One response to Free Will as an Illusion: Ethical and Epistemological Consequences of an Alleged Revolutionary Truth, Mario De Caro and Andrea Lavazza

  1. 

    Excellent article. I have (freely) decided to add one more argument. Those who argue that others “ought” to deny human freedom are “performatively” inconsistent. This is profoundly different from being “logically” inconsistent. To be performatively consistent, what they say ought to be consistent with what they do in the process of saying it. They ought to say that they were deterministically compelled to perform whatever research they did, and similarly compelled to report it in exactly the way they did. They were not free to do different observations or experiments, not free to report their results in different words, and not free to believe anything other than what they happen to believe. They should also say the same about their readers (and non-readers). No one was either free to read or not to read their reports, and those that were compelled to read their reports are also compelled either to understand or not to understand what they say, and, for those who understand, are compelled either to disagree, agree, or remain on the fence. Also, those who make policies about punishment are compelled either to believe or not to believe that humans are free, and are compelled to make the policies they make regardless of what they happen to believe. Absolute determinism, in other words, makes any attempt at deliberate change performatively inconsistent. I consider performative inconsistency to be an empirical indicator of sloppy thinking and writing. What performatively inconsistent writers do speaks so loudly that I cannot hear what they say.

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