Volume 10, Issue 2, February 2021 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Miller, Seumas. 2021. “Regarding Joint Abilities and Joint Know-How: A Reply to Yuri Cath.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (2): 36-42. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5Hh. ❧ Habgood-Coote, Joshua. 2021. “Caliphate… Read More ›
Moti Mizrahi
On the Argument from Double Spaces: A Reply to Moti Mizrahi, Seungbae Park
Abstract Van Fraassen infers the truth of the contextual theory from his observation that it has passed a crucial test. Mizrahi infers the comparative truth of our best theories from his observation that they are more successful than their competitors…. Read More ›
SERRC: Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2021
Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2021 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Congdon, Matthew. 2021. “Trusting Oneself Through Others: El Kassar on Intellectual Self-Trust.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (1): 48-55. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5DB. ❧ Elzinga, Benjamin. 2021. “Echo Chambers and… Read More ›
In Defense of Relative Realism: A Reply to Park, Moti Mizrahi
Abstract In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism…. Read More ›
The Appearance and the Reality of a Scientific Theory, Seungbae Park
Abstract Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. Relative realists object that we cannot make the absolute judgment that a theory is successful, and that we can only make the relative judgment that it… Read More ›
Some Devils in the Details: Methodological Concerns Regarding Mizrahi’s “The Scientism Debate”, Amanda Bryant
“The Scientism Debate” in Summary In his article “The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?” (2019), Moti Mizrahi sets out to empirically test two hypotheses that putatively explain why philosophers find scientism threatening. The hypotheses are: H1:… Read More ›
Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Scientism and Empirical Methods in Philosophy, Ryan Mitchell Wittingslow
Moti Mizrahi, in his 2019 “The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?” argues that the perceived threat of scientism to philosophy hinges upon a confluence of two distinct, but overlapping, phenomena. The first of these phenomena is… Read More ›
Some Demarcations and a Dilemma: Comments On Mizrahi, Kyriaki Grammenou
Let us start by examining a couple of assumptions which, albeit not explicitly, seem to inform Mizrahi’s text. He writes that “many philosophers seem to think that scientism poses a threat to them as teachers” and also that “scientism is… Read More ›
CFP: Weak Scientism and the Future of Philosophy
CFP: Weak Scientism and the Future of Philosophy Topic areas Metaphilosophy General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous Details The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (SERRC) invites contributions to a dialogue on Weak Scientism, which will then serve… Read More ›
Weak Scientism and Triviality: A Response to Moti Mizrahi, Matthew Damore
The crux of Mizrahi’s essay is the thesis that scientific knowledge is the best kind of knowledge. It is quantitatively the best because of the sheer volume of its published research (output) and citations (impact), as compared to other non-scientific… Read More ›