There’s a certain pleasure in accounts that debunk some of our most highly prized traits, especially when they’re seen to stem from science. Scientists and those who see themselves as scientifically minded often tell us that science shows that free… Read More ›
In “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging” (2021), I address a phenomenon that is widely neglected in the current literature on nudges: intentional doxastic nudging, i.e. people’s intentional influence over other people’s beliefs, rather than over their choices. I argue that,… Read More ›
Nudges (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) are ways of changing people’s behavior by changing features of the context in which they choose, rather than by giving them explicit arguments and without removing or unduly burdening the options available to them. The… Read More ›
In “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging” (2021), Thomas Grundmann examines nudging as applied to doxastic attitudes. Grundmann argues that given the right presuppositions about knowledge, justified beliefs, and the relevant belief-forming processes, doxastic nudging can result in justified beliefs and… Read More ›