I argued that the detrimental effects of acts of dismissive incomprehension stem from their nature as conflictive verbal actions […] which overtly damage an individual’s quality face as a knower and informer […] In other words, dismissive incomprehension undermines an… Read More ›
In “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” (Levy 2019) I argued that conspiratorial ideation—defined as the acceptance (not the generation) of conspiracy theories—might be much more rational than we tend to think. I suggested such ideation might be subjectively rational—rational for the… Read More ›
Neil Levy (2019) provides several new angles on the long-standing question about the rationality, or lack thereof, of people who accept objectively unwarranted conspiracy theories. Levy’s position rests on two arguments. First, accepting conspiracy theories is subjectively rational for many… Read More ›
Conspiratorial ideation—as I will call the disposition to be accepting of unwarranted conspiracy theories—is widely regarded as a product of irrationality or epistemic vice. I argue that it is not: the dispositions that underlie it are not rationally criticisable. Some… Read More ›
In a game of telephone, or as we called it “whisper down the lane”, someone whispers a sentence to someone else, and then that person whispers it to yet another person, and on and on it goes until the end… Read More ›
Here’s a plausible definition of an ally: an individual who supports a non-dominant group’s pursuit of their justice-based interests. One way to develop a more detailed theory of an ally is by specifying ‘support a non-dominant group’s pursuit of their… Read More ›
Author Information: Manuel Padilla Cruz, Universidad de Sevilla, mpadillacruz@us.es Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “One Thing is Testimonial Injustice and Another Is Conceptual Competence Injustice.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 3 (2018): 9-19. The pdf of the article gives specific page… Read More ›
Ben Almassi, Governors State University, balmassi@govst.edu Almassi, Ben. “Comments on Tim Kenyon’s ‘Oral History and the Epistemology of Testimony’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 12 (2015): 56-61. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink:… Read More ›
Author Information: Jeremy Fantl, University of Calgary, jfantl@ucalgary.ca Fantl, Jeremy. “Interest-Relativity and Testimony.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 11 (2015): 40-46. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-2tz Please refer to: Freedman, Karyn… Read More ›
Author Information: Rebecca Kukla, Georgetown University, rkukla@gmail.com Kukla, Rebecca. “A Further Look at Standards of Justification.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 9 (2015): 63-65. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-2j7 Please refer… Read More ›