Volume 10, Issue 11, 1-66, November 2021 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Scotland-Stewart, Laurel. 2021. “Being Through the Body: A Reply to Mark Gilks’s ‘Narrating Being through Phenomena’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (11): 60-66. ❧ Briggle, Adam…. Read More ›
Abstract In a reply to Mizrahi (2019), Bryant (2020) raises several methodological concerns regarding my attempt to test hypotheses about the observation that academic philosophers tend to find “scientism” threatening empirically using quantitative, corpus-based methods. Chief among her methodological concerns… Read More ›
Volume 10, Issue 6, June 2021 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Lynch, William T. 2021. “Zombie Epistemology: Or, I Ain’t Gonna Work on Zoltan’s Farm, Either.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (6): 1-19. Part I, https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5Ur; Part II,… Read More ›
Abstract In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2021)
Volume 10, Issue 2, February 2021 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Miller, Seumas. 2021. “Regarding Joint Abilities and Joint Know-How: A Reply to Yuri Cath.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (2): 36-42. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5Hh. ❧ Habgood-Coote, Joshua. 2021. “Caliphate… Read More ›
Abstract Van Fraassen infers the truth of the contextual theory from his observation that it has passed a crucial test. Mizrahi infers the comparative truth of our best theories from his observation that they are more successful than their competitors…. Read More ›
Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2021 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Congdon, Matthew. 2021. “Trusting Oneself Through Others: El Kassar on Intellectual Self-Trust.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (1): 48-55. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5DB. ❧ Elzinga, Benjamin. 2021. “Echo Chambers and… Read More ›
Abstract In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism…. Read More ›
Abstract Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. Relative realists object that we cannot make the absolute judgment that a theory is successful, and that we can only make the relative judgment that it… Read More ›
“The Scientism Debate” in Summary In his article “The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?” (2019), Moti Mizrahi sets out to empirically test two hypotheses that putatively explain why philosophers find scientism threatening. The hypotheses are: H1:… Read More ›