In their paper arguing that ‘educational’ solutions to fake news are superior to ‘structural’ solutions, Michel Croce and Tommaso Piazza (2021) challenge my earlier (Rini 2017) claim that the spread of fake news results (partly) from an individually reasonable practice… Read More ›
Testimony
The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging: Reply to My Critics, Thomas Grundmann
In “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging” (2021), I address a phenomenon that is widely neglected in the current literature on nudges: intentional doxastic nudging, i.e. people’s intentional influence over other people’s beliefs, rather than over their choices. I argue that,… Read More ›
A Further Characterization of Testimonial Void in Dialogue with Other Forms of Testimonial Injustice, Carla Carmona
1. Agreements or Quasi-Agreements I am grateful for Shannon Brick’s (2021) perceptive and stimulating critical commentary on my characterization of the phenomenon of ‘testimonial void’ (TV): a newly identified kind of testimonial injustice (TI) according to which “a speaker withholds… Read More ›
Anticipation, Smothering, and Education: A Reply to Lee and Bayruns García on Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice, Trystan S. Goetze
1. Introduction When you expect something bad to happen, you take action to avoid it. That is the principle of action that underlies J. Y. Lee’s recent paper (2021), which presents a new form of epistemic injustice that arises from… Read More ›
Giving, Receiving, and the Virtue of Testimonial Justice, Shannon Brick
In “Silencing by Not Telling: Testimonial Void as a New Kind of Testimonial Injustice” (2021) Carla Carmona claims to have identified a new kind of testimonial injustice. The newly identified injustice is called testimonial void. Testimonial void occurs when a… Read More ›
Epistemic Norms and Failures of Reporting, Beba Cibralic
In “Caliphate and the Social Epistemology of Podcasts”, Josh Habgood-Coote (2021) writes that the New York Times’ (referred to as the Times throughout) podcast Caliphate’s central flaw is that it “failed to accurately represent the credibility of someone whose speech… Read More ›
Caliphate and the Social Epistemology of Podcasts, Joshua Habgood-Coote
In “Caliphate’ and the Problem of Testimony,” Beba Cibralic (2020) argues that the New York Times (NYT) podcast Caliphate represents an epistemic failure that is similar in kind to its failures in reporting on weapons of mass destruction in the… Read More ›
‘Caliphate’ and the Problem of Testimony, Beba Cibralic
In 2004, the New York Times apologised for its misleading reporting on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After an internal review, the Times acknowledged the swamp of mistakes that resulted in the spread of misinformation: journalists did not confirm… Read More ›
Dismissive Incomprehension Revis(it)ed: Testimonial Injustice, Competence, Face and Silence—A New Reply to Cull, Manuel Padilla Cruz
I argued that the detrimental effects of acts of dismissive incomprehension stem from their nature as conflictive verbal actions […] which overtly damage an individual’s quality face as a knower and informer […] In other words, dismissive incomprehension undermines an… Read More ›
When Is it Right to be Wrong? A Response to Lewandowsky, Kozyreva, and Ladyman, Neil Levy
In “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” (Levy 2019) I argued that conspiratorial ideation—defined as the acceptance (not the generation) of conspiracy theories—might be much more rational than we tend to think. I suggested such ideation might be subjectively rational—rational for the… Read More ›