On a non-summative, non-supervenient (NSNS) account of group knowledge, a group may know that p without any members knowing or even believing that p. Additionally, group knowledge does not supervene on the mental states of the individual members of the… Read More ›
Volume 12, Issue 3, 1-65, March 2023 Podcasts ❧ Knowledge for Breakfast, Episode 4: “‘Realizing Knowledge Together’ and Reimagining Academic Futures.” Guest: Jim Collier. Hosts: Fabien Medvecky and Michiel van Oudheusden. Topics: Knowing and academic practice, Social Epistemology Review and… Read More ›
In my reply (2023) to Hiller and Randall (2023a), I suggested that since dispositional belief is arguably what knowledge in general requires, their (NSNS) view of group knowledge should account for how groups dispositionally believe p, as opposed to having… Read More ›
Jesper Kallestrup (2022b) has provided an insightful response to our paper, “Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge” (Hiller and Randall 2022). Kallestrup identifies some important issues pertaining to our non-summative, non-supervenient (NSNS) account of group knowledge which we did not… Read More ›
Volume 11, Issue 11, 1-71, November 2022 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Gonnerman, Chad and Stephen Crowley. 2022. “Can We Tell Whether Philosophy is Special?” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (11): 1-11. ❧ Gopal, William and Federica Russo…. Read More ›
In “Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge” (2022), Avram Hiller and R. Wolfe Randall argue that not only is not all group knowledge summative, the knowledge that groups have also fails to supervene on mental states of their members. That… Read More ›