This continuing exchange (2021a) makes it clear that Neil Levy (2021, 2022b) and I agree on many things—but we do tend to emphasize different issues and framings. Much more than he, I tend to emphasize our agreement. And I get… Read More ›
irrationality
The Bias that Unites Us: A Reply to Keith Stanovich, Neil Levy
Keith Stanovich (Stanovich 2021a) accuses me of misreading his book at multiple points. I think he’s misread my review, so I guess we’re even. Perhaps neither of us were as clear as we should have been. His main point is… Read More ›
A Rational Disagreement about Myside Bias, Keith E. Stanovich
Who says that book reviewing is dead? Within just a couple of weeks of the appearance of my new book, The Bias That Divides Us, it received two reviews that were in-depth and theoretically astute—one destined for the American Journal… Read More ›
Is Myside Bias Irrational? A Biased Review of The Bias that Divides Us, Neil Levy
The Bias That Divides Us (2021) is about myside bias, the supposed bias whereby we generate and test hypotheses and evaluate evidence in a way that is biased toward our own prior beliefs. Myside bias prevents convergence in beliefs: if… Read More ›
When Is it Right to be Wrong? A Response to Lewandowsky, Kozyreva, and Ladyman, Neil Levy
In “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” (Levy 2019) I argued that conspiratorial ideation—defined as the acceptance (not the generation) of conspiracy theories—might be much more rational than we tend to think. I suggested such ideation might be subjectively rational—rational for the… Read More ›
What Rationality? A Comment on Levy’s “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” Stephan Lewandowsky, Anastasia Kozyreva, and James Ladyman
Neil Levy (2019) provides several new angles on the long-standing question about the rationality, or lack thereof, of people who accept objectively unwarranted conspiracy theories. Levy’s position rests on two arguments. First, accepting conspiracy theories is subjectively rational for many… Read More ›