1. Introduction I find myself in almost complete agreement with Arlene Lo (2022). Child abuse victims surely suffer hermeneutical injustice if they are denied the concepts necessary to understand their experience, and that injustice is immensely harmful. In this reply… Read More ›
2. Unwitting Complicity: The Curse of Neoliberal Propaganda Given that the discourse on epistemic injustice neglects class issues, some may say: “so what? We’re all intersectional now.” There be good reason, some may hold that ‘we’ have evolved beyond a… Read More ›
Abstract This paper argues that the current discourse on epistemic injustice in social epistemology itself perpetuates epistemic injustice, namely hermeneutic injustice with regards to class and classism. The main reason is that debates on epistemic injustice have foremost focussed on… Read More ›
1. Agreements or Quasi-Agreements I am grateful for Shannon Brick’s (2021) perceptive and stimulating critical commentary on my characterization of the phenomenon of ‘testimonial void’ (TV): a newly identified kind of testimonial injustice (TI) according to which “a speaker withholds… Read More ›
1. Introduction When you expect something bad to happen, you take action to avoid it. That is the principle of action that underlies J. Y. Lee’s recent paper (2021), which presents a new form of epistemic injustice that arises from… Read More ›
Epistemic neglect is a kind of epistemic injustice that occurs when educators fail to extend, to their students, “hopeful epistemic trust” (Brick 2020). Hopeful epistemic trust (henceforth, simply ‘hopeful trust’), is trust that is extended not on the basis of… Read More ›
The phenomena that compose the epistemic-injustice literature have rapidly proliferated since Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice was published in 2007. The epistemic-oriented approach to analyzing systemic-identity-based injustice that feminist epistemologists and critical race theorists developed (Alcoff 1999; Code 1991; Collins 1990;… Read More ›
Can groups of people possess epistemic virtues? There has been some attention to this question in recent years in social epistemology and ethics. Interestingly, most defenses and criticisms of collective virtues so far have focused on proving or disproving that… Read More ›
We are very grateful to Aidan McGlynn for his thoughtful and generous reply to our paper, “Epistemic Injustice and Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System” (D.L. Townsend and L. Townsend 2021). He is right that our primary interest… Read More ›
The concept of epistemic neglect (EN) fills a conceptual lacuna by identifying a kind of epistemic injustice exercised by educators when they fail to extend ‘hopeful trust’, that is, the kind of trust that is knowingly extended despite the lack… Read More ›