Man’s freedom as a human being, as a principle of a commonwealth, can be expressed in the following formula. No one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may… Read More ›
John Rawls
Are There ‘Fixed Facts’ in Convergence Accounts of Public Reason? Andrew Reid
This response builds on some of the issues that Jason Tyndal raises in ‘Public Reason Liberalism and the Certification of Scientific Claims’ (2019b), itself a reply to my paper ‘What Facts Should be Treated as ‘Fixed’ in Public Justification?’ (Reid… Read More ›
Public Reason Liberalism and the Certification of Scientific Claims, Jason Tyndal
In “What Facts Should be Treated as ‘Fixed’ in Public Justification?” (2019), Andrew Reid examines the issue of when scientific claims ought to be regarded as beyond reasonable disagreement (i.e., as “fixed” facts). According to one common line of thinking,… Read More ›
Experts, Citizens, and Evidence: Who Manages What? Ivan E. Gómez-Aguliar
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has an unusual daily routine. Monday through Friday he leads a press conference from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. He fields a range of questions on his government’s new policies. Almost a month ago,… Read More ›
Science, State Neutrality, and the Neutrality of Philosophy: A Reply to Bellolio, Gabriele Badano
In ‘The Quinean Assumption: The Case for Science as Public Reason’, Cristóbal Bellolio takes a close look at John Rawls’s hugely influential theory of public reason–in essence, a theory of how debates leading to legally binding political decisions should be… Read More ›
Response to “The Quinean Assumption. The Case for Science as Public Reason,” Matteo Bonotti
In “The Quinean Assumption: The Case for Science as Public Reason” (2019), Cristóbal Bellolio examines an aspect that has often, and surprisingly, been overlooked in the extensive literature on public reason and political liberalism: the role of scientific arguments in… Read More ›