Critical Replies are engagements with articles recently published in Social Epistemology.
I started to first think of my response to Vivek Kant’s review (Kant 2020) of Instrumental Lives about 15 days ago. Some ideas and lines of thought were beginning to emerge when other more important things took over—another editing deadline… Read More ›
In my paper (Kasavin 2020), I responded to the question “what is the value of science” in the way that invites further clarification. I assume that the value of science is its special epistemological status. Yet, this value is not justified by… Read More ›
Localism says that one can construct local conditions to mitigate the effects of stereotype information. We should expect our capacity to construct the local environments to grow as our knowledge of triggers grows. There might be practical limits — people… Read More ›
I argued that the detrimental effects of acts of dismissive incomprehension stem from their nature as conflictive verbal actions […] which overtly damage an individual’s quality face as a knower and informer […] In other words, dismissive incomprehension undermines an… Read More ›
I would like to thank Danielle DeVasto for her careful discussion of my (2019) reconstruction and for putting it into the broader context of research on the L’Aquila 2009 case. Before coming to the above outlined discussion of overflow, its… Read More ›
Max Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation’ caused considerable controversy in the early 1920s across German academe. Significant critics weighed in on all sides including Ernst Curtius, a leading philologist, philosopher Heinrich Rickert (a close personal friend of the Webers), Arthur… Read More ›
The crux of Mizrahi’s essay is the thesis that scientific knowledge is the best kind of knowledge. It is quantitatively the best because of the sheer volume of its published research (output) and citations (impact), as compared to other non-scientific… Read More ›
Manuel Padilla Cruz has written an excellent response piece (Padilla Cruz 2019) to my initial article (Cull 2019) on dismissive incomprehension, where he raises a number of interesting issues and has put forward a number of excellent ideas for avenues for… Read More ›
In “Fake News, Conspiracy, and Intellectual Vice” Marco Meyer (2019) presents findings from an investigation of the role of intellectual vices—intellectual arrogance, intellectual vanity, boredom, and intellectual fragility—in the uptake of conspiracy theories and fake news. Using online survey tools,… Read More ›
In “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” (Levy 2019) I argued that conspiratorial ideation—defined as the acceptance (not the generation) of conspiracy theories—might be much more rational than we tend to think. I suggested such ideation might be subjectively rational—rational for the… Read More ›