Section 4: Back to a Relativistic Understanding of Standpoint Theory? The Problem of Circularity and, yet another one, Unnecessariness Now, if the standpoint thesis cannot plausibly be weakened so that it leaves room for a neutral ranking of standpoints (that… Read More ›
Howard Sankey
Can Standpoint Epistemology Avoid Inconsistency, Circularity, and Unnecessariness? A Comment on Ashton’s Remarks about Epistemic Privilege, Part I, Claudio Javier Cormick
In two provocative and interesting articles (Ashton 2019, 2020),[1] Natalie Ashton argues that standpoint epistemologies, though are not presented by their own authors as cases of epistemic relativism, are in fact relativistic, in a sense she reconstructs on the basis… Read More ›
Norms and the Temptations of Relativism: A Reply to Sankey, Chris Lepock
Author Information: Chris Lepock, Athabasca University, clepock@gmail.com Lepock, Chris. “Norms and the Temptations of Relativism: A Reply to Sankey.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 5 (2015): 37-42. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink:… Read More ›