A few months into the pandemic, and I was surprised so many people explicitly rejected expert advice. Mostly, I was shocked by their arguments: they said that scientists keep changing their minds; that not all scientists agree on what we… Read More ›
Amanda Bryant
Algorithmic Opinion Mining and the History of Philosophy: A Response to Mizrahi’s For and Against Scientism, Andreas Vrahimis
As Moti Mizrahi’s editorial introduction points out, For and Against Scientism ‘arises from an exchange between several scholars over the pages of the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective’ (Mizrahi 2022, 18) in response to Mizrahi (2019). Mizrahi (2019) defended… Read More ›
Philosophical Sentiments Toward Scientism: A Reply to Bryant, Moti Mizrahi
Abstract In a reply to Mizrahi (2019), Bryant (2020) raises several methodological concerns regarding my attempt to test hypotheses about the observation that academic philosophers tend to find “scientism” threatening empirically using quantitative, corpus-based methods. Chief among her methodological concerns… Read More ›
SERRC, Volume 9, Issue 11, November 2020
Volume 9, Issue 11, November 2020 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Park, Seungbae. 2020. “The Appearance and the Reality of a Scientific Theory.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (11): 59-69. ❧ Mason, Sharon E. 2020. “Closing the Hermeneutical… Read More ›
Some Devils in the Details: Methodological Concerns Regarding Mizrahi’s “The Scientism Debate”, Amanda Bryant
“The Scientism Debate” in Summary In his article “The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?” (2019), Moti Mizrahi sets out to empirically test two hypotheses that putatively explain why philosophers find scientism threatening. The hypotheses are: H1:… Read More ›
The (Lack of) Evidence for the Kuhnian Image of Science, Moti Mizrahi
Author Information: Moti Mizrahi, Florida Institute of Technology, mmizrahi@fit.edu Mizrahi, Moti. “The (Lack of) Evidence for the Kuhnian Image of Science.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 7 (2018): 19-24. The pdf of the article gives specific page references. Shortlink: https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3Z5… Read More ›
A Role for Taxonomic Incommensurability in Evolutionary Philosophy of Science, James Marcum
Author Information: James A. Marcum, Baylor University, james_marcum@baylor.edu Marcum, James A. “A Role for Taxonomic Incommensurability in Evolutionary Philosophy of Science.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 7 (2018): 9-14. The pdf of the article gives specific page references. Shortlink: https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3YP… Read More ›
Philosophers and Scientists Are Social Epistemic Agents, Seungbae Park
Author Information: Seungbae Park, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, nature@unist.ac.kr Park, Seungbae. “Philosophers and Scientists are Social Epistemic Agents.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 6 (2018): 31-40. The pdf of the article gives specific page references. Shortlink: https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3Yo Please… Read More ›
Each Kuhn Mutually Incommensurable, Amanda Bryant
Author Information: Amanda Bryant, Trent University, amandabryant@trentu.ca Bryant, Amanda. “Each Kuhn Mutually Incommensurable.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 6 (2018): 1-7. The pdf of the article gives specific page references. Shortlink: https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3XM This volume is divided into four… Read More ›