1. Agreements or Quasi-Agreements I am grateful for Shannon Brick’s (2021) perceptive and stimulating critical commentary on my characterization of the phenomenon of ‘testimonial void’ (TV): a newly identified kind of testimonial injustice (TI) according to which “a speaker withholds… Read More ›
testimonial injustice
Obligations of Intellectual Empowerment, Shannon Brick
Epistemic neglect is a kind of epistemic injustice that occurs when educators fail to extend, to their students, “hopeful epistemic trust” (Brick 2020). Hopeful epistemic trust (henceforth, simply ‘hopeful trust’), is trust that is extended not on the basis of… Read More ›
Are “Epistemic” and “Communicative” Models of Silencing in Conflict? Reply to McGlynn, Leo Townsend and Dina Lupin Townsend
We are very grateful to Aidan McGlynn for his thoughtful and generous reply to our paper, “Epistemic Injustice and Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System” (D.L. Townsend and L. Townsend 2021). He is right that our primary interest… Read More ›
Extending the Limits of Epistemic Neglect, Carla Carmona
The concept of epistemic neglect (EN) fills a conceptual lacuna by identifying a kind of epistemic injustice exercised by educators when they fail to extend ‘hopeful trust’, that is, the kind of trust that is knowingly extended despite the lack… Read More ›
Giving, Receiving, and the Virtue of Testimonial Justice, Shannon Brick
In “Silencing by Not Telling: Testimonial Void as a New Kind of Testimonial Injustice” (2021) Carla Carmona claims to have identified a new kind of testimonial injustice. The newly identified injustice is called testimonial void. Testimonial void occurs when a… Read More ›
Echo Chambers, Epistemic Injustice and Anti-Intellectualism, Carline Klijnman
C. Thi Nguyen’s (2020) recent account of echo chambers as social epistemic structures that actively exclude outsiders’ voices has sparked debate on the connection between echo chambers and epistemic injustice (Santos 2021; Catala 2021; Elzinga 2021). In this paper I… Read More ›
Social Imaginary and Epistemic Discrimination: From Global Justice to Epistemic Injustice, Venkatesh Vaditya
The situation of injustice can be defined when someone is denied the value or thing that is otherwise ‘due’ to them or ought to be theirs. They are denied such a value because of their historico-structural location at the margins…. Read More ›
Reply to Neil Levy’s “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” David Coady
Neil Levy says that he rejects something he calls my “solution to the problem” (2019 fn 3). This is doubly wrong, since I not only don’t advocate the so-called solution he ascribes to me, I also don’t think the so-called… Read More ›
Dismissive Incomprehension Revis(it)ed: Testimonial Injustice, Competence, Face and Silence—A New Reply to Cull, Manuel Padilla Cruz
I argued that the detrimental effects of acts of dismissive incomprehension stem from their nature as conflictive verbal actions […] which overtly damage an individual’s quality face as a knower and informer […] In other words, dismissive incomprehension undermines an… Read More ›
Dismissive Incomprehension Revisited: Testimonial Injustice, Saving Face, and Silence, Matthew Cull
Manuel Padilla Cruz has written an excellent response piece (Padilla Cruz 2019) to my initial article (Cull 2019) on dismissive incomprehension, where he raises a number of interesting issues and has put forward a number of excellent ideas for avenues for… Read More ›