In “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” (Levy 2019) I argued that conspiratorial ideation—defined as the acceptance (not the generation) of conspiracy theories—might be much more rational than we tend to think. I suggested such ideation might be subjectively rational—rational for the… Read More ›
Mark Alfano
What Rationality? A Comment on Levy’s “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” Stephan Lewandowsky, Anastasia Kozyreva, and James Ladyman
Neil Levy (2019) provides several new angles on the long-standing question about the rationality, or lack thereof, of people who accept objectively unwarranted conspiracy theories. Levy’s position rests on two arguments. First, accepting conspiracy theories is subjectively rational for many… Read More ›
What Evolutionary Biology Can Tell Us About Cooperation (and Trust) in Online Networks, Toby Handfield
In their introduction to this special issue, Alfano and Klein (2019) pose two neatly contrasting questions for social epistemologists who want to take our epistemic networks seriously. First, what sort of individual epistemic properties should we cultivate, given the social… Read More ›
Trust in a Social and Digital World, Mark Alfano and Colin Klein
The average Australian spends almost 10 hours a week on social media; a majority report that checking Facebook is one of the first things they do in the morning (Sensis 2017). Recent revelations about fake news and extremist sentiments spread… Read More ›
I Don’t Want to Change Your Mind: A Reply to Sherman, Natalia Washington
Author Information: Natalia Washington, Washington University in Saint Louis, nataliawashington@wustl.edu Washington, Natalia. “I Don’t Want to Change Your Mind: A Reply to Sherman.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5, no. 3 (2016): 10-14. The PDF of the article gives… Read More ›
Stealthy Vices, Quassim Cassam
Author Information: Quassim Cassam, University of Warwick, q.Cassam@warwick.ac.uk Cassam, Quassim. “Stealthy Vices.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 10 (2015): 19-25. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-2na Please refer to: Sherman, Benjamin R…. Read More ›
(Less Un-) Attainable Virtues: A Response to Alfano, Ben Sherman
Author Information: Ben Sherman, Brandeis University, shermanb@brandeis.edu Sherman, Ben. “(Less Un-) Attainable Virtues: A Response to Alfano.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 10 (2015): 14-18. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-2mL Please… Read More ›
Becoming Less Unreasonable: A Reply to Sherman, Mark Alfano
Author Information: Mark Alfano, University of Oregon, alfano@uoregon.edu Alfano, Mark. “Becoming Less Unreasonable: A Reply to Sherman.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 7 (2015): 59-62. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-2cw Please… Read More ›