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Special Issue 1: “Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School”, edited by Patrick J. Reider

By SERRC on January 4, 2013 • ( 1 )

In our first special issue, we address divergent views concerning the implication, scope, and cogency of the Pittsburgh School’s (i.e., Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell) application of ‘normative functionalism’.

The PDFs of each article give specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-Ab

I. An Introduction to the Pittsburgh School and Normative Functionalism

Normative Functionalism

Normative Functionalism in the Pittsburgh School
Patrick J. Reider, University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg

II. Normative Functionalism and Representation

The Pittsburgh School, the Given and Knowledge

Sellars on Perception, Science, and Realism: A Critical Response
Patrick Reider, University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg

Sellars, Realism, and Kantian Thinking
[A critical response to “Sellars on Perception, Science, and Realism: A Critical Response”]
Willem A. deVries, University of New Hampshire

Sellars and Knowing the Thing-In-Itself
[A response to “Sellars, Realism, and Kantian Thinking”]
Patrick J. Reider, University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg

Tales of the mighty tautologists? Does normative functionalism reduce the differentiating function of non-discursive habit in experience to post hoc logical possibility?
Frank Scalambrino, University of Dallas

III. Normative Functionalism and Agency

A response to a question regarding “normative functionalism”
Joseph Margolis, Temple University

Normative Functionalism about Intentional Action
Chauncey Maher, Dickinson College

Normative Functionalism and its Pragmatist Roots
Dave Beisecker, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Norms and Causes: Loosing the Bonds of Deontic Constraint
James Swindal, Duquesne University

IV. Normative Functionalism and Reference

Rigid Designation and Natural Kind Terms, Pittsburgh Style

V. Normative Functionalism and Rhetoric

Having “A Whole Battery of Concepts”: Thinking Rhetorically About the Norms of Reason