In “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging” (2021), I address a phenomenon that is widely neglected in the current literature on nudges: intentional doxastic nudging, i.e. people’s intentional influence over other people’s beliefs, rather than over their choices. I argue that,… Read More ›
Volume 10, Issue 8, August 2021 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Richmond, Sheldon. 2021. “Open Letter to Markus Gabriel: A Review of The Power of Art and The Meaning of Thought.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (8): 55-62…. Read More ›
In “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging” (2021), Thomas Grundmann examines nudging as applied to doxastic attitudes. Grundmann argues that given the right presuppositions about knowledge, justified beliefs, and the relevant belief-forming processes, doxastic nudging can result in justified beliefs and… Read More ›
Introduction I’m honoured by Chris Ranalli’s (2020) thought-provoking response to my recent article, “The Epistemic Benefits of Worldview Disagreement” (2020a), which is an expansion of ideas found in my book, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement (2020b). I’m also grateful to… Read More ›
I am grateful for Jonathan Matheson’s recent review (Matheson 2020) of my book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment (Pittard 2019). Matheson’s excellent summary reflects a very careful reading, and his critical commentary offers important objections that deserve reflection and response…. Read More ›
In Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political, I reflect on the claim that personal qualities like closed-mindedness, prejudice and wishful thinking are epistemic vices. This is not, in itself, a controversial claim. The interesting question is:… Read More ›
In Vices of the Mind, Cassam provides an accessible, engaging, and timely introduction to the nature of epistemic vices and what we can do about them. Cassam provides an account of epistemic vices and explores three broad types of epistemic… Read More ›
Author Information: Fabien Medvecky, University of Otago, fabien.medvecky@otago.ac.nz. Medvecky, Fabien. “Institutionalised Science Communication and Epistemic Injustice.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8, no. 2 (2019): 15-20. The pdf of the article gives specific page references. Shortlink: https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-46m This article responds to Matheson,… Read More ›
Author Information: Valerie Joly Chock & Jonathan Matheson, University of North Florida, n01051115@ospreys.unf.edu & j.matheson@unf.edu. Matheson, Jonathan, and Valerie Joly Chock. “Science Communication and Epistemic Injustice.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8, no. 1 (2019): 1-9. The pdf of the article gives specific… Read More ›
Author Information: Jonathan Matheson & Valerie Joly Chock, University of North Florida, jonathan.matheson@gmail.com. Matheson, Jonathan; Valerie Joly Chock. “Knowledge and Entailment: A Review of Jessica Brown’s Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 10 (2018):… Read More ›