind as a collective cautionary tale, we might well contemplate the question of why, normatively or otherwise, we should prefer self-correction to correction by others.

[6]Throughout the essay, Pitt relies on the old time religion of using physics and astronomy as experimental exemplars of all the sciences.

[7] I note the astounding breath and complexity of contemporary scientific experimentation and the general, if not absolute, lack of resources and rewards for replicating experiments. Replication is neither a routine, nor automatic, activity as Pitt suggests. In STS, Collins and Harrison’s “Building a TEA Laser: The Caprices of Communication” (1975) serves as the locus classicus in demonstrating the difficulties surrounding the transfer, and replication, of scientific knowledge and experimentation.

[8] Zimmer, Carl. 2011. “It’s Science, but Not Necessarily Right.” New York Times, June 26. Accessed January 19, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/opinion/sunday/26ideas.html

[9] I refer to Pitt’s Thinking About Technology (1999).

[10] We get an indication of Pitt’s counter to my claim in Alan Shapiro’s debate with Simon Schaffer: “Schaffer situates Newton’s experiment and use of prisms in such a local situation that, he argues, Newton and his conspirators held that the conspirators will succeed only with prisms made of British glass. This odd claim is what initially led me to distrust his account, especially when I found that the sources he cites to establish his argument said nothing of the kind.” Shapiro takes a swipe at Schaffer’s over determination of locality (or hyper-locality), and the apparent lack of evidence of the same, on Newton’s experimentation. Shapiro’s poke at Schaffer, and Pitt’s reference to the exchange, illustrates the unfortunate rhetorical opportunism in such debates. Shapiro chides Schaffer for an inaccurate interpretation of a source (Pitt suggests the exchange means something more about relative standards of historical evidence.). If true, such an inaccuracy does not reject the deeper claim that specific conditions, and new or uncommon technologies, may significantly affect the conduct and potential replication of scientific experiments.

[11] One wonders, on Pitt’s ontology, if practitioners can occupy both sides of his STS divide at a given time (or use the methods and perspectives of one camp while bearing allegiance to the other), move between the categories or, if once a modernist or postmodernist, then always so.

[12] From Pitt: “The Past is what happened, the whole thing, all of it, every minute, second and detail in the non-stop flow of time.” Past accounts of STS self-correction do not seem to aspire to Pitt’s criteria for doing history.

[13] Or with evidence as flimsy as hearsay and impression?

[14] Pitt, Joseph. 2001 “The Dilemma of Case Studies: Toward a Heraclitian Philosophy of Science.” Perspectives on Science 9: 373-382.

[15] Pitt claims: “… STS-1’s agenda is not political … If every agenda is a political agenda, then the use of ‘political’ to characterize an agenda loses its force.” I support Pitt’s inclinations (and logic) in dealing with ready-made, taken for granted, claims that this (e.g., power) or that (e.g., politics) always, already prefigures any argument, or observation, and awaits timely excavation by an interlocutor. Yet, following the pattern of his reductive account, Pitt denies the possibility of a specific understanding of an epistemic agenda as a political agenda. That one might proclaim “every agenda is a political agenda” does not necessarily entail that every political agenda is politically equivalent.

[16] I note Kuhn’s presence in the Wikipedia entry for postmodernism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodernism). So it must be.

[17] Steve Fuller (2001). Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times.

[18] See, for example: Chait, Jonathan. 2011. “Why Right-Wing Anti-Science Matters.” The New Republic August 25. Accessed January 19, 2012. http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-chait/94198/why-right-wing-anti-science-matters

[19] I underscore the subtitle of Gross and Levitt’s Higher Superstition — The Academic Left and Its Quarrels With Science.

[20] Latour, Bruno. 2004. Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. Critical Inquiry 30. Accessed January 18, 2012. http://www.uchicago.edu/research/jnl-crit-inq/issues/v30/30n2.Latour.html

[21] Pitt proposes a case for doing STS in such a way as “ … to seek to understand science in its historical context as a social process whose domain is the real world.” (emphasis added) The proposed definition seems odd as Pitt holds his nose throughout the essay in referring to “social process” (especially regarding STS-2): “Science is here presented as merely a social process …”; “The importance of the Strong Programme was the general position it opened up, which was that science should be considered a social process. For now the question became which social process?”; “The sociological study of science, concentrating as it does on the social processes within the scientific community …” (emphasis added)

[22] I refer to Gary Gutting’s conception in answering what the use of philosophy is: “Even though basic beliefs on ethics, politics and religion do not require prior philosophical justification, they do need what we might call ‘intellectual maintenance,’ which itself typically involves philosophical thinking.” Gutting, Gary. 2012. “Philosophy — What’s the Use?” New York Times January 25. Accessed January 25, 2012. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/philosophy-whats-the-use/

“Organizing intelligence: Development of behavioral science and the research based model of business education,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Issue Vol. 45, No. 3, 253-283, 2009 [PDF]

Thomas Basbøll, SERRC

This will be the first of what I hope to be a regular feature (from me or other members of the collective). These will be short posts that draw attention to a single piece of writing that one of us has recently read. The idea is just to note why we think it’s interesting: perhaps because we disagree, perhaps because we agree, perhaps simply because it gets us thinking.

There’s a great scene in Norman Mailer’s Harlot’s Ghost that I often think about when I think about social epistemology. Talking to his protégé, Hugh Montague (who was modeled on James Jesus Angleton, the spiritual father of the CIA) suddenly declares that “Our real duty [i.e., the duty of the CIA] is to become the mind of America”:

Already, we tap into everything. If good crops are an instrument of foreign policy, then we are obliged to know next year’s weather. That same demand comes at us everywhere we look; finance, media, labour relations, economic production, the thematic consequences of TV. Where is the end of all that we can be legitimately interested in?… Nobody knows how many pipelines we have in good places – how many Pentagon pooh-bahs, commodores, congressmen, professors and assorted think tanks, soil erosions specialists, student leaders, diplomats, corporate lawyers, name it! They all give us input…I tell you, we have liaison into every game that’s going on in this country. Potentially, we could direct the nation.

William Bottom’s paper is not nearly as exciting as this little speech suggests. But it makes up for this by being more informative and less paranoid than Mailer’s novel. And it does, in fact, note the CIA’s connections to what he calls the “Ford Foundation network”, which is largely responsible for what business education—and, by extension, administrative science—looks like today. (I don’t think I need to stress why social epistemologists should be interested in the state of business education and research today.) The argument is largely empirical, based in part on correspondence between key members of the network. We get an insight into the process by which anthropology “came home” and, what I find especially interesting, a clear statement of the social and economic causes of shoddy scholarship:

Because so many of the contributing actors … were not academics,they had very little reason to seek to maintain or advance any scholarly claims. Academics pursuing advancement had little to gain by scrupulously referencing the original contribution. Nor were they likely to be hurt by failing to do so.

Bottom convincingly shows that a concerted effort was made after the first world war re-organize something like “the mind of America”, indeed, to dominate the global social imaginary with social science. Everything is traced back to Walter Lippmann’s ideas about public opinion (and beyond), and there’s the obligatory reference to Hitler’s admiration for the Committee for Public Information. Great rousing stuff!

Contact details: tb.lpf@cbs.dk

Dieleman, Susan [2012]. Review Essay: ‘Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance’ and ‘Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance’ (PDF)
The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
social-epistemology.com/

Proctor, Robert N. and Londa Schiebinger, eds. Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 312 pp.

Sullivan, Shannon and Nancy Tuana, eds. Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. 284 pp.

Susan Dieleman, Ryerson University

(Editor’s Note: Jim Lang replies to Susan Dieleman and further reviews both volumes in “Situated Ignoramuses?”)

Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance (2007), edited by Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, and Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (2008), edited by Robert N. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger, developed out of workshops at Pennsylvania State University, the former in 2004  and the latter in 2003. Both anthologies grapple with ignorance as an important but hitherto overlooked and underdeveloped facet of epistemology. In Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, the authors, working from multiple theoretical perspectives and commitments, examine “the complex phenomena of ignorance, which has as its aim identifying different forms of ignorance, examining how they are produced and sustained, and what role they play in knowledge practices” (Sullivan and Tuana 2007, 1), while the stated purpose of Agnotology is “to promote the study of ignorance, by developing tools for understanding how and why various forms of knowing have ‘not come to be,’ or disappeared, or have been delayed or long neglected, for better or for worse, at various points in history” (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008, vii).  Although these volumes represent only the beginnings of sustained inquiry into the phenomenon of ignorance and how it relates to knowledge and its study, some common themes begin to emerge.  Most notably, ignorance itself comes to be understood not just as the dark side of traditional epistemology, but as an integral aspect of knowledge and its study.  The study of ignorance serves to reveal the multiple dimensions of power at work in practices of knowing, and can help to clarify the overlap between social and political institutions and structures with such practices.

While each of the two books considered here is excellent on its own, together they balance each other out and compensate for the other’s weaknesses to provide a superb entrée into and first attempt at theorizing those aspects of epistemology traditionally relegated to the shadows.  More specifically, although both texts claim to focus on both theoretical interventions in and practical examples of ignorance, they do not both wholly succeed.  In fact, each succeeds in the task opposite to the other.  Whereas Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance focuses predominantly on providing careful, nuanced theories of ignorance and its production and maintenance, but is light on practical examples of ignorance that are likely to resonate with non-philosophers, Agnotology presents interesting and useful case studies that serve to flesh out those theories, even though it is itself light on theory.  Thus, these two books are wonderfully complementary and it can be up to the reader to decide which to read first, depending on their preferred approach.  Those who prefer examples to introduce theory would do well to read Agnotology first, while those who prefer theory to be fleshed out with examples, should begin with Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.

The distinction I suggest above likely is not surprising, in large part because the editors and authors contributing to each book come out of different (although certainly related and often overlapping) academic circles.  Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance is edited by two professors of philosophy, and its contributors are overwhelmingly located in philosophy departments, whereas Agnotology is edited by professors of the history of science, and its contributors come from a somewhat more diverse collection of backgrounds, although they all share in common an interest in the history of science, from various backgrounds including philosophy, psychology, and journalism.  These varied backgrounds are evident in the approach to and examples chosen to elucidate the phenomenon of ignorance in which they all share an interest.  Here, I will examine the essays in each book, beginning with Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, for the simple reason that it was published prior to Agnotology.  The aim of this overview is to provide a clear picture of how each book complements the other to result in a pairing that provides an excellent first foray into this new topic, and would provide an excellent basis for a senior undergraduate or graduate course on topics in epistemology.

The essays in the first book, Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, are intended to “critically examine practices of not knowing that are linked to and often support racism” (3).  In other words, in this book, race specifically is understood to offer a window into thinking about ignorance, or to contextualize the examination of practices of not knowing.  Or, cast in another light, race issues are explored in this text because they represent a – or possibly even the – fundamental form of ignorance.  The six essays comprising the first section, “Theorizing Ignorance,” aim to develop theories that can explain why and how racialized ignorance is produced and sustained.

The section begins with the essay “White Ignorance” by Charles W. Mills, which is based on themes presented in his 1997 text, The Racial Contract. In this chapter, Mills theorizes the phenomenon of white ignorance in an attempt to “pin down … the idea of an ignorance, a non-knowing, that is not contingent, but in which race – white racism and/or white racial domination and their ramifications – plays a crucial causal role” (20).  He explores the ways white ignorance is manifest in and sustained by five dimensions of cognition: perception, conception, memory, testimony, and motivational group interest.  Of these five dimensions, Mills’s treatment of memory and testimony are particularly noteworthy, in part because of their overlap with and assistance in elucidating other approaches and chapters in the text.  Mills’s contribution promises to become a foundational text in further discussions and examinations of ignorance. Indeed, The Racial Contract is often credited as one of the first texts to identify ignorance as a topic worthy of investigation.  As editors Sullivan and Tuana note, Mills’s original text is “an exception to the neglect of racialized ignorance” (2).   The notable passage in the original text, quoted in the introduction to Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance as well as in many other places looking to tackle the issue of ignorance, reads as follows:

on matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made” (emphasis added; quoted in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, 2).

The introduction of the phenomenon of ignorance in The Racial Contract as a topic worthy of investigation, and its further development in the chapter included in this collection, likely explains the appearance of an almost identical version at the beginning of the “Theorizing Ignorance” section in Agnotology as well.  Those interested in either studying or teaching about the phenomenon of ignorance will find that Mills’s “White Ignorance” proves an excellent place to begin.
 
“Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types,” is Linda Martín Alcoff’s contribution to Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, which usefully builds upon work already done in the area of feminist epistemology to elaborate a typology of ignorances.  She suggests there are, broadly speaking, three types of epistemologies of ignorance.  The first is derived from the situatedness of knowers, the second type builds upon the insights of standpoint epistemology, and the third type of epistemology of ignorance is a systemic type, according to which knowing(s) and unknowing(s) serve to differentiate the powerful from the powerless in relation to a specific area of knowledge.  Although this third type overlaps with the previous two types of epistemologies of ignorance, in this case it is maintained (either actively or passively, or both in concert) by the structures and institutions of society for a specific reason, which will in turn vary according to the purposes determined by a society and the dominant and subordinate groups that inhabit it.  Alcoff also makes the further, normative claim that traditional epistemology is not suited to unearthing and judging ignorance because it is insufficiently reflexive.  That is, traditional epistemology does not pay sufficient attention to the “structural economic organization of society, its reigning paradigms, and the coherence between these paradigms and scientific methodology” (54).  Only a more reflexive epistemology than is currently available, one that incorporates the insights of critical theory and allows us to identify “the social-structural context for the production of historical modes of perception that result in ignorance” (54), will provide the basis from which to judge ignorance.  This philosophically robust claim of Alcoff’s, though likely to border on opaque for those unfamiliar with the work of Horkheimer or other critical theorists, sets up a thought-provoking position from which to continue reading this volume, particularly when considered alongside the other theoretical perspectives forwarded in the text.  The tension that results, which is made particularly clear by reading both this and the following chapter together, is both the benefit and the challenge of the pluralist approach the editors pursue.

“Ever Not Quite: Unfinished Theories, Unfinished Societies, and Pragmatism,” by Harvey Cormier, comprises the third chapter of this anthology.  In his essay, Cormier cautions against an uncritical pursuit of theories of ignorance because, as he puts it, “No systematic study will reveal the structures of our foolishness” (73).  Cormier suggests that this insight is made available by adopting a pragmatist perspective, which reveals that an uncareful or uncritical epistemology of ignorance is likely to invoke a problematic distinction between appearance and reality with its presumption that, with a better theoretical apparatus, it might be possible to see past appearances to reality and thereby correct practices of ignorance.  In other words, realizing that truths are built rather than grasped requires us to discard the appearance-reality distinction for a distinction between less and more useful, which is tempered by a pragmatist fallibilism that limits what will be revealed by any theory of ignorance.  Cormier echoes a point made by Alcoff, namely, that some forms of ignorance arise as a result of our situations and our situatedness.  Yet he makes the more radical claim that this may very well negate the value of the project of theorizing ignorance, a claim worthy of further investigation.  Although Cormier’s contribution to Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance focuses on debates within pragmatism at the expense of explaining his central point or continuing on to explore what other risks and assumptions might be revealed when examining the idea of epistemologies of ignorance from a pragmatist perspective, the warning he sounds is valuable nonetheless.

Alison Bailey’s “Strategic Ignorance” forms chapter four of Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.  In this contribution, Bailey offers an account of ignorance it would be hazardous to overlook: she suggests that ignorance can be wielded strategically by oppressed groups.  This strategic or subversive use of ignorance is not captured in Charles Mills’s account of (white) ignorance because the latter is limited by its reliance “the logic of purity,” a term Bailey borrows from María Lugones.  Social contract theory, on which Mills’s account of the Racial Contract depends, relies on this logic of purity because it is “intolerant of spatial ambiguity: it split-separates polities into white civilized space and wild savage lands occupied by nonwhites” (85).  That is, the ignorance identified by Mills’s Racial Contract is characterized as an inverted epistemology that can be corrected by simply reinverting the epistemology.  Bailey suggests that this is a problematic metaphor because it erases the possibility for strategic ignorance and resistant epistemologies, which is why she recommends turning to Lugones’s metaphor of “curdled logic” instead, which offers us “a more relational understanding of ignorance” (84) that requires us to think of ourselves as “curdled beings” (91).  Bailey’s chapter uses Lugones’s work to offer an important reminder that ignorance itself is a complex phenomenon, transcending our traditional understanding of its nature and role, and that its study must be attuned to such complexities.  This approach is carried on and enriched by the following chapter as well.

“Denying Relationality: Epistemology and Ethics and Ignorance,” by Sarah Lucia Hoagland, forms chapter five of Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.  The argument forwarded by Hoagland closely resembles that presented by Bailey, building upon the work of María Lugones to theorize ignorance.  For Hoagland, it is the denial of relationality that contributes to problematic forms of ignorance.  Relationalities, Hoagland argues, “are rendered invisible through an epistemology that presupposes autonomy and denies relationality between knower and known” (99).  As a result, it is not whiteness that is invisible because it is the norm, but rather white relationality and interdependence with peoples of color that white people are ignorant of.  Hoagland argues that the ignorance that emerges from the denial of relationality can be challenged via “complex communication” and “playful world travel,” concepts borrowed from Lugones, because these take place outside of and challenge the dominant logic, which only ever reinforces its own status.  She writes, “When there is engagement on terms not countenanced by the dominant logic, then relationality changes and so does who we are becoming” (110).  Although Hoagland’s position is not as clearly communicated as the similar argument forwarded in the previous chapter, the two chapters together provide a careful caution against or corrective to theories of (white) ignorance that are likely to prove overly simplistic.

Chapter six is “Managing Ignorance” by Elizabeth V. Spelman.  In this paper, Spelman suggests the contradictory beliefs and incompatible commitments involved in ignorance require careful management.  Though she uses an odd combination of analytic methods and literary examples to make her point, Spelman provides a unique perspective on the phenomenon of willful ignorance by exploring how individuals are forced to manage their own ignorance when faced with unhappy truths they do not care to admit.  She explores this point through the lens of James Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time, in which he indicts the ignorance of White America.  Spelman uses Baldwin’s text to show that, when there are costs and benefits associated with ignorance, strategies to manage that ignorance will need to be deployed.  Complicated propositional attitudes, like “W is quite happy about not believing g is true but unhappy about not believing g is false” (121), are common occurrences within the area of ignorance that require extensive management.  Understanding the management and commitment required to maintain ignorance that takes complicated forms such as “Her ignoring g allows her to stand by g’s being false, to be committed to g’s being false, without believing that g is false” (122) might be, the author suggests, one method for finding a way out of ignorance.

After these chapters comes Part II of the text: “Situating Ignorance.”  Where the first section of Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance sought to theorize ignorance, the seven chapters in this section, in the words of the editors, explore “some of the geographical, historical, and disciplinary sites in which racial ignorance has operated and often continues to operate” (6). The essays in this section are filled with examples and insights that serve to enrich the theoretical approaches offered in the first part of this text.  However, for those interested to find more accessible examples for teaching purposes, or to inform everyday conversations, the essays in Agnotology will serve this purpose more effectively than the papers in this second section of Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, as they are still far more theoretical and abstract than the papers in the other text.

The first chapter in this second section is “Race Problems, Unknown Publics, Paralysis, and Faith” by Paul C. Taylor.  In his contribution, Taylor considers the institutional, discursive, existential and volitional conditions that allow social ignorance to “take root and grow” (143).  Taylor opens by considering examples of social ignorance that result from racial stereotypes; “racial myths,” he argues, “make it easier for us to ignore the complex realities that our fellows inhabit and represent” (137).  That is, “race thinking” can function as a type of agnogenesis (to borrow a term from Agnotology).  However, Taylor contends that some forms of race thinking – in particular, the critical racialism of radical constructionism, according to which “each race comprises people who stand in similar relations to the stratifying mechanisms of white supremacy” (138) – can also help to “banish” social ignorance.  There are multiple benefits of radical constructionism, Taylor argues, which link up with work on ignorance in ways that simple “practical racialism” (“the idea that race talk is a useful tool for identifying the victims of racism” (140)) cannot.  Taylor fleshes out his argument by examining the political situation in Haiti at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a topic complicated by his personal connections to the country and its people.  As a result of these connections, Taylor’s chapter concludes more as a ponderous affair than a sustained argument, where he seems to be grappling with the realities of one’s own ignorance when one is made aware of it by the circumstances in which one finds oneself.

Chapter eight is “White Ignorance and Colonial Oppression: Or, Why I know So Little about Puerto Rico” by Shannon Sullivan.  Sullivan provides a particularly rich and accessible example of ignorance in the form of an historical overview that details the construction of “Porto Rico” – the “object of colonialist ignorance/knowledge” (158).  This example reveals the workings of what Sullivan calls “ignorance/knowledge,” a term she uses because it “denies, or at least places under suspicion, the purported self-master and self-transparency of knowledge, as if nothing properly escaped its grasp” (154).  Sullivan recounts the many ways ignorance is constructed and sustained by various institutions as part of the colonial project.  Making note specifically of the role of education in perpetuating ignorance/knowledge, Sullivan explores how Puerto Ricans – because of the education they receive from their colonizers – become Americanized, masculinized versions of themselves, even to themselves.  That is, not only are those who inhabit the United States ignorant of Puerto Rico; through colonization, so too are Puerto Ricans.  However, Sullivan also points out that “Puerto Ricans have been effective in using ignorance/knowledge of them as Porto Ricans against itself for their own benefit” (163).  That is, ignorance/knowledge can be a tool of resistance, and not just of (colonialist) oppression.   Sullivan argues that the practice of jaiba politics in Puerto Rico, which “seeks to achieve its goals through ambiguity and subversion” (165), presents a picture of how ignorance/knowledge can be used in opposition to dominance.  Sullivan’s is an excellent paper that provides a careful account of how knowledge/ignorance operates in complex social-political-historical cases, therefore providing a useful example that retains a commitment to careful theoretical work.

“John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Alain Locke: A Case Study in White Ignorance and Intellectual Segregation” by Frank Margonis comprises the ninth chapter of Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.  Though more useful for those who locate themselves in the pragmatist tradition than in others, this chapter provides an illuminating case study that demonstrates the value of genealogy and of using multiple lenses to evaluate the works of major figures in our philosophical heritages to illuminate the ignorances that shaped their work and that, by extension, shape our own work as well.  The specific case to which Margonis turns his attention involves how Dewey was affected by and contributed to ignorance about the role of race in American history.  Margonis suggests that, despite Dewey’s explicit opposition to and work against racism, his silences around pivotal aspects of American history, such as Roosevelt’s imperialism, federal antilynching legislation, and race riots, are “structured silences, characteristic silences: the epistemology of ignorance that Mills rightly condemns” (174).  Thus, Dewey’s vision of American democracy is a distinctly white vision of democracy, and the author challenges contemporary philosophers to be attentive to the likelihood of incorporating such assumptions into one’s own views when deploying the situation-specific tools of a philosopher like Dewey.

Chapter ten is Lucius T. Outlaw Jr.’s “Social Ordering and the Systematic Production of Ignorance.”  Outlaw’s aim in this chapter is to show how ignorance is legitimated through social and political institutions and organizations.  He focuses on how education – and academic philosophy in particular – contributes to and stabilizes ignorance of “White Racial Supremacy” in America.  Such legitimation occurs, for example, through the maintenance of a particular philosophical canon – he points to Tocqueville’s Democracy in America as an example of a text included in the canon despite its racist presumptions.  Outlaw expresses amazement at the extent to which the rigors of thought definitive of philosophical inquiry “have not been applied … to the substantial conditioning influences of raciality on the makeup of the ‘communities of discourse’ constituting the discipline” (203).  Moreover, despite the emergence of potentially transformative critiques within philosophy, such critiques have been simply relegated to the margins.  He argues, therefore, that “we need, among other things, a very substantial re-education and redirection of knowledge workers and knowledge work in academic philosophy” (210).  Outlaw’s is an excellent contribution to this anthology, in particular as a complement to Margonis’s chapter, in revealing the deep and problematic racist assumptions of our canon, our departments, our educational institutions, and, as a result, our selves.  Yet for all its eye-opening fervor, an example of how education could be helpful, in more specific terms, would have benefited this chapter, and provided a basis upon which to build further inquiry and critique.

Lorraine Code’s “The Power of Ignorance” is chapter eleven of Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.  In this densely-packed contribution, Code reflects on the operations of ignorance through examples from literature.  Using George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda and James Mill’s The History of British India as examples of the multiple ways ignorance shapes practices of and generates puzzles about knowing, Code reveals that “the idea of ignorance brings real human knowers and their capacities and responsibilities squarely into the picture” (227).  In short, the study of ignorance contributes to and helps strengthen feminist epistemologists’ projects aimed at showing the importance of the subject and of communities in building knowledge and knowledge practices.  Thus, while the study of ignorance “is best conceived as a genealogical inquiry into the power relations and structures of power that sustain, condone, or condemn ignorance,” (227-228) it goes beyond this explanatory function to produce a model of inquiry “with a stronger descriptive-empirical and social-historical component than epistemology in an authorized sense would countenance” (228).  In other words, epistemologies of ignorance, Code argues, should be empirical and genealogical, but this itself has implications for our understandings of how epistemology should be conducted.  This is, in fact, the strength of studying ignorance, a point that Code’s piece is invaluable for making.

“On Needing Not to Know and Forgetting What One Never Knew: The Epistemology of Ignorance in Fanon’s Critique of Sartre,” a shorter contribution by Robert Bernasconi, forms chapter twelve of the anthology.  Bernasconi identifies in Sartre’s “Black Orpheus” (originally the preface to an anthology of African and West Indian poets that appeared in 1948) an ignorance that derives from his attempt to locate the negritude movement as a moment in the dialectical movement from white supremacy to a raceless society.  By engaging with Fanon’s critique of Sartre’s “Black Orpheus,” Bernasconi suggests Sartre “made the mistake of locating the black agents he was addressing within a narrative” (232) when he was not suitably situated to do so.  Fanon’s critique of Sartre is an example that reveals there is a beneficial sort of ignorance necessary to experience: phronesis.  In placing negritude within a dialectical movement – in intellectualizing black experience – Sartre replaces this good form of ignorance, phronesis, with another, bad form of ignorance – his own ignorance that results from his lack of experience.  It was Sartre’s social identity as a white man and philosopher that was significant in this case; a fact Bernasconi argues we must be more attuned to in assessing knowledge claims.  Bernasconi therefore offers a challenge.  He argues,

the urgent task of establishing the extent and depth of the white man’s ignorance of how the targets of racism suffer – just as the targets of sexism do – is still largely ignored by white philosophers in their attempts to contribute to race theory.  Fanon’s critique of Sartre … shows how even some of the best-intentioned whites failed.  The stories of their failures serve as an appropriate warning (238).

Bernasconi’s contribution to this volume provides a powerful reminder, similar to some of the chapters that precede it, that we philosophers must be cognizant of the ignorances in our own work that often result from our social identities and situatedness.  This call is echoed in the following chapter as well.

Chapter thirteen, and the final chapter of the volume, is “On the Absence of Biology in Philosophical Considerations of Race” by Stephanie Malia Fullerton.  Fullerton argues in this stimulating piece that the philosophical denial of a biological basis of race, which can be traced, the author suggests, to the work of Kwame Anthony Appiah, serves the purpose it is intended to serve, namely, to undermine the “ontological legitimacy of race as a basis for human classification” (243).  However, the advancement of a social constructivist view of race leads to a worrisome and harmful form of ignorance within philosophic race theory insofar as this area of inquiry ends up overlooking “specific features of the empirical record, not to mention pervasive practices, … in favor of broad disclaimers relevant to only a narrowly applicable model of human biological difference” (242-243).  In other words, while philosophers have tended to dismiss race as a topic worthy of biological investigation, work within the biological sciences has proceeded to investigate race in terms of population variation, an investigation outside of which philosophers of race have placed themselves.  This philosophical position of self-imposed ignorance is likely to prove harmful, Fullerton contends, because “the insistence that race has no biological basis therefore places biological ‘facts’ about race outside the realm of critique and denies the philosophical analysis of the biological and social constitution of racial identity” (251).  Fullerton’s piece, like many of the papers in this section, provides a striking reminder that we philosophers are not immune from troublesome forms of ignorance – some of them of our own making.  It also provides an opportunity to ask some important questions, most of which go unasked and unanswered in this volume, including the question of whether and when some forms of ignorance might be warranted or necessary.  Such questions surely could form the basis of much further work in this exciting and evocative new area of inquiry.

What is most striking about Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance is its unity.  It has the feeling (unsurprisingly) of having been preceded by discussion and deliberation among the authors, a feeling too often lacking in thematic anthologies.  As such, it makes the text an exceptional foundation for a course, where each piece can be considered in light of the other material already considered.  Moreover, as already mentioned, Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance would make an excellent pairing with Agnotology, to which I now turn my attention. 

Agnotology is divided into three sections, a reverse ordering to Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, beginning with concrete examples and moving on to theorizing ignorance.  After an introductory chapter from one of the editors, Robert N. Proctor, comes Part I, entitled “Secrecy, Selection, and Suppression,” Part II, entitled “Lost Knowledge, Lost Worlds,” and Part III, “Theorizing Ignorance.”  As with the previous text, Agnotology emerged out of workshops on ignorance, specifically at Pennsylvania State and Stanford Universities in 2003 and 2005.

Proctor’s introduction, entitled “Agnotology: A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production of Ignorance (and Its Study),” outlines the aim of the project as thinking “about the conscious, unconscious, and structural production of ignorance, its diverse causes and conformations, whether brought about by neglect, forgetfulness, myopia, extinction, secrecy, or suppression” (3).  He starts off the conversation by proposing three specific types of ignorance: “ignorance as native state (or resource), ignorance as lost realm (or selective choice), and ignorance as deliberately engineered and strategic ploy (or active construct)” (3).  The first names the traditional understanding of ignorance, as a blank or void (often naturally occurring), meant to be overcome – the type of ignorance that fuels the scientific enterprise.  The second refers to the ignorance that arises from attention, neglect, and selectivity.  The third type of ignorance is “something that is made, maintained, and manipulated by means of certain arts and sciences” (8).  He goes on to outline some paradigm cases of non-traditional understandings of ignorance, which are covered in greater detail in the volume, including the manufactured ignorance of the tobacco industry and military classification, as well as the possibility of “not knowing” as a form of resistance.  The introduction finishes with an explanation of how the term “agnotology” was decided upon, as “the historicity and artifactuality of non-knowing and the non-known – and the potential fruitfulness of studying such things” (27).

Part I, “Secrecy, Selection, and Suppression” opens with “Removing Knowledge: The Logic of Modern Censorship” by Peter Galison.  In this chapter, Galison explores the “classified universe” (37) – the vast and proliferating collection of classified documents that has emerged after World War II – suggesting there is likely more classified knowledge than there is unclassified (in the United States).    The “Establishment of Secrecy” (49), Galison suggests, faces a number of dilemmas – from the fact that it is possible for one and the same person to create knowledge that is classified and at the same time not have the appropriate clearance to read that information, to the difficulties of determining how much to classify without impeding industry and technology.   These dilemmas highlight some of the very real problems involved with manufactured ignorance, including the immense financial cost of maintaining the “antiepistemology” of classification, the threat to democracy it enables, the impediment to industry and technology, the barriers imposed on universities, and the challenge to intelligence-gathering for security purposes.  Galison presents statistics that are staggering their scope, forcing us to rethink assumptions about public and private, about knowledge and its transmission, and about democracy.  While this is the strength of this chapter, the fact that the author himself does not address any of these issues is a weakness.

The second essay in this section is “Challenging Knowledge: How Climate Science Became a Victim of the Cold War” by Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway.  Like the first chapter, this chapter is heavy on historical fact and light on analysis, but is valuable for encouraging the reader to ask important questions, and seek answers to those questions (possibly in a text like Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance).  Oreskes and Conway explore how the George C. Marshall Institute, since the early 1990s, “has insisted that the evidence of global climate change is uncertain, incomplete, insufficient, or otherwise inadequate” (60).  In short, the Marshall Institute, the authors contend, developed the tactic of “balanced reporting” – where minority views are expected to have equal coverage in the media – in their support of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) during the 1980s, and has carried that tactic over to the issue of global warming.  More specifically, the tactic is to “convince the public, through mass media campaigns, to accept an interpretation well outside the mainstream of professional science” (69).  The same tactics were used, by the same people, “in denying that cancer causes smoking [sic], that pollution causes acid rain, that CFCs destroy ozone, and that greenhouse gas emissions are causing global warming” (76).  What ties all these “causes” together is a political ideology, the authors argue – the Marshall Institute maintains and enforces ignorance using this tactic to sustain their political ideology, market fundamentalism.  In essence, uncertainty has become a political tactic, a way to influence policy decisions.

David Michaels’s “Manufactured Uncertainty: Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment” is the third chapter in Part I.  In this thought-provoking chapter, replete with interesting examples and insights, Michaels explores the role certainty plays in contemporary medicine and public health debates.  Based on the assumption that “debating the science is much easier and more effective than debating the policy” (92), big business, Michaels argues, has become adept at manufacturing ignorance about science in order to attain their policy goals.  Michaels brings together the examples of tobacco, global warming, and toxic chemicals such as beryllium (used in the production of nuclear weapons systems), to support his claim that a “new regulatory paradigm is required” (102).  Michaels sets out the first steps for such a paradigm, including requirements that federal regulatory agencies develop requirements for research integrity, which means they should be given the authority to inquire into who pays for studies “and whether these studies would have seen the light of day if the sponsor didn’t approve the results” (102-103).  Michaels concludes that “those charged with protecting the public health [must] realize that the desire for absolute scientific certainty is both counterproductive and futile” (104).  That is, we need a new regulatory paradigm that focuses more on values in policy than just science, which is fallible and easily manipulated.

“Coming to Understand: Orgasm and the Epistemology of Ignorance,” by Nancy Tuana, comprises the final chapter in this section.  Tuana uses case studies of knowledge and ignorance about female genitalia and orgasm to demonstrate that understanding ignorance “has the potential to reveal the role of power in the construction of what is known” (110).  Tuana does an excellent job of tracing the complex genealogy of female sexuality to reveal the pushes and pulls involved in the construction of power/knowledge-ignorance – in her words, “to understand what ‘we’ do and do not know about women’s orgasms, and why” (112).  This includes the women’s health movement, which has met with varied success in part because, “if you discover new knowledge about something others do not take seriously, do not expect your knowledge projects to have much effect” (131).  Though Tuana does not claim to have presented a comprehensive theory or epistemology of ignorance, it is unfortunate that she does not explore in greater detail the central theoretical claims she outlines at the end of the chapter.  In particular, the following claim would have been well-served by further investigation: “We should not assume that the epistemic tools we have developed for the study of knowledge or the theories we have developed concerning knowledge practices will transfer to the study of ignorance” (140).  Although this chapter does not purport to be a theoretical intervention, the theoretical claims included would have benefited from more than a brief statement at the end of the chapter. Whether these claims might be satisfactorily answered in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance I leave up to the reader to discern.

Part II, “Lost Knowledge, Lost Worlds,” begins with co-editor Londa Schiebinger’s contribution, “West Indian Abortifacients and the Making of Ignorance.”  In this chapter, Schiebinger explores “how gender relations in Europe and its West Indian colonies guided European naturalists as they selected particular plants and technologies for transport back to Europe” (149).  She focuses specifically on the peacock flower, examining how knowledge of its use as an abortifacient was not brought back to Europe by botanist explorers, instead slipping through “agnotological fissures” (154).  She suggests three reasons for this ignorance: the fact that colonial enterprises were largely male, that controlling fertility worked against imperial interests, and that there were challenging disciplinary and professional divides (156-157).  Schiebinger concludes with the following query: “One wonders what easy, safe, and effective methods of birth control and abortion have been lost to women because innocent plants have become entangled in the web of history and wide-ranging cultural politics” (159).  At the end of the chapter, the author tells of trips to the Caribbean to learn more about contemporary use of abortifacients.  This is an interesting section, and it is unfortunate that it is so short, as the chapter would have benefited from increased attention to the possibility of ignorance as a form of resistance, as it appears elsewhere in this volume, and in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.

Adrienne Mayor’s “Suppression of Indigenous Fossil Knowledge: From Claverack, New York, 1705 to Agate Springs, Nebraska, 2005” forms the central chapter of this section.  Mayor explores the complex interactions between ignorance and the discovery and recording of fossils.  She notes how striking it is “that the contributions of Native Americans in the first scientific investigations of fossils are missing in modern histories of paleontology” (164).  In other words, despite evidence that there existed communication between Native Americans and Euro-Americans about fossil discoveries, contemporary histories of paleontology do not reflect this communication.   This is a result, Mayor argues, of purposeful omission, which she explores using five case studies.  Such omission can arise from either the Euro-American perspective as willful ignorance arising out of an oppressive framework, or the Native American perspective as an act of resistance.  Unfortunately, of all the chapters in the first two sections, this chapter suffers from the least amount of analysis, which would have been really helpful and worthwhile.

The final chapter of this section is Alison Wylie’s “Mapping Ignorance in Archaeology: The advantages of Historical Hindsight.”  Wylie looks at the various factors shaping knowledge and ignorance, specifically by looking at the history of the development of archaeology as a field, and tracing the movement of knowledge and ignorance through four moments.  The factors influencing these moments include empirical and ontological factors (the limitations imposed upon the knower by the nature of the data), theoretical considerations (with an emphasis “on theory building as a necessary framework for articulating interesting, productive questions, fueled by an impatience with ‘unimaginative observation’ for its own sake” (190) which emerged in the 1960s and 70s), and the sociopolitics of archaeology (emerging during the 1980s, which emphasized how the theoretical moves during the 60s and 70s involved “the projection of contemporary preoccupations and expectations onto past lifeways and cultural formations that may bear little relation to anything familiar from the ethnohistoric present” (191)).   She proceeds to explore ways to intervene in the construction of ignorance, developed out of Trouillot, and outlined in relation to earthen mound sites.  She concludes, “focusing on how it is produced and maintained holds the potential for systematic, empirically and theoretically informed well-informed calibration of what we know” (199-200).  Wylie’s contribution is more theoretical than the other chapters in the first two sections of the volume, although at times, it is too much so.  Yet the framework she provides is quite useful in helping us to understand more fully why it is that ignorance might be an important and valuable area of study.

Parts I and II of the volume come together well to present a compelling case for the study of ignorance.  However, relying as it does more heavily on example than theory, it is so far left up to the reader to piece together what might emerge as the most salient points of a theory of ignorance, or the most important facets of our knowledge practices requiring a new field of study, agnotology.  The third section of the volume, “Theorizing Ignorance,” is intended to offer an account of what such theories might look like, and what might constitute a field of agnotology.

“Social Theories of Ignorance,” by Michael J. Smithson, opens Part III of the volume.  Smithson’s chapter offers various candidates for “orienting strategies” and “core concerns” (224) that can shape inquiry in agnotology, in the hopes that “a working consensus about the basic nature of the field of inquiry” (224) will enable an interdisciplinary collaboration into this emerging area of inquiry.  As such, this chapter is dedicated to finding a basis for this consensus, and developing such orienting strategies and core concerns.  He opens by providing a literature review in an effort to nail down a set of terminology or nomenclature that might be considered useful, as well as the benefits or drawbacks of defining and presenting a taxonomy for ignorance, in a new field of agnotology.  He also seeks to present and defend a “social theory of ignorance,” which he argues “should focus on ignorance with sociocultural origins” (214).  Although this chapter recommends the development of an interdisciplinary collaboration in the field of agnotology, it is not itself an interdisciplinary effort, drawing mainly on work in the social sciences, and rarely venturing into other fields.  And though the chapter has passing mentions of the importance and relevance of philosophical questions, they are not explored in any great detail.  What this paper mostly clearly reveals is the lack of interdisciplinarity that exists between the humanities and social sciences.  The different meanings for the same terms, as used across these disciplines is at times surprising, and reveals one of the few areas where a weakness might reside in pairing this text with Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.

Charles W. Mills’s “White Ignorance,” an almost identical essay to the one found in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, is the next chapter in the “Theorizing Ignorance” section of this volume.  I won’t revisit it here except to say that, as a part of this specific collection of papers, it offers what might be the best balance of theory and example to provide a perspective that both offers original insight, and encourages further insights on the part of the reader.

David Magnus’s “Risk Management versus the Precautionary Principle: Agnotology as a Strategy in the Debate over Genetically Engineered Organisms” is the third chapter of this section, and one of the better papers in the book.  In this chapter, Magnus shows how regulatory regimes are impacted by ignorance.  He uses examples of policy decisions to show how risk assessment and the precautionary principle have led to various deployments of ignorance, in service, sometimes, of opposing views.  In other words, he explores how ignorance is encoded into policy, and used strategically for various political goals.  In short, Magnus shows how uncertainty can be used in support of new technologies, and also by those who seek to limit new technologies; its manufacture is malleable.  He also points toward “religious agnotology,” “in which we are urged to recognize our ignorance as a fundamental limitation on human experience, and we are urged not to intervene in matters where only God has knowledge” (260).  In other words, not just science, but religion as well, has a voice in agnotology.  Such a view would recognize that “the precautionary principle can be seen as a moral and religious expression of appropriate humility in the face of human ignorance” (261).  Magnus also introduces the concept of “values agnotology,” where ignorance is constructed “in the realm of values – by denying the existence or relevance of anything seen as ‘nonscientific’ – into the regulatory risk assessment process” (263).  Magnus’s piece aptly demonstrates the complexities of ignorance, the (political) purposes it can serve, and how it does, can, and should impact policy decisions in the regulatory realm.  Although this chapter still falls short of the bar for “theoretical” set out by Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, it remains an insightful piece that ought not be overlooked.

The volume finishes with “Smoking Out Objectivity: Journalistic Gears in the Agnotology Machine” by Jon Christensen, another excellent paper that upsets expectations and shows how prized epistemic values such as objectivity can be (mis)used toward political ends.  The author uses the example of “the tobacco industry’s development of agnogenesis through public relations and journalism” to show how these values are easily manipulated. He points out the ironies of how protections developed for journalism led to their being pawns in political wars.  It is worth quoting Christensen at length to get an idea of the position he forwards:

It is one of the ironies of this history that objectivity, a professional code meant, in part, to free journalists from the manipulations of the new field of public relations in the early twentieth century, would in the end prove one of the most useful tools for the professional manipulators of news.  Another irony is that a code of balance, meant to create a space for newspapers outside of the confines of the partisan politics of parties, which developed a the same time as an emerging trust in the empiricism of science, would leave journalists ill equipped when scientific evidence itself was politicized” (270).

Christensen suggests that new journalistic values, strategies and forms, such as the narrative form, and investigative journalism, can be used as correctives for, or counteract problematic uses of, “fairness,” “balance,” and “objectivity,” which tend to be accomplices to agnogenesis.  Further explanation of the alternative offered by the author would have been helpful, but overall, this paper provides an apt note on which to finish the volume.

In sum, Agnotology is an excellent volume, more sociological in orientation than Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, and therefore in some ways, more accessible.  It is, however, less obviously unified than the other.  This isn’t to say that the chapters are disconnected, only that the connections between them do not seem as consciously undertaken.  Indeed, the repetition of specific examples, without mention or acknowledgement of that repetition, is striking.  How much this might take away from the text is an open question, although I would not be surprised if a more deliberate undertaking in the creation, compilation and delivery of the chapters would have enhanced the final product.  As mentioned at the outset, these two books together would form an excellent basis for a class on ignorance and its study at the senior undergraduate or graduate level, including classes with students from disciplines other than philosophy, as Agnotology in particular is a very accessible text.  The order in which the texts, and the individual papers within them, are presented, would be up to the individual presenting the material, although the choice will likely come down to a preference for either theory before practice, or practice before theory.  My preference and recommendation would be for the latter, since the rich examples in Agnotology are likely to get students interested in the questions and issues that inform the theoretical investigations in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.

Susan Dieleman recently completed her PhD in Philosophy at York University in Toronto, Canada, in the areas of feminist philosophy, pragmatism, and social epistemology.  She is currently working toward an MA in Public Policy and Administration at Ryerson University, with a focus on issues at the intersection of social epistemology, deliberative democracy, and the philosophy of public policy.

Contact details: susan.dieleman@ryerson.ca

References

Proctor, Robert N. and Londa Schiebinger, eds.  2008.  Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance.  Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rock Ethics Institute. 2004.  “Ethics and Epistemologies of Ignorance.”  Accessed January 13, 2012.  http://www.psu.edu/dept/rockethics/events/eei/index.htm.

Sullivan, Shannon and Nancy Tuana, eds.  2007.  Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany: State University of New York Press.

The British Society for the History of Science.  2003.  “Agnatology: The Cultural Production of  Ignorance.”  Accessed January 13, 2012. http://www.bshs.org.uk/agnatology-the-cultural-production-of-ignorance/.

Wettersten, John [2012]. ‘The Social Scientific Study of Rationality:
A Reply to Joseph Agassi’
(PDF)
The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
social-epistemology.com/

The Social Scientific Study of Rationality:
A Reply to Joseph Agassi

John Wettersten, Universität Mannheim

(Editor’s Note: John Wettersten’s article “The Rationality of Extremists” appears in Social Epistemology 26.1 (2012) available through Taylor & Francis Online. Please see Joseph Agassi’s “Reply to ‘The Rationality of Extremists’ by John Wettersten”)

In his comment on my essay on the rationality of extremists, Joseph Agassi has sought, first, to explain the theoretical framework in which my research has taken place, second, to use this explanation to appraise the results of my research, which he finds of some value, and third, to determine what consequences it may have for good or effective reactions to extremism today. In regard to the first task he describes the theoretical background of contemporary social scientific research. He then interprets my own research program as a response to the establishment’s discussion of established programs. This is, however, a far too narrow portrayal of how my research developed: it is in fact a theoretical response to fallibilist versions of research in the social science, including Agassi’s, which I regard as defective. Agassi ignores this crucial aspect of my research. After erroneously portraying my research of extremism as a mere addition to examples given by himself and Jarvie and in accord with their program, he turns to the second task of appraising my work. In this appraisal he limits his descriptions of my contributions to specific additions to the understanding of extremists, without any new view of rationality as social, as I have maintained it is. He places my work, however, deeply in conventional discussions of rationality, including fallibist ones. He ignores the fact that have I sought to improve such views by adding to them the importance of studies of the social impact of established theories of rationality; this addition is needed in order to overcome difficulties they face. In regard to the third task, he seeks to draw consequences from my research about what it might say about the task of overcoming extremism today. This third task seems, of course, a worthy exercise; but there is no gaurantee of progress. In this case his discussion goes a bit awry, because there are differences between Agassi’s view of how rationality is and/or should be studied, on the one hand, and my view of such matters, on the other hand. In my reply, then, I wish to spell out some differences between our views of the research of rationality, which have consequences for (1) the understanding and appraisal of my work, (2) the consequences for the appraisal of extremism given my work and (3) the ability we might have of limiting the social impact of extremism.

1. How Agassi sets his problems

Agassi’s comment starts with a seemingly simple and easily accepted, albeit quite general, purported description of the place of my research in today’s intellectual context. I investigate. Agassi says, ‘rationality’. But, there are many differing ways of investigating various aspects of rationality, he here takes no notice of such differences. He further says, that I begin with a principle, that action is always explained as the outcome of some ‘rational’ decision. There are, of course, many ways of reading this ‘principle’, which I never stated in my essay. Though I do hold that all directed action can be partially explained by the partial rationality of the acting persons, this is significantly more limited statement than that which Agassi attributes to me. But to complain all too seriously at this point my very well be too quick. I might note, however, that Agassi simply ignores my own explanations of how my research program fits in today’s intellectual context and of its relation to historical and contemporary alternatives. My own explanation is presented in my essay, but, without explaining why, he substitutes his own, contrary alternative explanation, with no mention of mine.

2. Agassi’s portrayal of theoretical problems about social scientific research without fallibilism today.

Agassi proceeds by describing what he takes to be central problems of the social scientific investigation of ‘rationality’ today. The three problems he mentions have, indeed, played significant roles in the history of social scientific methodology up until the present. The first problem he mentions is whether all rational action is successful action. This is an unfortunate problem, which results from traditional theories of rationality as proof. If all rationality is proof, then all rational action must be successful: it is based on proven assumptions. Of course I reject this assumption that rationality is only possible, when proof is possible. Having long ago decided, on which side of this issue I stand, it has played no important role in the development of my research.

The second problem which Agassi portrays is whether rational actions can take into account, as causal factors of the making of decisions, social conditions in which decisions occur. Of course they can; but this point, although Agassi portrays it as avant-garde, is hardly questioned by anyone. In some social scientific research it is merely conflated with portrayals of the selection of problems.

The third dispute is whether the rationality principle can be applied to societies, that is, can actions of societies be deemed rational, because they are the outcome of rational decisions? As stated here, this question is once again quite vague. Agassi does not explain here what counts as a rational decision. Popper had, indeed, two theories of rationality. One was a mere version of methodological individualism: all individuals are rational in the sense that they act on the basis of their beliefs, their aims and the logic of their situations. Popper quite correctly separates this theory of rational action from his second theory of rationality as the pursuit of truth: all rationality is critical and without justification. Agassi slides from one to the other without explaining just what is meant. I have argued elsewhere that Popper’s two-sided approach to rationality is a mistake: the rational actions of individuals are highly influenced by competing theories of rationality as the pursuit of truth, and these are, of course, quite often quite misguided. Agassi also does not explain whether a social decision can be deemed a rational decision of a society, when it is the product of a collection of individual rational decisions, but nevertheless quite unsuccessful. But we can here leave these questions aside to turn to Agassi’s portrayal of my approach to the investigation of rationality.

3. Is my study of the connection between rationality and extremism one further example of Agassi’s and Jarvie’s normative studies of the rationality of dogmatism and irrationality, or is it part of a competing research program in the social sciences, which studies the social influence of established theories of rationality due to their influence on how individuals think?

My approach to the study of rationality is, according to Agassi, avant-garde, but no innovation. Whereas the traditional established theory of rational actions views aims, pursued by individuals, as given, as exogenous, I observe that they are to a high degree socially determined. Social scientists do quite regularly take aims as given, but they often do not bother to ask to what degree they are socially determined. In the past there have been, of course, thinkers such as Gunnar Myrdahl who have developed such views and ‘keeping up with the Jones’ has, for example, been much discussed. Perhaps such considerations are less intensively studied today than they once were, but they keep turning up in poliltical analyses and in political-cum-economic analyses. From an historical point of view Weber’s theory of the rise of capitalism as a product of the adherance of individuals to the socially established Calvinist ethics is such an example.

When Agassi describes the view, according to which social conditions play a role in determing rational action, which he regards as avant-garde, he leaves aside that important aspect of it, which I regard as my own innovation: established theories of rationality determine to a degree how people think. There is no virtually universal human thought process as is presumed by methodological individualism. Whatever general psychological basis for thought there is, this basis is always combined by individuals with other factors and these varying combinations lead to signficant variances in individual thought processes. Examining, how individuals steer their directed thought processes, and what the consequences of their approaches are, pose new and important tasks for the social sciences. One way one erroneous theory of rationality influences thought processes is the connection I have described between it and extremism.

We then, says Agassi, come to the question: What is the rationality of extremism? This problem, Agassi claims, gains import, because extremists may change their extremist views, thus they make decisions which are not rational. Individualists then turn, he suggests, to psychological explanations as alternative explanations of extremism. They deny the role of social factors. But we should ask what social conditions lead to extremism, as I have advocated.

The trouble that Agassi sees here, is that rationality does not as yet help us avoid extremism. He proceeds, then, to offer his own, above all psychological conjectures about the attraction of extreme views, and attraction which he even finds in physics. He also provides an explanation of how the adherance to extremism, when it seems to fail, can be maintained. When it fails, the sacrifice that has been made can be said not to have been thorough enough. (I do note this in my essay.) Baconian philosophy, Agassi reminds us, illustrates such a procedure.

I find this observation quite insightful and useful. But the shift which Agassi makes from the application of theories of rationality as a social factor which encourages extremism to psychological factors as their real cause goes too far: many psychological factors can be, and often are, combined with the use of a traditionally established, but nevertheless, erroneous theories of rationality; and these combinations can cause and shape extremist views in various contexts. The fact that the use of a traditonal theory of rationality can be combined with the adoption of various extreme positions is no sign of its unimportance for any.

What does the example of Baconian doctrine blocking the avoidance of an extreme view show about my research? On Agassi’s view it shows that rationality alone does not suffice to avoid a kind of trap, which keeps individuals in extremist positions even when their actions, guided by their extremist views, go awry. But this is not what I claim. I have argued that the established theory of rationality not only does not suffice to avoid such a trap, but even creates conditions which encourage its occurrence. But this does not show that rationailty, when correctly understoond, does not avoid the trap, which Agassi discusses. I offer a social analysis of one bad consequence of the application of the traditional, errouneous view of rationality. This consequence is due to the fact that this theory mistakenly demands comprehensive thought processes. This consequence requires a change in the theory of rationality, and not merely the correction of some misguided applications of it. Agassi does explain that I do point to confusions about rationality, and agrees with this observation.

Agassi claims that rationality does not suffice to avoid a trap of extremism. He sees this trap as a special case of what Popper called ‘reinforced dogmatism’, thereby negating any claim by me to have viewed the connection between rationality and extremism in some original theoretical way, as opposed to merely finding a new example of Popper’s theoretical observation. But it is not true that rationality, when properly conceived as critical, does not suffice to avoid a trap of extremism. It does do that. It is only when rationality is erroneously conceived, as it is on the standard view, that it does not do that. I am really not sure about this; it seems that Agassi flip-flops between the two views.

Agassi says further that he and I.C. Jarvie, in accord with Popper’s observation of what he called ‘reinforced dogmatism’, tried to square rationality with dogmatism. Thereby they give a degree of rationality, conceved of as the pursuit of truth, to intellectual strategies, which Popper would have simply viewed as irrational. Agassi does not here mention that they argued that rationality can have degrees, and that even dogmatism or irrationality can have rational aspects, that is, can be judged to be, even if to a small degree, an exercise in rationality. This nice. But this is only then possible, when rationality is properly described as critical. I did not venture into this endeavor.

My discussion of the rationality of extremism should, on Agassi’s interpretation of it, be a mere addition of one further example to the discussion already developed by himself and Jarvie: Agassi suggests that I add a new example to the list of cases of limited rationality, that Popper began, and that he and Jarvie have already significantly developed. Aggassi suggests that I explain the rationality of extremism, that is, I explain how extremism meets to some, even if to some low degree, the standards of rationality as properly conceived, that is, as critical. The analyses of Agassi and Jarvie are fine results. But my discussion of the linkagea between a traditonal theory of rationality and extremism was by no means intended to add any new such analysis of partial rationality to extremists, which Agassi and Jarvie had offered of dogmatism and irrationalism. I did not show that extremists were, in fact, to some degree rational, when judged from the point of view of some correct theory of rationality. I merely wanted to explain how some extremists think that they are rational, because they observe that their extremism conforms to an erroneous, but socially accepted, standard of rationality. The evaluation of the degree to which they might be rational in accord with some theory of rationality accepted as a norm, is a different problem. But even here I think there is a more important problem concerning the degree of rationality brought about by specific social standards of rationality. This is not a traditional question such as that posed by Agassi and Jarvie of the degree of rationality of some thought processes used by individuals when judged by the normative theory of rationality as critical, but rather the degree of rationality of discussions between individuals, who adhere to specific canons of rational thought..

Agassi ends this portion of his comment with a discussion of the problem, how do we explain how extremism often wins influence? The reason for the influence of extremism, Agassi says, is that individuals choose to meet the highest possible standards in order to achieve the best possible result. This is a quite general attaction, says Agassi. I presume he views this attraction to be a universal psychological trait, though I do not. The explanation that the attraction of extremism is due to the psychological fact that all humans try to meet the highest possible standard does not depend on some erroneous theory of rationality, such as my analysis of some extremists does. It is, Agassi also notes, very hard to recommend lowering standards, and this recommendation is needed to fight the persisance of extremism. This is true, but a different problem, than that problem which I have investigated.

4. Talmon’s social analysis of rationality

Insofar as he goes in his description of my analysis of Talmon, Agassi describes my position very nicely; there is little of significance to criticize in his portrayal. There is, however, something rather important to add. On my view Talmon’s description of the social consequences of the Enlightenment revolution presumes that this revolution properly followed what is, in fact, an erroneous theory of rationality. And Talmon himself follows that same established and erroneous theory of rationality, which some extremists use to rationalize their views. Tolman’s use of this erroneous theory as a framework for his research leads him, first, to mistaken appraisals of the limits of rationality, then, to erroneous conclusions about the seeming inevitable historical development of the Enlightenment into totalitarian poliltical systems, and finally to his unhappy social and political analyses of Israel.

5. Explaining and fighting extremism

In the last two paragraphs of his commentary Agassi turns to the problem of explaining the prevalence of extremism today, a problem my essay really does not touch on, and which it was not intended to explain. His explanation is that extremism is simple, and that this is a factor of its appeal. But, whether this explanation explains the extent of extremism is rather dubious, since many other factors are in play. Just how and when which factors and to how high a degree are influential in which societies pose serious social scientific problems. Agassi notes, that I note, that it is hard to demand the lowering of standards. (That rationality can be improved by lowering standards is a significant contribution of Agassi to the dicussion of rationality, which he has made elsewhere.) This difficulty of demanding the lowering of standards or rationality is real; it is very difficult to change the established theory of rationality. (A significant change in this direction frightened even Bertrand Russell; for that reason he refused to budge in regard to his demand for justification in the theory of rationality, which, he openly conceded, had not been obtained.) Changing the established theory of rationality to theories of rationality as critical should remove one contemporary aspect of some extremist developments. How important this significant aspect of some extremism today is for extremism in general is an open question, rather than a cause for increased optimism about contemporary political developments.

Contact details: wettersten@t-online.de

Agassi, Joseph [2012]. ‘Reply to “The Rationality of Extremists”
by John Wettersten’
(PDF)
The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
social-epistemology.com/

Reply to “The Rationality of Extremists” by John Wettersten

Joseph Agassi, Tel Aviv University and York University, Toronto

(Editor’s Note: John Wettersten’s article “The Rationality of Extremists”, to which Joseph Agassi replies, appears in Social Epistemology 26.1 (2012) available through Taylor & Francis Online. Please see “The Social Scientific Study of Rationality: A Reply to Joseph Agassi”.)

Wettersten investigates rationality. He begins with the principle of rationality; action is always explained as the outcome of some rational decision. Two or three disputes traditionally surround this principle.

The first dispute is, whether the rationality principle applies to successful action alone or to any action. Of course, assuming that an action was successful one can conclude that its goal – or at least its partial goal — is what it has reached. Obviously, failure is as common as success if not much more so. Is failure to be explained as due to rational action? The idea that rationality is proof led to the conclusion that in principle suffice it to view only successful action as rooted in rationality. This is obviously too strict a position. Using our brains to plan actions must count as rational even if misguided, as all our cogitations are likely to be.

The second dispute was about the conditions surrounding a decision: can these include social settings even though these are given rather than rationally constructed? Again, decision goes the social way and this is more-or-less decided (even though it is the minority view, like most of what we may deem avant-garde): irrational assume social institutions surely are, the rational takes them into considerations either when acting within their rule  or when trying to improve them, say by legislation.

The third dispute is as to whether the rationality principle applies not only to individuals but also to societies. The latter view allows for social or historical forces, for destiny and such. We can ignore this and agree that only individuals act, not societies and not social institutions. We do observe mass movements and notice that in mass movements interactions between individuals are so strong that they make masses of people move in unison so that the mass seems to have its own purpose. Whether we deem mass movements rational or not, we tend to view the actions that move them as of individuals in them, not of the masses as such. (Thus societies and institutions are not reducible to individuals but social or institutional actions are.) This idea becomes less obvious when we consider not the movement of a mass of people (often called a herd with unjust contempt) but such items as the national interest, since they are institutions that often reflect a majority view of the view of the leadership and similar institutionally-determined groups of individuals.

Here Wettersten has introduced his own innovation. In classical, strictly individualist social science, the goal of any individual is given (as exogenous). This was justified as liberal: we do not impose a goal on individuals, as they possess the inalienable right to their tastes. It was also justified in a naturalist way: we all have more-or-less the same basic needs and our chief aims are to satisfy them in reasonable ways. Wettersten says, more reasonably, we must agree that our tastes too are largely socially determined. We all must eat, but our tastes in food vary, and they are largely determined socially! Thus even the most basic individual needs are not independent of their given societal frameworks. Moreover, given any demand one makes on oneself or on the environment in which one acts, there is always the question of how high it is.  And this too is largely socially determined. One such case of high standard is that of extremism: the extremist raises some standard as far as possible.

And so we come to the question at hand: what is the rationality of extremism? This question gains import in the light of the fact that some people may alter their views and attitude and remain extremist; indeed they may alter their views and attitudes in search of extreme standards that they may aspire to.  As individualism may lead investigators to play down the role of social environment in action, it leads its adherents to psychology. They may then adopt the view of Alfred Adler that people who fear failure raise their stakes as much as possible, thus, paradoxically, insure failure. Moreover, they may act obsessively that way. (This is not to say that the adoption of Adlerian psychology imposes the individualist mode of explanation. Indeed, Adler himself was a socialist and so he rejected the extreme individualist mod of explanation.) We may ask, then, what social conditions direct individuals to extremism? Wettersten’s purpose is not to explain “why specific individuals or groups of individuals choose to adopt extremist positions … but only [to claim] … that institutionalized standards of rationality help them along the way to defending, even to institutionalizing, their views when they choose to do so; [and] that institutionalized views of rationality can be changed to improve the practice of rationality; and that such an improvement can remove this means of legitimizing extremist positions.” This is very exciting as it is another instance of philosophical considerations claim to improve significantly our ways of thinking and even the quality of our lives.

The trouble is that rationality should but does not as yet help us avoid extremism.

Extremism regarding any item is the idea that only extreme cases of that item are available, or that only they are reasonable to seek. The simplest case of extremes is the idea that the item in question is present or absent, like life and death: when we say that some person is almost dead, whatever we may by that, it is not that the person in question is literally partly dead and partly alive. Indeed, the law of all civilized societies defends the lives of individuals without allowing for the view of them as nearly dead or anything of this kind. Many other things are familiar only in their extreme forms. One prominent example here is the present of things in any point in space-time: in Newtonian physics every point I space-time is either occupied or not. Kant denied this (under the influence of Leibniz) on the ground of some questionable considerations. Field theory nevertheless vindicated him: whereas classical physics took an extremist view of occupation of matter in space, modern physics takes it for granted that no point in space-time is utterly empty. An example that takes us nearer to the present discussion of Wettersten is the idea of Francis Bacon that unless one is utterly free of all preconceived notion (dogma, prejudice, and superstition), one cannot function as a scientific researcher. This is important, if at all, only on the supposition that utter freedom form all preconceived notion is possible. Bertrand Russell called this supposition humbug, thus rendering it possible to grade the level of intellectual freedom that one may reach.

Bacon first promised success for all research: proper research is bound to be successful. He then said, this is so on an obvious condition: before an experiment takes place one should not decide its outcome: one must let facts speak for themselves. This sounds very reasonable, but it turns out to be very hard; our awareness of the difficulty to be intellectually free mounts as log as despite our raising of our efforts to succeed in research we remain frustrated.  This is a pattern: first make a fabulous promise, then make it conditioned on a small sacrifice, and then make the size of the sacrifice grow as much as necessary to avoid the conclusion that the promise was broken. The paradigm is not Bacon but the promise for salvation of all religion. The Pauline promise for salvation is the most prominent: just believe that the Savior came to save you, that the Redeemer came to redeem you of all you sins.

What this shows, says Wettersten, is that rationality alone does not suffice to avoid this kind of trap. It is a special case of the trap that Popper called reinforced dogmatism. Like everyone else, Popper deemed dogmatism irrational. Jarvie and I tried to square rationality with dogmatism (“The Rationality of Dogmatism”, in our Rationality: The Critical View, 1987). We even tried to square the theory of rationality with irrationalism (“The Rationality of Irrationalism”, ibid.).  Going further, Wettersten claims that likewise rationality needs squaring with the prevalence of extremism even in the very best intellectual circles. This is quite agreeable to us, of course.

Partly, Wettersten finds the fault with some simple confusion, of course. Thus, we regularly confuse the idea that rational action maximizes results — we take the shortest routes to our goals — with the idea of maximum rationality — we always choose the best possible goals and the shortest possible routes (rather than the best we know of, for example). But confusion is only a part of the story. Error is the other part: we assume that going for the highest degree of rationality possible is more rational than going for the highest degree of rationality available. For, it is suggested, going for the impossible strains our muscles most and so brings about the best result available, whereas going for the best result available may make us content with less than with what we can achieve. (This error too, incidentally, may be viewed as confusion of the diverse senses of availability and possibility. But then, confusion clarified usually becomes clear error.) Wettersten also suggests another error: having some of us go for the highest degree of whatever they are doing may benefit us all and at least tell us what is the limit that is at all possible. (A most conspicuous example for the public benefit of extremes is the best achievement in science and in technology; the most conspicuous example for the fixing of the limit is top-level sports.)

Wettersten takes as his paradigm the philosophy of history that is the background of the terrific historical studies of Jacob Talmon. This is a very good choice, since Wettersten considers Talmon’s output excellent, since Talmon considered disastrous the extremist rationalism and utopianism of the Enlightenment Movement, since Wettersten agrees with him about that, yet while considering Talmon an extremist too, albeit of a different sort. The excess that Talmon wrongly supports lies in his view of an earthly liberal democracy as insufficient, since there is the need for higher, transcendent values. He finds this excess in accord with the identification of all theories of rationality with the extremist theory of rationality that the Enlightenment Movement had advocated: limiting the variants of a theory to its extremist versions reduces their number drastically. This, says Wettersten, constrains Talmon’s view: he can offer no theory of the rationality of liberal democracy.

This failing of Talmon is quite general. As noted above, the classical theory of rationality was limited to successful conduct, and Talmon cannot see liberal democracy but as a failure, since it falls short by his extremist criterion. Nor does Talmon take his own alternative as a theory of rationality, since his alternative is highly socially oriented and the classical theory of rationality, as noted above, disregards social circumstances, as they are often far from rational. Disregarding historical circumstances leads to utopianism, and Talmon rejects it. So he replaces it with a Hegelian theory of history, says Wettersten, but without a theory of destiny. This, adds Wettersten, deprives it of all explanatory power: by Talmon, the fate of a historical movement is determines not by its goal and not by any rationality, and so it is unexplainable.

This is not easily obvious, since Talmon does explain much. In particular he explains failures as rooted in erroneous (extremist) views. But the failures then lead to further changes (“dialectically”), and these are not explained. For the new ideas to develop and bring about new failures there has to be some rationality to them, and this Talmon ignores in favor of some vague transcendentalism, to repeat.

There still is a need to explain the prevalence of extremism. I have indicated above, the extremist view is the simplest and it clashes with reality rapidly but then the requirement of some small sacrifice to make it true becomes very appealing: we all think that small sacrifices are inevitable except in very extreme cases. Also, this demand seems morally right on diverse views of morality and so it looks a winner. This is a general fact. To take the most prominent example, let me refer to Marxist social thinkers, since Marxism is opposed to moralizing. Marx assumed that the workers will be driven to the revolution because their fight for the improvement of their lots under capitalism must fail since the competitive nature of the system will force capitalists to pay them minimum wages. Marxist social thinkers notice that this is not true. Nothing is more rational than to say that Marx was in error, since the introduction of trade unions limits the competition in the system. Instead they blame workers for their greed.

Blame, to repeat, is popular. It appears in theoretical discussions under a famous extremist ploy: if only. This ploy is already in bacon’s writing: if only people were a little less self-centered and more generous, then science would flourish and all our problems will be solvable. And so, a few simple techniques interlock to block progress. It is particularly hard, Wettersten observes, to demand the lowering of standards. This sounds paradoxical and so it has, he says, little chance of implementation. Perhaps: such things are not given to rational prediction. But then we do not know and we should try. The analysis that Wettersten offers, if it has any merit at all, should make us reasonably more optimistic. And its merit is so obvious that it should lead to serious discussion and efforts at practical improvements.

Contact details: agass@post.tau.ac.il