Archives For Wayne Riggs

Author Information: David Coady, University of Tasmania, Australia, david.coady@utas.edu.au

Coady, David. 2012. Decision-making and credibility. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (8): 13-15

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-pq

Professor Wayne Riggs has made a generous and thoughtful response to my comments on his article. I would like to offer some further comments on the matter, which I hope will be constructive.

Both Riggs and Fricker claimed that the fictional character Herbert Greenleaf was not culpable for the epistemic harm he did Marge Sherwood. They both argued that since Greenleaf could not reasonably be expected to know better (and so avoid causing the harm), he is not to blame. I responded that this argument lets Greenleaf (and others like him) off too lightly. One can reasonably expect (i.e. predict) that people will do bad things (or fail to do good things), and still rightly hold them responsible for what they do (or fail to do). Riggs responds to my objection by noting an ambiguity in the word “expect”: Continue Reading…

Author Information: Wayne Riggs, University of Oklahoma, wriggs@ou.edu

Riggs, Wayne. 2012. Response to David Coady. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (7): 17-20.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-nG

Please refer to:

First, let me thank Professor Coady for his insightful comments on my article. They highlight several points that are well worth going over in more detail. Indeed, my thinking on these issues has deepened as a consequence of reading his responses, and for that I am doubly grateful.

Coady’s comments focus on my characterization of (Fricker’s account of) epistemic injustice as a kind of epistemic and/or moral negligence. (My goals in the paper were primarily exegetical, so I did not mean to commit myself to this account of epistemic injustice. But since I also did not disavow it, it is quite reasonable for Coady to have taken my silence to indicate assent.) Coady takes issue first with my proposed conditions on negligence in general, and then with the idea that the full range of epistemic injustices can be accounted for as forms of negligence. I will respond to these criticisms in turn. Continue Reading…

Author Information: David Coady, University of Tasmania, David.Coady@utas.edu.au

Coady, David. 2012. Critical reply to “Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic or Aretetic?” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (5): 3-6.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-jP

Please refer to:

Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic of Aretetic?” is an excellent piece of constructive criticism of Miranda Fricker’s important work on testimonial injustice. I agree with much that Riggs says. In particular, I agree with him that Fricker’s work on this subject owes more to the Kantian deontological tradition than it does to the Aristotelian virtue ethical tradition. In what follows, I will take issue, not with the substance of Riggs’ article, but with some subsidiary points, which, I think, are of some importance. Continue Reading…