Introduction I’m honoured by Chris Ranalli’s (2020) thought-provoking response to my recent article, “The Epistemic Benefits of Worldview Disagreement” (2020a), which is an expansion of ideas found in my book, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement (2020b). I’m also grateful to… Read More ›
Most attention in the epistemology of disagreement has centered around epistemic peer disagreement. Epistemic peer disagreements are disagreements between epistemic peers over a proposition, p, where epistemic peers are people who are roughly equal to each other in terms of… Read More ›
I am grateful for Jonathan Matheson’s recent review (Matheson 2020) of my book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment (Pittard 2019). Matheson’s excellent summary reflects a very careful reading, and his critical commentary offers important objections that deserve reflection and response…. Read More ›
Author Information: Jensen Alex, Valerie Joly Chock, Kyle Mallard, and Jonathan Matheson, University of North Florida, jonathan.matheson@gmail.com Alex, Jensen, Valerie Joly Chock, Kyle Mallard, and Jonathan Matheson. “Conscientiousness and Other Problems: A Reply to Zagzabski.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective… Read More ›
The following position announcement may be of interest to readers of the SERRC: Canada Research Chair (Tier 2) in Social Epistemology and Cognitive Science. The research foci of this position—distributed cognition, collective epistemic agents, feminist epistemology, group polarization, peer disagreement,… Read More ›