This continuing exchange (2021a) makes it clear that Neil Levy (2021, 2022b) and I agree on many things—but we do tend to emphasize different issues and framings. Much more than he, I tend to emphasize our agreement. And I get… Read More ›
epistemic significance of disagreement
The Bias that Unites Us: A Reply to Keith Stanovich, Neil Levy
Keith Stanovich (Stanovich 2021a) accuses me of misreading his book at multiple points. I think he’s misread my review, so I guess we’re even. Perhaps neither of us were as clear as we should have been. His main point is… Read More ›
A Rational Disagreement about Myside Bias, Keith E. Stanovich
Who says that book reviewing is dead? Within just a couple of weeks of the appearance of my new book, The Bias That Divides Us, it received two reviews that were in-depth and theoretically astute—one destined for the American Journal… Read More ›
Is Myside Bias Irrational? A Biased Review of The Bias that Divides Us, Neil Levy
The Bias That Divides Us (2021) is about myside bias, the supposed bias whereby we generate and test hypotheses and evaluate evidence in a way that is biased toward our own prior beliefs. Myside bias prevents convergence in beliefs: if… Read More ›
Debating the Significance of Disagreement: A Review of John Pittard’s Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, Jonathan Matheson
Richard Feldman’s “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” launched debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement that have been a dominant point of discussion in epistemology as of late. While most of these debates have been concerned with disagreement more generally, Feldman’s original… Read More ›