A few months into the pandemic, and I was surprised so many people explicitly rejected expert advice. Mostly, I was shocked by their arguments: they said that scientists keep changing their minds; that not all scientists agree on what we… Read More ›
Jeroen de Ridder
Algorithmic Opinion Mining and the History of Philosophy: A Response to Mizrahi’s For and Against Scientism, Andreas Vrahimis
As Moti Mizrahi’s editorial introduction points out, For and Against Scientism ‘arises from an exchange between several scholars over the pages of the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective’ (Mizrahi 2022, 18) in response to Mizrahi (2019). Mizrahi (2019) defended… Read More ›
Reply to Jeroen de Ridder’s “Online Illusions of Understanding”, Justin McBrayer
Professor de Ridder (2022) argues that while online informational environments are epistemically good in some ways, they also have an epistemic flaw: they create illusions of understanding instead of the real McCoy. … [please read below the rest of the… Read More ›
Call for Papers: Epistemic Vices: From the Individual to the Collective
Synthese Topical Collection on “Epistemic Vices: From the Individual to the Collective” Deadline: 31st August 2022 Guest Editors: Robin McKenna (University of Liverpool) and Ian James Kidd (University of Nottingham) Topical Collection Description: A central theme of contemporary vice epistemology… Read More ›
Some Devils in the Details: Methodological Concerns Regarding Mizrahi’s “The Scientism Debate”, Amanda Bryant
“The Scientism Debate” in Summary In his article “The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?” (2019), Moti Mizrahi sets out to empirically test two hypotheses that putatively explain why philosophers find scientism threatening. The hypotheses are: H1:… Read More ›
Some Demarcations and a Dilemma: Comments On Mizrahi, Kyriaki Grammenou
Let us start by examining a couple of assumptions which, albeit not explicitly, seem to inform Mizrahi’s text. He writes that “many philosophers seem to think that scientism poses a threat to them as teachers” and also that “scientism is… Read More ›
CFP: Weak Scientism and the Future of Philosophy
CFP: Weak Scientism and the Future of Philosophy Topic areas Metaphilosophy General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous Details The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (SERRC) invites contributions to a dialogue on Weak Scientism, which will then serve… Read More ›
Response to Jeroen de Ridder’s “So What if ‘Fake News’ is Fake News?” David Coady
It is tempting to accept the studies de Ridder (2019) cites in support of my position that the fake news scare has been “overhyped”. However, since I have argued there is no fake news problem at all, I cannot accept… Read More ›
Against Empirical-ish Philosophy: Reply to Mizrahi, Jeroen de Ridder
Is the debate about scientism ‘a battle for the soul of philosophy’, as Moti Mizrahi (2019) contends? If it is, it is unlikely that the proponents of scientism would be inclined to put it this way … [please read below… Read More ›
So What if ‘Fake News’ is Fake News? Jeroen de Ridder
David Coady (2019), in his contribution to this issue, joins a small but growing number of people expressing misgivings about the current hype surrounding fake news, alternative facts, and other post-truthy phenomena in society and academia (cf. also Habgood-Coote 2019)…. Read More ›