Testimony and Morality Let us now turn to the second objection. According to it, it can be rational to take another person’s word and believe her even in cases where one does not vindicate one’s view about the speaker’s trustworthiness… Read More ›
trust
On the Rationality of Word-Taking, Part I, Juha Räikkä
Abstract It is rather commonly assumed that “trustworthiness” is a trait among others and can be appraised with evidence, although trust may go beyond evidence in some cases. It is also rather commonly assumed that a sort of estimation of… Read More ›
SERRC: Volume 11, Issue 5, May 2022
Volume 11, Issue 5, 1-79, May 2022 Articles, Replies, and Reviews ❧ Riggio, Adam. 2022. “Becoming Gestalt: Human and Algorithmic Intelligence—Review of Machine Habitus.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (5): 1-11. ❧ Prusik, Charles A. 2022. “Reply to… Read More ›
A Few Words on #Trust, Patricia Wong
I am not a philosopher. I am a mathematician. I have taught mathematics for more than 30 years, and so, when it comes to knowledge, I am comfortable only where certainty can be obtained, or, if it cannot be obtained,… Read More ›
Epistemic Norms and Failures of Reporting, Beba Cibralic
In “Caliphate and the Social Epistemology of Podcasts”, Josh Habgood-Coote (2021) writes that the New York Times’ (referred to as the Times throughout) podcast Caliphate’s central flaw is that it “failed to accurately represent the credibility of someone whose speech… Read More ›
Trusting Oneself Through Others: El Kassar on Intellectual Self-Trust, Matthew Congdon
In a pair of recent and illuminating articles, Nadja El Kassar develops a notion of intellectual self-trust and argues that it should play a central role in theorizing epistemic agency under oppression. Though the two articles focus on different theoretical… Read More ›
‘Caliphate’ and the Problem of Testimony, Beba Cibralic
In 2004, the New York Times apologised for its misleading reporting on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After an internal review, the Times acknowledged the swamp of mistakes that resulted in the spread of misinformation: journalists did not confirm… Read More ›
Coalitions of Trust: Using Epistemic Teams to Identify Experts, Jamie Carlin Watson
I appreciate the opportunity to continue this conversation on how non-experts might identify and, thereby, come to trust experts. While so much of contemporary philosophical discussion might be called destructive—attempts to defeat an “opponent’s” claims through counterexample—this forum has been… Read More ›
When Is it Right to be Wrong? A Response to Lewandowsky, Kozyreva, and Ladyman, Neil Levy
In “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” (Levy 2019) I argued that conspiratorial ideation—defined as the acceptance (not the generation) of conspiracy theories—might be much more rational than we tend to think. I suggested such ideation might be subjectively rational—rational for the… Read More ›
What Rationality? A Comment on Levy’s “Is Conspiracy Theorising Irrational?” Stephan Lewandowsky, Anastasia Kozyreva, and James Ladyman
Neil Levy (2019) provides several new angles on the long-standing question about the rationality, or lack thereof, of people who accept objectively unwarranted conspiracy theories. Levy’s position rests on two arguments. First, accepting conspiracy theories is subjectively rational for many… Read More ›