Archives For Gloria Origgi

Author Information: Gianluca Manzo, GEMASS–CNRS and University of Paris-Sorbonne, glmanzo@msh-paris.fr

Manzo, Gianluca. 2013. “Reputation and Social Mechanisms: A Comment on Origgi’s ‘A Social Epistemology of Reputation’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (5): 45-50.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-LG

Please refer to: Origgi, Gloria. 2012. “A Social Epistemology of Reputation.” Social Epistemology 26 (3-4): 399-418.

Origgi’s penetrating outlook on social life, combined with her deep knowledge of several streams of literature in economics, sociology and philosophy makes “A Social Epistemology of Reputation” a brilliant piece of work. Origgi’s article develops a general theoretical framework for studying the emergence and function of reputational hierarchies and dynamics in complex societies. Continue Reading…

Author Information: Gloria Origgi, CNRS, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, gloria.origgi@gmail.com

Origgi, Gloria. 2012. Reply to Paul Faulkner’s comments. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (10): 1-3

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-nG

Please refer to:

I thank Paul Faulkner for his insightful comments. I am flattered that he found the time to go through my paper so carefully. Yet, I do not know exactly what I am supposed to do now because the paper is already published and his comments are in the style of a competent “referee” — I should have received it before the publication! Also, we are on a blog of social epistemology, discussing epistemic injustice, and we cannot pretend I have studied analytical philosophy at Oxford. Thus, in order to avoid a conversation that involves the biases, the identity prejudices and the epistemic injustices that we are here to debunk, I ask the reader (Paul included) to situate my intervention (and my paper) as coming from an Italian scholar living and working in France for whom English is her third professional language. Among the many epistemic injustices that we commit in academia, one of the strongest is linguistic injustice — a much debated subject at least in continental Europe [1] — and some of my arguments may appear less convincing than those coming from an Oxford educated philosopher because the style of writing and structuring of thoughts we have learned is radically different. Continue Reading…

Author Information: Paul Faulkner, University of Sheffield, paul.faulkner@sheffield.ac.uk

Faulkner, Paul. 2012. Trust and the assessment of credibility. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (8): 1-6.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-oN

Please refer to:

Epistemic failings can be ethical failings. This insight is owed to Miranda Fricker who explores this idea in developing a theory of epistemic injustice. [1] A central type of epistemic injustice is testimonial injustice, where there are two components to this. A knower suffers a testimonial injustice when she is not given due credit and is thereby prevented from doing what is fundamental to being a knower, which is inform others of what she knows. This is the first component, which is epistemic: a testimonial injustice starts with a misjudgement of a knower’s credibility; it starts, in Fricker’s terms, with the knower suffering a credibility deficit. The second, ethical, component is the explanation of this credibility deficit. There is a testimonial injustice when the cause of this credibility deficit is not innocent error but some form of prejudice. Here Fricker wants to draw our attention to one pervasive prejudice, which she calls identity prejudice. [2] This is the prejudice that attaches to a person by virtue of their social identity and which thereby tracks that person through the multitude of social activities, economic, political and so on. Thus the paradigm case of testimonial injustice is identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. [3]

The stated objective of Gloria Origgi’s paper “Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust” is:

to broaden her [Fricker’s] analysis in two ways: first, I will argue that the ways in which credibility judgments are biased go far beyond the central case of identity prejudice; and, second, I will try to detail some of the mechanisms that control our ways of making testimonial injustices to the speakers [sic]. [4]

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