Archives For Dwight Holbrook

Author Information: Dwight Holbrook, Adam Mickiewicz University, hdwight10021@yahoo.com

Holbrook, Dwight. “Coming Back to What Started It All.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 7 (2015): 63-68.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-2cI

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time

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In this response to Jesse Butler’s helpful explanations and broad discussion of subtle issues in his latest turn in our exchange of views—his paper this time around entitled, “Phenomenal Knowledge, Dualism, and Dreams” (2015)—for the most part it will be my purpose at this stage to bring this broad canvas of points of harmony and difference back to the issue that touched off this debate between Butler and myself. [1]

Prior to doing that, I do want to touch on what I believe represents more or less our extent of harmony. Continue Reading…

Author Information: Jesse Butler, University of Central Arkansas, jbutler@uca.edu

Butler, Jesse. “Phenomenal Knowledge, Dualism, and Dreams.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 6 (2015): 12-18.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-27C

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dreaming

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Dwight Holbrook (2015b) expresses misgivings that phenomenal knowledge can be regarded as both an objectless kind of knowledge and an objective feature of the world. He attributes a problematic dualism to my account of phenomenal knowledge, suggesting that my treatment of phenomenal knowledge as a kind of objectless knowledge sets it apart from the objective world, creating a dualistic divide between phenomenal knowledge and the objective world of which I claim it is a part.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Dwight Holbrook, Adam Mickiewicz University, hdwight10021@yahoo.com

Holbrook, Dwight. “Closing in on Dualism.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 3 (2015): 57-62.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1Xf

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dualism

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Let us start with what appears to be a congruence of viewpoint shared by Jesse Butler (Butler 2015) and myself (Holbrook 2014). We both agree on two things:

(1) Objectless knowing is not tantamount to mere personal bias, false impressions, illusions, distortions imposed by the mind, or in other words is not tantamount to subjectivity in contradistinction to whatever may constitute objective truth. As Butler writes, “I do not mean that the knowledge [of my own experience] is subjective in the sense of being inaccurate with regard to the objective world” (Butler 2015, 23).

(2) Objectless knowing is infallible in that it is not about propositional statements of truth. Hence, it is neither falsifiable nor verifiable. “I do say that phenomenal knowledge is infallible, but only in the deflationary sense that it contains no propositional content by which it could possibly be fallible, or inaccurate” (Butler 2015, 23).  Continue Reading…

Jesse Butler, University of Central Arkansas, JButler@uca.edu

Butler, Jesse. “Knowledge, Objects, and the Objective NOW.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 2 (2015): 21-25.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1U5

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time_warp

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In his response (Holbrook 2014) to my discussion (Butler 2014) of his work (Holbrook 2015), Dwight Holbrook’s primary counterpoint is a rejection of my account of phenomenal knowledge. He claims that knowledge requires an object, thereby rejecting the possibility of phenomenal knowledge as a distinct kind of knowledge in which there is no object that stands apart from the knowing subject. In his words, “knowledge iff subject and object are differentiated” (Holbrook 2014, 37).  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Dwight Holbrook, University of Adam Mickiewicz, hdwight10021@yahoo.com

Holbrook, Dwight. “What is an Object?” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 11 (2014): 35-38.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1HH

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non-formImage credit: Tiemen Rapati, via flickr

I offer the following response to Jesse Butler’s critique “Knowledge and the NOW: What Is the Epistemic Standing of the Present Moment?” (2014) his paper being a review and reply to my essay “Is Present Time a Precondition for the Existence of the Public and Material World?” published in Social Epistemology.

First, I want to commend the acuity of thought and analysis in Butler’s review. My response will focus on his two points of disagreement, the first of which figures essentially as a call for clarification and epistemic distinction, a suggestion well articulated and well founded to which I raise only a tangential concern. With regard to his second point of contention, I have rather substantive reservations that I express below.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Jesse Butler, University of Central Arkansas, JButler@uca.edu

Butler, Jesse. “Knowledge and NOW: What Is the Epistemic Standing of the Present Moment?” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 10 (2014): 5-11.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1CJ

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The present moment, NOW, is a pretty big deal to us humans. Everything seems to be happening NOW, on the razor edge between history and the future, and without a NOW through which we experience the world, the world itself seems inaccessible, if not altogether incomprehensible. But what is this NOW? Is NOW an objective feature of external reality, a uniquely privileged public moment through which we are in contact with the actual world as it unfolds, or is NOW merely a subjective illusion that we each project onto the world through the egocentric temporal window of our own experience?   Continue Reading…