Author Archives
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SERRC: Volume 12, Issue 11, 1-100, November 2023
Volume 12, Issue 11, 1-100, November 2023 ❧ Bollen, Caroline. 2023. “Empathy as a Virtue: A Response to Marshall.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (11): 94–100. ❧ Wills, Bernard N. 2023. “Believing in Dawkins: A Review of Steinhart.”… Read More ›
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Empathy as a Virtue: A Response to Marshall, Caroline Bollen
Colin Marshall wrote a detailed reply (2023) to my paper “Towards a Clear and Fair Conceptualization of Empathy” (2023) in which he raised four challenges to inspire a discussion. First, I would like to thank him for his detailed, critical,… Read More ›
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Believing in Dawkins: A Review of Steinhart, Bernard N. Wills
Believing in Dawkins (2020) by Eric Steinhart is a book that answers a question I would not myself have asked. This makes it both intriguing and frustrating. Steinhart wants to build a ‘new spiritual atheism’ based on two elements which,… Read More ›
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Is Conspiracy Theory a Case of Conceptual Domination? M. Giulia Napolitano and Kevin Reuter
How should philosophers define conspiracy theory? In our paper, “What is a Conspiracy Theory?” (2021), we argued that the best definition is an evaluative one—one which characterizes conspiracy theories in terms of epistemic deficiency, appropriately spelled out. We argued for… Read More ›
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The End of Big Theory? A Rejoinder to Strand, Simon Susen
I would like to start by thanking Michael Strand (2023) for his thoughtful comments on my recent article, entitled ‘Lessons from Reckwitz and Rosa: Towards a Constructive Dialogue between Critical Analytics and Critical Theory’.[1] As stated in the title of… Read More ›
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Conspiracy Theories and Relevant Epistemic Authorities: A Response to Räikkä on Pejorative Definitions, Part III, Kurtis Hagen
In this essay, I argue that, with regard to controversial conspiracy theories: (1) Determining what the evidence indicates by appealing to expert consensus is problematic; (2) Identifying the relevant epistemic authorities is fraught with challenges, and; (3) The degree to… Read More ›
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Implausible Conspiracy Theories: A Response to Räikkä on Pejorative Definitions, Part II, Kurtis Hagen
Vague evaluative terms, such as “implausible” and “unlikely,” are often used to describe conspiracy theories. In this essay, I argue that such vagueness facilitates equivocations that support unfounded negative generalizations about explanations called “conspiracy theories,” especially when the generalizations are… Read More ›
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Three Ways to Define Conspiracy Theories: A Response to Räikkä on Pejorative Definitions, Part I, Kurtis Hagen
This is the first in a series of three essays in which I address the following issues: (1) The pros and cons of the so-called “minimalist” definition of conspiracy theories, compared to more complicated alternatives. (2) Whether taking implausible conspiracy… Read More ›
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“From Divinity to Bovinity” and the Square Route of Orthogonality: A Review of Fuller’s Back to the University’s Future, Des Hewitt
I always seem to be reviewing books for the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective while on holiday. My last review was written while on the beaches of South Goa, India. That book was by Michael Gibson and was about… Read More ›
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Why Everything You Think You Know about Scientism is Probably Wrong, Moti Mizrahi
I would like to thank Renia Gasparatou, Philip Goff, and Andreas Vrahimis for contributing to the book symposium on For and Against Scientism: Science, Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022). I am grateful to James… Read More ›