1. Introduction When you expect something bad to happen, you take action to avoid it. That is the principle of action that underlies J. Y. Lee’s recent paper (2021), which presents a new form of epistemic injustice that arises from… Read More ›
Testimony
Giving, Receiving, and the Virtue of Testimonial Justice, Shannon Brick
In “Silencing by Not Telling: Testimonial Void as a New Kind of Testimonial Injustice” (2021) Carla Carmona claims to have identified a new kind of testimonial injustice. The newly identified injustice is called testimonial void. Testimonial void occurs when a… Read More ›
Epistemic Norms and Failures of Reporting, Beba Cibralic
In “Caliphate and the Social Epistemology of Podcasts”, Josh Habgood-Coote (2021) writes that the New York Times’ (referred to as the Times throughout) podcast Caliphate’s central flaw is that it “failed to accurately represent the credibility of someone whose speech… Read More ›
Caliphate and the Social Epistemology of Podcasts, Joshua Habgood-Coote
In “Caliphate’ and the Problem of Testimony,” Beba Cibralic (2020) argues that the New York Times (NYT) podcast Caliphate represents an epistemic failure that is similar in kind to its failures in reporting on weapons of mass destruction in the… Read More ›
‘Caliphate’ and the Problem of Testimony, Beba Cibralic
In 2004, the New York Times apologised for its misleading reporting on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After an internal review, the Times acknowledged the swamp of mistakes that resulted in the spread of misinformation: journalists did not confirm… Read More ›
Dismissive Incomprehension Revis(it)ed: Testimonial Injustice, Competence, Face and Silence—A New Reply to Cull, Manuel Padilla Cruz
I argued that the detrimental effects of acts of dismissive incomprehension stem from their nature as conflictive verbal actions […] which overtly damage an individual’s quality face as a knower and informer […] In other words, dismissive incomprehension undermines an… Read More ›
When Is it Right to be Wrong? A Response to Lewandowsky, Kozyreva, and Ladyman, Neil Levy
In “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” (Levy 2019) I argued that conspiratorial ideation—defined as the acceptance (not the generation) of conspiracy theories—might be much more rational than we tend to think. I suggested such ideation might be subjectively rational—rational for the… Read More ›
What Rationality? A Comment on Levy’s “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” Stephan Lewandowsky, Anastasia Kozyreva, and James Ladyman
Neil Levy (2019) provides several new angles on the long-standing question about the rationality, or lack thereof, of people who accept objectively unwarranted conspiracy theories. Levy’s position rests on two arguments. First, accepting conspiracy theories is subjectively rational for many… Read More ›
Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational? Neil Levy
Conspiratorial ideation—as I will call the disposition to be accepting of unwarranted conspiracy theories—is widely regarded as a product of irrationality or epistemic vice. I argue that it is not: the dispositions that underlie it are not rationally criticisable. Some… Read More ›
Beyond Testimony: When Online Information Sharing is not Testifying, Emily Sullivan
In a game of telephone, or as we called it “whisper down the lane”, someone whispers a sentence to someone else, and then that person whispers it to yet another person, and on and on it goes until the end… Read More ›