Neil Levy (2019) provides several new angles on the long-standing question about the rationality, or lack thereof, of people who accept objectively unwarranted conspiracy theories. Levy’s position rests on two arguments. First, accepting conspiracy theories is subjectively rational for many… Read More ›
Testimony
Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational? Neil Levy
Conspiratorial ideation—as I will call the disposition to be accepting of unwarranted conspiracy theories—is widely regarded as a product of irrationality or epistemic vice. I argue that it is not: the dispositions that underlie it are not rationally criticisable. Some… Read More ›
Beyond Testimony: When Online Information Sharing is not Testifying, Emily Sullivan
In a game of telephone, or as we called it “whisper down the lane”, someone whispers a sentence to someone else, and then that person whispers it to yet another person, and on and on it goes until the end… Read More ›
Richly Trustworthy Allies, William Tuckwell
Here’s a plausible definition of an ally: an individual who supports a non-dominant group’s pursuit of their justice-based interests. One way to develop a more detailed theory of an ally is by specifying ‘support a non-dominant group’s pursuit of their… Read More ›
One Thing is Testimonial Injustice and Another Is Conceptual Competence Injustice, Manuel Padilla Cruz
Author Information: Manuel Padilla Cruz, Universidad de Sevilla, mpadillacruz@us.es Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “One Thing is Testimonial Injustice and Another Is Conceptual Competence Injustice.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 3 (2018): 9-19. The pdf of the article gives specific page… Read More ›
Comments on Tim Kenyon’s “Oral History and the Epistemology of Testimony”, Ben Almassi
Ben Almassi, Governors State University, balmassi@govst.edu Almassi, Ben. “Comments on Tim Kenyon’s ‘Oral History and the Epistemology of Testimony’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 12 (2015): 56-61. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink:… Read More ›
Interest-Relativity and Testimony, Jeremy Fantl
Author Information: Jeremy Fantl, University of Calgary, jfantl@ucalgary.ca Fantl, Jeremy. “Interest-Relativity and Testimony.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 11 (2015): 40-46. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-2tz Please refer to: Freedman, Karyn… Read More ›
A Further Look at Standards of Justification, Rebecca Kukla
Author Information: Rebecca Kukla, Georgetown University, rkukla@gmail.com Kukla, Rebecca. “A Further Look at Standards of Justification.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 9 (2015): 63-65. The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-2j7 Please refer… Read More ›
Knowing from Others: A Review of Knowledge on Trust and A Critical Introduction to Testimony, Fabien Medvecky
Author Information: Fabien Medvecky, University of Otago, fabien.medvecky@otgao.ac.nz Medvecky, Fabien. “Knowing From Others: A Review of Knowledge on Trust and A Critical Introduction to Testimony.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 9 (2015): 11-12. The PDF of the article… Read More ›
Group Accountability Versus Justified Belief: A Reply to Kukla, Karyn L. Freedman
Author Information: Karyn L. Freedman, University of Guelph, karynf@uoguelph.ca Freedman, Karyn L. “Group Accountability Versus Justified Belief: A Reply to Kukla.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 7 (2015): 6-12. The PDF of the article gives specific page… Read More ›