Author Information: Simone Chambers, University of California – Irvine, sechambe@uci.edu Chambers, Simone. “The Epistemic Ideal of Reason-Giving in Deliberative Democracy.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 10 (2017): 59-64. The pdf of the article includes specific page numbers. Shortlink: https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3PY Please… Read More ›
Month: October 2017
Not-So-Well-Designed Scientific Communities, Inkeri Koskinen
Author Information: Inkeri Koskinen, University of Helsinki, inkeri.koskinen@helsinki.fi Koskinen, Inkeri. “Not-So-Well-Designed Scientific Communities.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 10 (2017): 54-58. The pdf of the article includes specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3PB Please refer to: Rolin, Kristina. “Scientific Community: A… Read More ›
Beyond Consensus? A Reply to Alan Irwin, Jeroen Van Bouwel and Michiel Van Oudheusden
Author information: Jeroen Van Bouwel, Ghent University, Belgium, jeroen.vanbouwel@ugent.be; Michiel Van Oudheusden, SKC-CEN Belgian Nuclear Research Centre and University of Leuven, Belgium. Van Bouwel, Jeroen and and Michiel Van Oudheusden. “Beyond Consensus? A Reply to Alan Irwin.” Social Epistemology Review… Read More ›
To Know and To Be: Second-Person Knowledge and the Intersubjective Self, A Reply to Talbert, Joshua Bergamin
Author Information: Joshua Bergamin, University of Durham, UK, joshua.bergamin@uqconnect.edu.au Bergamin, Joshua. “To Know and To Be: Second-Person Knowledge and the Intersubjective Self, A Reply to Talbert.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 10 (2017): 43-47. The pdf of… Read More ›
Toxic Necro-Waste, Daniel Robins
Author Information: Daniel Robins, University of York, UK, daniel.robins@york.ac.uk Robins, Daniel. “Toxic Necro-Waste.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 10 (2017): 39-42. The pdf of the article includes specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3OQ Please refer to: Olson, Philip. 2013. “Knowing… Read More ›
The Superior Lie: A Review of The Deceptive Activist, Steve Breyman
Author Information: Steve Breyman, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, breyms@rpi.edu Breyman, Steve. “The Superior Lie: A Review of The Deceptive Activist.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 11 (2017): 36-38. The pdf of the article includes specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3Ox… Read More ›
Putting The Deceptive Activist into Conversation: A Review and a Response to Rappert, Gregory Nelson
Author Information: Gregory Nelson, Northern Arizona University, nelsong@vt.edu Nelson, Gregory. “Putting The Deceptive Activist into Conversation: A Review and a Response to Rappert.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 11 (2017): 33-35. The PDF of the article gives… Read More ›
There’s No Such Thing as Conceptual Competence Injustice: A Response to Anderson and Cruz, Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky and William Tuckwell
Author Information: Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky and William Tuckwell, University of Melbourne, ppodosky@student.unimelb.edu.au; wtuckwell@student.unimelb.edu.au Podosky, Paul-Mikhail Catapang and William Tuckwell.[1] “There’s No Such Thing as Conceptual Competence Injustice: A Response to Anderson and Cruz.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6,… Read More ›
In Defense of Weak Scientism: A Reply to Brown, Moti Mizrahi
Author Information: Moti Mizrahi, Florida Institute of Technology, mmizrahi@fit.edu Mizrahi, Moti. “In Defense of Weak Scientism: A Reply to Brown.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 11 (2017): 9-22. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers…. Read More ›
The Epistemic Injustice Anthology: A Review of The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, Amiel Bernal
Author Information: Amiel Bernal, Virginia Tech, abernal@vt.edu Bernal, Amiel. “The Epistemic Injustice Anthology: A Review of The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 11 (2017): 1-8. The PDF of the article gives specific… Read More ›