How should philosophers define conspiracy theory? In our paper, “What is a Conspiracy Theory?” (2021), we argued that the best definition is an evaluative one—one which characterizes conspiracy theories in terms of epistemic deficiency, appropriately spelled out. We argued for… Read More ›
Critical Replies
Critical Replies are engagements with articles recently published in Social Epistemology.
The End of Big Theory? A Rejoinder to Strand, Simon Susen
I would like to start by thanking Michael Strand (2023) for his thoughtful comments on my recent article, entitled ‘Lessons from Reckwitz and Rosa: Towards a Constructive Dialogue between Critical Analytics and Critical Theory’.[1] As stated in the title of… Read More ›
Conspiracy Theories and Relevant Epistemic Authorities: A Response to Räikkä on Pejorative Definitions, Part III, Kurtis Hagen
In this essay, I argue that, with regard to controversial conspiracy theories: (1) Determining what the evidence indicates by appealing to expert consensus is problematic; (2) Identifying the relevant epistemic authorities is fraught with challenges, and; (3) The degree to… Read More ›
Implausible Conspiracy Theories: A Response to Räikkä on Pejorative Definitions, Part II, Kurtis Hagen
Vague evaluative terms, such as “implausible” and “unlikely,” are often used to describe conspiracy theories. In this essay, I argue that such vagueness facilitates equivocations that support unfounded negative generalizations about explanations called “conspiracy theories,” especially when the generalizations are… Read More ›
Three Ways to Define Conspiracy Theories: A Response to Räikkä on Pejorative Definitions, Part I, Kurtis Hagen
This is the first in a series of three essays in which I address the following issues: (1) The pros and cons of the so-called “minimalist” definition of conspiracy theories, compared to more complicated alternatives. (2) Whether taking implausible conspiracy… Read More ›
Why Everything You Think You Know about Scientism is Probably Wrong, Moti Mizrahi
I would like to thank Renia Gasparatou, Philip Goff, and Andreas Vrahimis for contributing to the book symposium on For and Against Scientism: Science, Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022). I am grateful to James… Read More ›
What Does Theology about Science and Religion Accomplish? A Reply to Zacky and Moniruzzaman, Taner Edis
Mohamed Fouz Mohamed Zacky and Md Moniruzzaman (2023) describe three Muslim responses to modern knowledge: “Islamization of Knowledge (IOK), Radical Reform (RR), and Maqasid Methodology (MM).” Their work adds to our understanding of the variety contained in Islam. For those… Read More ›
The Counterfactual Paths and Their Convergence in the History of Physics, Science, and the World, Slobodan Perović
In her groundbreaking paper, Léna Soler (2023) explores a counterfactual historical scenario in which an interpretation of quantum physics, similar to that of David Bohm (1952), is taught everywhere at the university level, following its victory over what we now… Read More ›
The Severity of the Information Gap Problem for Epistocracy: On Gibbons’s Reply, María Pía Méndez
Adam Gibbons (2022) holds, in response to my recent paper on epistocracy (Méndez 2022), that the severity of what I identify as a very relevant epistemic problem for epistocracy is overstated. What I call the Information Gap Problem refers to… Read More ›
A Reply to Hauswald’s “‘That’s Just a Conspiracy Theory’”, David Coady
I agree with much that Rico Hauswald (2023) says in “‘That’s Just a Conspiracy Theory’: Relevant Alternatives, Dismissive Conversational Exercitives, and the Problem of Premature Conclusions.” I agree with him that the term “conspiracy theory” standardly acts in ordinary language… Read More ›