Volume 10, Issue 10, October 2021 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Page, Jennifer. 2021. “De-Moralizing Breastfeeding.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (10): 59-67. ❧ Miller, Seumas. 2021. “Reply to Giangiuseppe Pili’s ‘The Missing Dimension—Intelligence and Social Epistemology’.” Social… Read More ›
Neil Levy
Is Myside Bias Irrational? A Biased Review of The Bias that Divides Us, Neil Levy
The Bias That Divides Us (2021) is about myside bias, the supposed bias whereby we generate and test hypotheses and evaluate evidence in a way that is biased toward our own prior beliefs. Myside bias prevents convergence in beliefs: if… Read More ›
SERRC: Volume 10, Issue 8, August 2021
Volume 10, Issue 8, August 2021 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Richmond, Sheldon. 2021. “Open Letter to Markus Gabriel: A Review of The Power of Art and The Meaning of Thought.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (8): 55-62…. Read More ›
Nudging is Giving Testimony: A Response to Grundmann, Neil Levy
Nudges (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) are ways of changing people’s behavior by changing features of the context in which they choose, rather than by giving them explicit arguments and without removing or unduly burdening the options available to them. The… Read More ›
Reply to Neil Levy’s “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” David Coady
Neil Levy says that he rejects something he calls my “solution to the problem” (2019 fn 3). This is doubly wrong, since I not only don’t advocate the so-called solution he ascribes to me, I also don’t think the so-called… Read More ›
When Is it Right to be Wrong? A Response to Lewandowsky, Kozyreva, and Ladyman, Neil Levy
In “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” (Levy 2019) I argued that conspiratorial ideation—defined as the acceptance (not the generation) of conspiracy theories—might be much more rational than we tend to think. I suggested such ideation might be subjectively rational—rational for the… Read More ›
Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational? Neil Levy
Conspiratorial ideation—as I will call the disposition to be accepting of unwarranted conspiracy theories—is widely regarded as a product of irrationality or epistemic vice. I argue that it is not: the dispositions that underlie it are not rationally criticisable. Some… Read More ›
The Bad News About Fake News, Neil Levy
Author Information: Neil Levy, Macquarie University, neil.nl.levy@gmail.com Levy, Neil. “The Bad News About Fake News.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 8 (2017): 20-36. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3GV Image credit: Paul… Read More ›