Archives For Paul Faulkner

Author Information: Fabien Medvecky, University of Otago,

Medvecky, Fabien. “Knowing From Others: A Review of Knowledge on Trust and A Critical Introduction to Testimony.Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 9 (2015): 11-12.

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Image Credit: Oxford University Press; Bloomsbury Academic

A Critical Introduction to Testimony
Axel Gelfert
Bloomsbury, 2014
264 pp.

Knowledge on Trust
Paul Faulkner
Oxford University Press, 2011
240 pp.

If you are hungry for some reading on testimonial epistemology—the study of knowledge created and gained through testimony—then Axel Gelfert’s introductory text, A Critical Introduction to Testimony (2014), sits as a perfect entrée to Paul Faulkner’s Knowledge on Trust (2011). Both are well written and both are aimed at philosophers, though they are very different in style. While Gelfert’s volume is clearly aimed as an upper undergraduate or postgraduate philosophy course text, presenting the reader with a good overview of the field, Faulkner’s work delves into more specificity as it develops a rich theory of how we acquire new knowledge as a result of testimony. And while I am sympathetic to Faulkner’s views on the role of trust as the foundation for testimonial knowledge, I think his discussion on trust is a little quick.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Paul Faulkner, University of Sheffield,

Faulkner, Paul. 2013. “Two-Stage Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, Dualism and the Problem of Sufficiency.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 121-138.

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Social epistemology should be truth-centred, argues Goldman. Social epistemology should capture the ‘logic of everyday practices’ and describe socially ‘situated’ reasoning, says Fuller. Starting from Goldman’s vision of epistemology, this paper aims to argue for Fuller’s contention. Social epistemology cannot focus solely on the truth because the truth can be got in lucky ways. The same too could be said for reliability. Adding a second layer of epistemic evaluation helps only insofar as the reasons thus specified are appropriately connected to reliability. These claims are first made in abstract, and then developed with regard to our practice of trusting testimony, where an epistemological investigation into the grounds of reliability must inevitably detail the ‘logic of everyday practices’. Continue Reading…

Author Information: Gloria Origgi, CNRS, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris,

Origgi, Gloria. 2012. Reply to Paul Faulkner’s comments. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (10): 1-3

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I thank Paul Faulkner for his insightful comments. I am flattered that he found the time to go through my paper so carefully. Yet, I do not know exactly what I am supposed to do now because the paper is already published and his comments are in the style of a competent “referee” — I should have received it before the publication! Also, we are on a blog of social epistemology, discussing epistemic injustice, and we cannot pretend I have studied analytical philosophy at Oxford. Thus, in order to avoid a conversation that involves the biases, the identity prejudices and the epistemic injustices that we are here to debunk, I ask the reader (Paul included) to situate my intervention (and my paper) as coming from an Italian scholar living and working in France for whom English is her third professional language. Among the many epistemic injustices that we commit in academia, one of the strongest is linguistic injustice — a much debated subject at least in continental Europe [1] — and some of my arguments may appear less convincing than those coming from an Oxford educated philosopher because the style of writing and structuring of thoughts we have learned is radically different. Continue Reading…

Author Information: Paul Faulkner, University of Sheffield,

Faulkner, Paul. 2012. Trust and the assessment of credibility. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (8): 1-6.

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Epistemic failings can be ethical failings. This insight is owed to Miranda Fricker who explores this idea in developing a theory of epistemic injustice. [1] A central type of epistemic injustice is testimonial injustice, where there are two components to this. A knower suffers a testimonial injustice when she is not given due credit and is thereby prevented from doing what is fundamental to being a knower, which is inform others of what she knows. This is the first component, which is epistemic: a testimonial injustice starts with a misjudgement of a knower’s credibility; it starts, in Fricker’s terms, with the knower suffering a credibility deficit. The second, ethical, component is the explanation of this credibility deficit. There is a testimonial injustice when the cause of this credibility deficit is not innocent error but some form of prejudice. Here Fricker wants to draw our attention to one pervasive prejudice, which she calls identity prejudice. [2] This is the prejudice that attaches to a person by virtue of their social identity and which thereby tracks that person through the multitude of social activities, economic, political and so on. Thus the paradigm case of testimonial injustice is identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. [3]

The stated objective of Gloria Origgi’s paper “Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust” is:

to broaden her [Fricker’s] analysis in two ways: first, I will argue that the ways in which credibility judgments are biased go far beyond the central case of identity prejudice; and, second, I will try to detail some of the mechanisms that control our ways of making testimonial injustices to the speakers [sic]. [4]

Continue Reading…