How should philosophers define conspiracy theory? In our paper, “What is a Conspiracy Theory?” (2021), we argued that the best definition is an evaluative one—one which characterizes conspiracy theories in terms of epistemic deficiency, appropriately spelled out. We argued for… Read More ›
conspiracy theories
Conspiracy Theories and Relevant Epistemic Authorities: A Response to Räikkä on Pejorative Definitions, Part III, Kurtis Hagen
In this essay, I argue that, with regard to controversial conspiracy theories: (1) Determining what the evidence indicates by appealing to expert consensus is problematic; (2) Identifying the relevant epistemic authorities is fraught with challenges, and; (3) The degree to… Read More ›
Implausible Conspiracy Theories: A Response to Räikkä on Pejorative Definitions, Part II, Kurtis Hagen
Vague evaluative terms, such as “implausible” and “unlikely,” are often used to describe conspiracy theories. In this essay, I argue that such vagueness facilitates equivocations that support unfounded negative generalizations about explanations called “conspiracy theories,” especially when the generalizations are… Read More ›
Three Ways to Define Conspiracy Theories: A Response to Räikkä on Pejorative Definitions, Part I, Kurtis Hagen
This is the first in a series of three essays in which I address the following issues: (1) The pros and cons of the so-called “minimalist” definition of conspiracy theories, compared to more complicated alternatives. (2) Whether taking implausible conspiracy… Read More ›
Should We be Generalists about Official Stories? A Response to Hayward, Will Mittendorf
In “The Applied Epistemology of Official Stories” (2023), Tim Hayward offers a thorough and convincing rejection of Neil Levy’s claim that we ought to defer to official stories from relevant epistemic authorities. In this response, I take no issue with… Read More ›
Is ‘Conspiracy Theory’ Harmful? A Reply to Foster and Ichikawa, Scott Hill
Some terms are harmful. Take slurs. The use of slurs can promote and sustain connections between concepts and stereotypes that harm innocent people. A slur for African Americans, for example, may be harmful even if that slur does not license… Read More ›
Why We Should Stop Talking about Generalism and Particularism: Moving the Debate on Conspiracy Theories Forward, Maarten Boudry and M. Giulia Napolitano
It is highly unusual for philosophers to agree about anything. And yet, philosophers of conspiracy theories seem to have achieved this remarkable feat. For more than a decade, a campaign has been waged against a position called “generalism”. Originally coined… Read More ›
Creative Misreadings, Jesse Walker
Lee Basham’s article is wildly inaccurate.[1] I do not mean that he has marshaled poor arguments against my positions; I mean that the positions he is arguing against are not mine in the first place. He attributes opinions to me… Read More ›
Two Problems with the Generalist-Particularist Distinction in the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory and Why I am not a Generalist, Steve Clarke
I conducted some of the ‘first generation’ work in analytic philosophy on conspiracy theories (Clarke 2002; 2006; 2007),[1] and then set the topic aside for 14 years.[2] The current scene is quite different from the one I left. One difference… Read More ›
Conspiracy Theory and the “Bodyguard of Lies”: The Bennewitz Matter, Mark D. West
Joseph Uscinski and Adam Enders (2022) describe “conspiracy theory” as a pejorative term, one employed in what they see as our “post-truth” era to indict official explanations for historical events. Conspiracy theories involve answers for why things happened that conflict… Read More ›