Volume 12, Issue 5, 1-71, May 2023 Symposium on Moti Mizrahi’s For and Against Scientism: Science, Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2022): ❦ Vrahimis, Andreas. 2023. “Algorithmic Opinion Mining and the History of Philosophy: A Response… Read More ›
Group Dispositional Belief, Information Possession, and “Epistemic Explosion”: A Further Reply to Jesper Kallestrup, Avram Hiller and R. Wolfe Randall
On a non-summative, non-supervenient (NSNS) account of group knowledge, a group may know that p without any members knowing or even believing that p. Additionally, group knowledge does not supervene on the mental states of the individual members of the… Read More ›
In my reply (2023) to Hiller and Randall (2023a), I suggested that since dispositional belief is arguably what knowledge in general requires, their (NSNS) view of group knowledge should account for how groups dispositionally believe p, as opposed to having… Read More ›
Volume 12, Issue 1, 1-77, January 2023 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Riggio, Adam. 2023.
Jesper Kallestrup (2022b) has provided an insightful response to our paper, “Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge” (Hiller and Randall 2022). Kallestrup identifies some important issues pertaining to our non-summative, non-supervenient (NSNS) account of group knowledge which we did not… Read More ›
Comments on Hiller and Randall’s “Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge”, Jesper Kallestrup
In “Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge” (2022), Avram Hiller and R. Wolfe Randall argue that not only is not all group knowledge summative, the knowledge that groups have also fails to supervene on mental states of their members. That… Read More ›