



<http://social-epistemology.com>  
ISSN: 2471-9560

Everybody Stands Ready for eXcetera: Rhetoric of Science meets the Pickwick Papers; or A Humble Reply to Morales (and Gruber and Pietrucci)

Randy Allen Harris, University of Waterloo, [raha@uwaterloo.ca](mailto:raha@uwaterloo.ca)

---

Harris, Randy Allen. 2022. "Everybody Stands Ready for eXcetera: Rhetoric of Science meets the Pickwick Papers; or A Humble Reply to Morales (and Gruber and Pietrucci)." *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 11 (4): 26-50. <https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-6H0>.

## Installment I

Many thanks to Alexander William Morales for continuing this dialogue, and to SERRC for this wonderful venue. I'm happy to reply to Morales and answer a few of his questions, but Jim Collier, our illustrious editor, suggested that this might also be a good opportunity to talk more generally about the future of Rhetoric of Science (RoS) studies, when—Lo! Behold! And Holy Good Timing, Batman!—another review, or rather, a tandem of two review articles, came out which focusses largely on that future, as well as the perceived successes and failures of the *Landmark Essays* volumes to properly ground that future (Pietrucci and Gruber 2022).

I couldn't be more delighted that early-career scholars are using the two *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science* volumes as a platform to meditate about the field, to militate about missed representations, and to agitate for particular futures. In an extraordinarily precise sense, that is exactly what the anthologies are meant to do: support and encourage, if not provoke, RoS scholarship. So, rather than rattle on in isolation about these issues, I'll engage David R. Gruber and Pamela Pietrucci's review article(s) here as well, alongside Morales's.<sup>1</sup> They use my volumes as an opportunity to develop their positions; using their essays, I will reciprocate.

But, I confess Dear Reader, that once I started reciprocating my keyboard heated up. When I dropped my thousands and thousands of word on our Good Editor's desk, Jim Collier was aghast. He professed to be aghast in a good way. "Great Googly Moogly!" he decried, or something like that. "It's a serial novel!" So, these reciprocations, speculations, and mediations will appear in three Installments.<sup>2</sup>

## Introduction

Morales and Pietrucci and Gruber use the time-honoured scholarly strategy of hypophora—the title asks a question, the body provides the answer—but to very different ends. Morales asks "Why *didn't* I decide to pick a fight with Harris?" Pietrucci and Gruber ask "Where did the rhetoric of science go?" You'll notice right off the bat that the first question is largely introspective and centripetal, the second appraisive and centrifugal, and also that the second question has a big, honking thumb on the scale: the presupposition that rhetoric of science is gone.

---

<sup>1</sup> The format of Pietrucci and Gruber (2022) is a little unusual. *Poroi* treats it in all ways as a single article. But Gruber and Pietrucci ostensibly divide the volumes between them, Gruber focussing on *Case Studies*, Pietrucci on *Issues and Methods*, writing independently attributed but thematically interpenetrating articles (sometimes self-referring with singular pronouns, sometimes plural), and both of them refer to the set. The collaboration is close. I will generally cite them collectively, as *Pietrucci and Gruber (2022)*, but there are also a few occasions where it seems to make more sense to site them individually, as *Gruber (2022)* and *Pietrucci (2022)*.

<sup>2</sup> All the works cited in the three installments are listed immediately after Instalment III.

Morales's question ("Why *didn't* I decide to pick a fight with Harris?") has nothing to do with your Humble Narrator's internationally famous congeniality (I'm too nice a guy to pick on); nor on the converse, my rumoured pugnacity (I'm too redoubtable a battler to take a swipe at); nor even with Morales's very evident good will (he's too pleasant a guy to go looking for a scrap). Rather, it is abstract and methodological, concerning the epistemic wholesomeness of disputes. It's not about me, it's about the role of contention in scholarship and how to make one's way as a young scholar.

Enter Gruber and Pietrucci, stage left. Their question is a poke in the nose. They hold up two volumes entitled *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science* and ask "Where did the rhetoric of science go?" Don't get me wrong. Pietrucci and Gruber are highly collegial, and their review is absolutely written in the service of the discipline. They aren't out for blood. But they are arguing for a vision of the future that starts with the assumption that these volumes are obsolete. So, perhaps my response to them can help to illustrate an answer to Morales's guiding question, why fight?

Gruber and Pietrucci are scholars, excellent ones, so they don't drop their presupposition on my books and walk away. They offer solid arguments, mostly around the instability of *science* as a signifier of the domain it purports to represent in RoS, the frailty of the rhetorical tradition as a foundation for studying science, the false sense of stability my two volumes assert, and the necessity of (what I would call) exogenous frameworks for buttressing rhetoric when it studies science.

Alan G. Gross comes up yet again, of course. The familiar cry of "Where's the rhetoric?" will echo through some passages, alongside the various existential crises that interrogative may or may not signal, the future will always be on our minds, the role of controversy in scholarship will get discussed and performed, we will hear more about the trials and tribulations of anthologizing, and—batten the hatches!—there will be a wealth of reading suggestions.

I assume naturally that you have read the previous contributions to this dialogue—Morales's review, my response, and Morales's further commentary—or you probably wouldn't even be here. Now, I know you're busy and we really appreciate the time that you have spared for us here (me and all the proxies I implicate), but I'm going to ask you, Dear and Sagacious Reader, to inform your sagacity a little further yet: please read Pietrucci and Gruber (2022) before proceeding. I'll be here when you get back. There's always the chance that you'll find their articles utterly crushing and won't see the need to come back. I'll take that risk, firstly because it is an excellent probing of the field by our best and brightest which anyone interested in RoS in particular and Science Studies more generally should read anyways, but secondly because it will help to hold me accountable, so you can tell if I am representing their claims reasonably and judge my responses accordingly. It's never good to get only one side of an argument.

First, however, about those landmarks ...

### **Landmarks Galore!**

As one would expect from such a review, Gruber and Pietrucci engage extensively in that wonderful sport of Armchair Anthologizing. As the relevant Behind-the-Bench Anthologizer, it is hard not to take some umbrage, but I will put most of the umbrage where it belongs, in a footnote,<sup>3</sup> and content myself in the body here with giving an extra shout out to the excellent essays they admonish me for omitting (full references at the end of Installment III).<sup>4</sup>

- Valeria Fabj and Matthew J. Sobnosky (1995), AIDS activism and the rejuvenation of the public sphere;

---

<sup>3</sup> As the following list indicates, they are mostly concerned with omissions, Gruber predominantly with the omission of articles on medical science in *Issues and Methods* (“[the] Rhetoric of Health and Medicine is largely absent;” Gruber 2022, 8), Pietrucci with the omission in *Case Studies* of what she calls “the external approach to RoS,” which she associates most fully with the Public Understanding of Science; Pietrucci 2022, 14). Gruber is certainly right. In fact, even that *largely* can be removed. Aside from some very peripheral mentions throughout, as I note in the introduction, “the entire domain of medical science is absent;” Harris 2020a, x). But Pietrucci, in my construal of the terms, is quite wrong. Waddell’s (2020/1990) study of the Cambridge Experimentation Review Board hearings on recombinant DNA research is the landmark in this area, alongside which certainly belong Weaver (2018/1953), for historical provenance, Reeves (2018/1992), for its focus on the major public health crisis of the latter 20th century, HIV/AIDS, and Mehlenbacher and Miller (2018/2017) for its extension to emerging internet genres—as do all of them for their outright excellence. They make up the section entitled “Public Science.” Leah Ceccarelli’s (2018/2011) “Manufactured scientific controversy: Science, rhetoric, and public debate” is also included in another section. (By the way, Pietrucci rightly chides me for including it in that section—“Conflict in Science”—noting that Ceccarelli’s whole point is that the conflicts she examines *do not occur at all in science*; that the appearance of conflict among scientists is manufactured for anti-scientific purposes (Pietrucci 2022, 16-17). Here we see another how-the-sausages-are-made aspect of anthologizing of the sort that I mention in my first response to Morales, “X marks the spot” (Harris 2021). The fact is that Ceccarelli’s article was too good and too influential to leave out, but I couldn’t justify bumping Mehlenbacher and Miller’s piece from “Public Science,” which was too recent to really qualify as a landmark but which dealt with the influence of the internet on science, a landmark shift in terms of genre theory, a landmark methodology, and which I trust time and citations will ratify as ‘true’ landmark; too, Pietrucci commends me for including it (Pietrucci 2022, 16). Thus, I manufactured a rationale for including Ceccarelli’s article in “Conflicts.”) Again, while Gruber is certainly right about the absence of Health and Medicine, and absolutely right to bring it up in a discussion of *Landmark Essays* and the future of RoS, I am a bit disappointed he didn’t acknowledge my explicitly presented reasoning about the omission, leaving the impression the lack of health and medicine articles was through negligence, or perhaps my out-of-touchness with contemporary RoS, rather than a principled choice of my anthology strategy. What I say in the preface is that I have omitted Rhetoric of Health and Medicine articles in *Issues and Methods*, “because it has effectively become its own brilliant subfield, one that deserves a *Landmark Essays* offering of its own” (2020a, x). One can disagree with that reasoning. I am frankly a bit uneasy about it myself, but I had to make hard decisions on selection criteria, with only a few hundred pages to work with, and I bit the bullet. So, Gruber can disagree with my rationale, as he does, but not mentioning the rationale at all borders on the discourteous. Similarly, Pietrucci seems to overlook my selection criteria for the second edition of *Case Studies*, which was to keep every section intact from the first edition but to add a single post-1997 article to each. Again, the reasoning can be rejected, or an argument for a different addition to “Public Science” than Mehlenbacher and Miller (2018/2017) might be offered, but ignoring my rationale is bad form. Oh, and one more piece of the sausage: Pietrucci identifies Jeanne D. Fahnestock’s wonderful (1987) “Accommodating science: The rhetorical life of scientific facts,” as a landmark that should not have been overlooked. She’s right, but I opted for Fahnestock’s (2020/1989) “Arguing in different forums: The Bering crossover controversy” in the first edition, which contains many of the same arguments and observations, in large part because it more fully fits the case study genre.

<sup>4</sup> While all of these are mentioned in Pietrucci and Gruber, not all of them appear in their Works Cited list.

- Jeanne D. Fahnestock (1998), Accommodating science: The rhetorical life of scientific facts;
- S. Scott Graham and Carl Herndl (2013), Multiple ontologies in pain management: Toward a postplural rhetoric of science;
- Debra Hawhee (2015), Rhetoric's sensorium;
- Leo R Chavez, Belinda Campos, Karina Corona, Daina Sanchez, and Catherine Belyeu Ruiz (2019), Words hurt: Political rhetoric, emotions/affect, and psychological well-being among Mexican-origin youth;
- S. Scott Graham and Lynda Walsh (2019), There's no such thing as a scientific controversy;
- Pamela Pietrucci and Leah Ceccarelli (2019), Scientist citizens: Rhetoric and responsibility in L'Aquila;<sup>5</sup>
- Diane Marie Keeling, Patricia Garza, Charisse Michelle Nartey, and Anne-Ruxandra Carvunis (2020) The recalcitrance and resilience of scientific function;
- Pamela Pietrucci (2020), Blasting for science.

I don't endorse each and every one of these suggestions with the same enthusiasm as do Pietrucci and Gruber, though not for reasons of quality (they are all quite wonderful), but I *do* endorse them and I considered several of them seriously for inclusion, leaving them aside with some regret. I especially rue not being able to find room for Graham and Herndl (2013), because it is very good, because it implicates important issues in a way I am happy to hereby designate *landmark*, and because it would have given me the opportunity to pick a bone with them about their misrepresentation of Harris (2005), *Rhetoric and Incommensurability*.<sup>6</sup> Many of these suggestions were published too late for either volume, of course, but all of them are absolutely worth your attention and several of them are stellar.

---

<sup>5</sup> If you really want to have some fun, check out Feldbacher-Escamilla (2019, 2020), DeVasto (2020), and Pietrucci and Ceccarelli (2020) as well.

<sup>6</sup> OK, while we're on the subject, I'll pick that bone here. Graham and Herndl are largely accurate and respectful in the way they describe my apparatus, but they seem to misconstrue my claims about it—perhaps willfully, since it gives them a useful foil, though perhaps I am just unclear in the essay they invoke (the introduction to Harris 2005). Maybe it isn't sufficiently apparent there what I regard as the 'true' situation with incommensurability in science with respect to how the historical, sociological, philosophical, and sometimes rhetorical literature (at least prior to 2005) treats incommensurability in science. The elaborate taxonomy I offer and the incommensurometer (the first concerned with categories, the second with degrees) are ways of diagnosing scientific misalignments that are called *incommensurable* in that literature, not ways of diagnosing scientific practice. The apparatus identifies zones where compatibilities, adjustments, and mutual benign neglect can be pursued, not where irresolvable blockages lie. My stance, and the stance of all the contributors to that volume except Gross, is that incommensurability is artifactual—a product not of symbolic constructs (such as theories), still less of methods and practices, but of the unwillingness of (some) scientists; “not of theories (things), but of theorists (people)” (Harris 2005, 92). Graham and Herndl, though, offer a multiple-ontologies model as an “alternative to incommensurability” (Graham and Herndl 2013, 104). In effect, they argue that incommensurability does not (or perhaps need not) really exist. They argue that point convincingly and empirically by noting how in both the RoS and the STS literature there are numerous examples of cross-disciplinary collaboration that could not happen if incommensurability was a thing, and by their own rich case study of the Midwest Pain Group (MPG). They find that “practical strategies of alignment, incorporation, coordination, and calibration describe a flexible repertoire of rhetorical processes ... [that] provide the members of the MPG with professional and rhetorical resources to develop alliances across disciplines, to work together toward a new language to describe pain (Graham and Herndl, 2011), and to integrate different forms of practical pain management” (Graham and Herndl 2013, 122). Bingo, bango, boingo! That is precisely the argument of Harris (2005). Graham and Herndl identify exactly the sorts of tools and techniques that are

Frankly, I wouldn't mind sitting in that armchair for a spell myself, budgets and page-counts and quasi-arbitrary selection criteria be damned. So here are a few essays I would have liked to see in one or the other of the *Landmark* volumes:

- Don Geiger (1958), Rhetoric and science: Notes for a distinction;
- James A. Kelso (1980), Science and the rhetoric of reality;
- Wilda Anderson (1989), Scientific nomenclature and revolutionary rhetoric;
- Lynette Hunter (1991), Rhetoric and Artificial Intelligence;
- Dale L. Sullivan (1991), The epideictic rhetoric of science;
- Marouf Hasian, Jr. and Earl Croasmun (1992), The legitimizing function of judicial rhetoric in the eugenics controversy;
- Heather Brodie Graves (1995), Rhetoric and reality in the process of scientific inquiry;
- Celeste M. Condit (1996), How bad science stays that way: Brain sex, demarcation, and the status of truth in the rhetoric of science;
- Elinor Ochs and Sally Jacoby (1997), Down to the wire: The cultural clock of physicists and the discourse of consensus;
- Catherine F. Schryer (1999), Genre time/space: Chronotopic strategies in the experimental article;
- Philip C. Wander and Dennis Jaehne (2000), Prospects for 'a rhetoric of science';
- Nathan Crick (2004). Conquering our imagination: Thought experiments and enthymemes in scientific argument;
- Marie Secor and Lynda Walsh. (2004), A rhetorical perspective on the Sokal hoax: Genre, style, and context;
- Marouf Hasian, Jr. (2004), Transnational genome debates and the return of eugenics;
- John Angus Campbell (2005), The "anxiety of influence"—hermeneutic rhetoric and the triumph of Darwin's invention over incommensurability.
- Jeanne D. Fahnestock (2005), Cell and membrane: The rhetorical strategies of a marginalized view;
- Jeanne D. Fahnestock (2005), Rhetoric of science: Enriching the discipline
- Judy Z. Segal (2007), Illness as argumentation: A prolegomenon to the rhetorical study of contestable complaints;
- Celeste M. Condit (2008), Feminist biologies: Revising feminist strategies and biological science;
- Colleen Derkatch (2008), Method as argument: Boundary work in evidence-based medicine;
- Jordynn Jack (2009), A pedagogy of sight: Microscopic vision in Robert Hooke's *Micrographia*;

---

deployed when scientists and practitioners are willing to work together, which is what I call for there (and what several of its essays demonstrate). 'Incommensurability' in the terms of Harris (2005) is a family of rhetorical moves to dismiss and undermine rival positions, strategically or instinctively, not a theory of scientific practice that precludes calibration, coordination, alignment, or other methods of scientific cooperation.

- Carolyn Skinner (2009), “She will have science”: Ethos and audience in Mary Gove’s *Lectures to ladies*;
- Carol Reeves (2011), Scientific visuals, language, and the commercialization of a scientific idea: The strange case of the prion;
- Kathryn M. Northcut (2011), Insights from illustrators: The Rhetorical invention of paleontology representations;
- Simon Locke. (2013), Colouring in the “black-box”: Alternative renderings of scientific visualisations in two comic book cosmologies;
- Celeste M. Condit (2013) “Mind the gaps”: Hidden purposes and missing internationalism in scholarship on the rhetoric of science and technology in public discourse;
- Blake Scott, Judy Z. Segal, and Lisa Keränen (2013), Rhetoric of health and medicine: Inventional possibilities for scholarship and engaged practice;
- Jennifer Clary-Lemon (2019), Persuasive movement: The rhetoricity of things.

All of these essays were considered for the books (as were, again, a few from Gruber and Pietrucci’s list(s)), with some of them very near misses indeed. We can rehearse the reasons I wanted to include them quickly enough—they are very good, each with significant contributions to the development of the field—but we can’t revisit each of my individual decisions for why I eventually decided to leave them out in favour of one or another of the essays that did end up in the volumes (though some of pressures behind that reasoning are no doubt rather obvious, such as the second-edition strategy of *Case Studies*, which only allowed for four new essays).

It is worth commenting on a few choices however, particularly on my exclusion of Segal (2007), Derkatch (2008), Graham and Herndl (2013), and Scott et al (2013), all of which implicate the rhetoric(s) of health, wellness, and medicine, a very significant domain of contemporary science. The omission of this domain is one of the most prominent ways in which Gruber points out how the “present [in rhetorical scholarship] is not always very harmonious with the history showcased in [the *Landmark* volumes]”. The lack of essays concerning the rhetoric(s) of health, wellness, and medicine is part of a broader pattern of exclusions for which Gruber indicts the *Issues and Methods* volume in particular.

We will get to that broader argument shortly, but I do want to plead for an independent *Landmark* volume that would compensate for health and medicine exclusions here (as I suggest in the *Issues and Methods* preface; Harris 2020a, x). In fact, I have encouraged the series editors to solicit such a volume, and even lobbied a couple rhetoricians of health and medicine to propose such a volume, but it has not yet come about. So, I turn to you, Dear Reader. There are some good collections of such work, including Heifferon and Brown (2008), Melonçon and Scott (2017), and Melonçon et al (2020), as well as important monographs, including Keränen (2010), Graham (2015), Derkatch (2016), and the groundbreaking Segal (2005); there is even a dedicated journal, *The Rhetoric of Health and Medicine*. But there still is no *Landmark Essays* volume yet. There are lots of arguments to be had over canon formation and maintenance, but my own view is that canons are absolutely essential for grad students and junior scholars, so that they can get a steady foothold on the field and make their way in part by contesting and reconfiguring that canon as their

scholarship develops (Pietrucci and Gruber 2022 is, as it should be, partially in the business of canon contestation.)

If you feel this oversight, the lack of landmark curation for rhetoric of health and medicine as keenly as Gruber and I feel it, please propose a volume to the folks at Routledge/Taylor and Francis.

Pietrucci and Gruber also lament the lack of diversity and inclusiveness among the voices in my two anthologies (2022, 5), lamentation I feel keenly myself. Gruber and Pietrucci are not only right to express their dissatisfaction and disappointment on this front, but, like all of us, *obligated* to do so. The more this issue is raised, the more scholars like me are held accountable, the people assembling collections like these, the healthier it is for the discipline and the stronger our chances of achieving the greater diversity of voices we all desire. My generation is certainly responsible for the current (but finally, slowly fading) lack of diversity in the academy overall and rhetoric specifically.<sup>7</sup> Some of us, I know, have made efforts, as departmental officers, as referees, in the classroom, on hiring committees, and so on, to attract, support, and nurture diversity. But we have been notably unsuccessful.

As an index of just *how* unsuccessful we have been, one might look not just at the relatively narrow range of scholars included in the *Landmark Essays* volumes (texts drawn largely from the past), but even at Pietrucci and Gruber's citations. To the best of my knowledge there are only two Persons of Colour among the authors and co-authors they cite, and one of them is the scholar whose arguments they directly leverage in their call for inclusion (Darrel Wanzer-Serrano's important 2019b arguments in "Rhetoric's rac(e/ist) problems," to which we can add the other pieces in the special number it introduces, Wanzer-Serrano 2019b). On the brighter side of this question, however, we have Alexander William Morales. We can all hope that he becomes a leading voice in the field, and support that hope in whatever ways we can. Equally, we have Jim Collier, who, as the SERRC editor, is a gatekeeper making a point of holding it open to promote diverse voices like Morales's.

By the way, speaking mostly to the Youngling Dear Readers, if you're looking for sites for your own RoS work, you could do worse than *Social Epistemology* and SERRC, home not only to this bracing discussion but to exemplary work by venerables like Alan G. Gross (1994), James Zappen (1994), Philip C. Wander [and Dennis Jaehne] (2000), Carl Herndl (2016), and Leah Ceccarelli ([Pietrucci and] 2020), venerables-in-the-making like Colleen Derkatch (2008), Rob Danisch and Jessica Mudry (2008), and Ashley Rose Mehlenbacher ([Moriarty and] 2019), and venerables-on-the-horizon, like Devon Moriarty (2019, [and Mehlenbacher]

---

<sup>7</sup> Sticking this in a note so as not to skew the discussion away from equity-seeking racialized groups: I will point out that my generation inherited not only a white supremacist, but also a classist, patriarchal, and heteronormative profession as well, and that significant inroads have been made in the latter three categories. This is not to claim any credit for the profession in some abstract way or for the white cis males who predominantly populated it three decades back—the inroads were overwhelmingly made by working-class, female, and LGBTQ+ scholars themselves, finding or making space in the academy—just to observe that equity and diversity has not been wholly stalled over the last several decades, and also to be acknowledge that RoS has its share of pathbreakers in this regard, including Mount Rushmore RoSers, Carolyn R. Miller, Jeanne D. Fahnestock, and Celeste M. Condit.

2019), Pamela Pietrucci ([and Ceccelli 2019), and of course Alex William Morales (2021, 2022).

And now for that broader argument, ...

Oh, wait, the word count is up. See you in the next installment.

## Installment II

In our first Pickwickian installment, we reconnected with Alex William Morales and met Pamela Pietrucci and David R. Gruber, hearing some of their allegations of a crisis-riddled, fractionating Rhetoric of Science and their (muted, courteous) suggestions that the *Landmark Essays* volumes are pre-fractionation scholarly relics, allegations to which your Humble Narrator was starting to respond before he got distracted reading suggestions. In this, our second installment, he finally gets down to addressing that fractionation, where we will find him, as often we do, engaging in a little history. We will also see him blundering about, looking behind curtains and under rocks trying to find out, Where's the rhetoric?

## Alphabet Soup

The short answer that Pietrucci and Gruber offer to their titular question—"Where did the rhetoric of science go?"—might be rendered as 'into a bowl of alphabet soup.' "[C]onsider the extended name RSTHM," they ask us early on, where the extra magiscules stand for *Technology, Health, and Medicine* (Pietrucci and Gruber 2022, 4). Even this extension rapidly proves unsatisfactory for them, however, as other fields and methods quickly accrete. Gruber and Pietrucci wisely never tack on any more letters, but they note the ways in which the studies I anchor with the term *RoS* bleed off in all directions. They suggest that "the complex exigencies of our current time" might be best served by an approach that rejects such labels and "is instead oriented towards going beyond disciplinary barriers" (Pietrucci and Gruber 2022, 12). The virtue of current work, she feels, "looking at contemporary scholars in ARSTM, is that we are productively stepping beyond those barriers" (2022, 12-13). In many ways they are echoing the sentiments of S. Scott Graham's important (2020) *Where's the rhetoric?*, which is motivated by a sense of crisis and fractionation.

If they *were* to tack on more letters, they would certainly need to include *E*, for *Environmental Rhetoric*, which is at least as significant as *HM Rhetoric*, *AI* for *Artificial Intelligence*, or another suitable letter/subdiscipline pairing for the rhetoric of computational activities, perhaps *D* or *DS* for *Data* or *Data Science*, maybe something to distinctly signal *Science Policy* rhetoric; who knows? But Gruber and Pietrucci's point is clear: we start running out of letters pretty quickly. More alarmingly, we see a discomfiting and confusing fractionation of a purportedly (by Harris!) solid, anchoring *RoS* centre.

The *Issues and Methods* introduction begins with the story of rhetoricians realizing their methods were equally revealing about modes and genres beyond oratory and literature—politics, cinema, music, religion, protest, advertising, graffiti, ...—culminating, because it's

telling an unabashedly Whiggish history, in that realization for science. And now, Pietrucci and Gruber tell us, the *science* half of RoS is splintering into all sorts of other bits and pieces too. “[T]he rhetoric of this and that and that and this is starting to be a bit embarrassing,” they complain. “Do you feel it too?” (Pietrucci and Gruber 2022, 4). Their solution, however, is not inspiring.

They envision—in fact, they urge “for a future that will make labelling areas in RoS totally impractical and infeasible” (Pietrucci and Gruber 2022, 4). I’m not at all sure why they find such a future desirable, beyond its amorphously mystical expression of, in the words of Dirk Gently, “the fundamental interconnectedness of all things” (Adams 2014/1987, 121). Most of us believe, sticking just to the interconnectedness of scholarly things, that the study of mind, communication, culture, society, matter, life, and so on—certainly, of rhetoric, which pervades all of these areas—must be open to a range of framings, commitments, and phenomenal interests, and that specialists in one area should listen carefully to specialists in another area. Many of us also believe that work at the intersections of specialties can often be the most productive. Fundamental interconnectedness: yay! But none of that interconnectedness requires the utter diffusion of scholarship, the complete flattening of distinctions, that Gruber and Pietrucci appear to desire.

However interconnected scholarship in RoSEtc is, no one proceeds, or can proceed, as if it is all one big schmoosh. One of the aspects of the *Case Studies* volume that made the first edition so successful is that it came out in the wake of what Richard Rorty called “the rhetorical turn” in philosophy, history, and sociology of science, a turn that was in part at the time also sponsoring the emergence of Science and Technology Studies (STS). (See Simons 1990, vii; also Campbell and Benson 1996; Harris 2018/1997, 2-7). Everybody who was talking about science, it seems, was talking about persuasion, inscription, style, genre, appeals. Most of them were talking about these rhetorical notions in partially digested and largely intuitive ways, marginally beyond a High School English teacher. Their use of *rhetorical* frequently served as little more than a synonym for *literary* or *political*, or a lever for introducing some generalized notion of “metaphor,” or as an all-purpose antonym for *logical* or *rational*. They wouldn’t know *kairos* if it bit them in the ass.

The work was certainly not without rhetorical insight here and there, some of it was highly inspiring for rhetoricians, and much of it moved the needle noticeably towards issues of suasion, context, and non-deductive argumentation within its own compass (history, philosophy, sociology). But few of those scholars had more than an inkling about what sort of creature a rhetorician might be or even that one or two of them might still be stalking an academic hallway somewhere; less yet about what might constitute rhetorical criticism. What the *Case Studies* introduction insisted upon was that putting the *rhetoric* in the *rhetorical* turn was a job for *rhetoricians*: that scholars with a primary allegiance to the rhetorical tradition had a distinctive and vital contribution to make towards understanding the symbolic machinery of science and its impact on society.

That is the defining criterion of both these *Landmark Essays* volumes, established in the 1997 *Case Studies* edition: Rhetoric of Science is the investigation of science by rhetoricians (Harris 2018/1997, 15-17). The criterion was frankly imperialistic, but the imperialism is a Bizarro

World kind of imperialism where the imperialists are staking claim to their own homeland. The criterion was also, as I confessed, and as it certainly remains, somewhat arbitrary, because there are rhetoricians who rely more heavily on the machinery of other disciplines than on the rhetorical tradition, and there are sociologists and historians who productively deploy rhetorical concepts with admirable precision. But it does provide a principled way to avoid the big, bleeding schmoosh. The whole point of a ‘globalized’ rhetoric in the first place was to simultaneously acknowledge the fundamental suasiveness of all things while avoid such schmooshes. Richard McKeon outlines this especially with an eye on technology and science in “The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age,” where he identifies rhetoric as “an architectonic productive art” (1987/1971, 11); that is, “an art of structuring all principles and products of knowing, doing, and making” (3). Structuring.

Whether or not a schmoosh is desirable (and, if not, whether rhetoric provides the best way to structure the analysis of all the principles and products of knowing, doing, and making) is for you to decide in your own work. But Pietrucci and Gruber’s *argument* for the schmoosh is based on an awkward flaw, the unfortunate conflation of RoS, the field, and ARSTM, a scholarly association.

Everyone was aware back in the day, just as everyone is aware now, here in this day, that the focus of study in RoS is not ‘science,’ in some pure and antiseptic mode, outside politics, culture, and economics, or beyond materiality, neurocognition, and embodiment, but the ramified and entangled set of symbolic practices better labelled *technoscience* (Harris 2020a, 1-8), a blend but not a schmoosh. Still, *technology* and *science* provide different terministic circumferences on those practices, two different x’s, two ways of structuring analyses of those practices. Their rhetorical study grew out of distinct traditions.

Rhetoric of Technology (RoT) arose organically as rhetoricians started (1) to work in the technology sector on the creation, arranging, and stylizing of information in the technical genres, and (2) to teach new generations of English students looking for good paying jobs in the that sector. As documentation went increasingly online, digital rhetoric also emerged from this synergy. Rhetoric of Science, however, developed as the architectonic and Burkean gaze of rhetoricians turned toward the history, philosophy, and sociology of science, which was still largely oriented toward abstract theorizing (Harris 2018/1997, 3-8). There was a lot of cross pollination, of course, with a few scholars starring on both stages (most prominently, Carolyn R. Miller; compare, e.g., Miller 2020/1992 and 1994). But the fields also had distinct interests and distinct exemplars.

Please let us pause as well Dear Reader, to note that the two books under consideration by Pietrucci and Gruber (2022) are entitled *Landmark Essays on the Rhetoric of Science*, not *Landmark Essays in the Rhetoric of Science and Technology*.

Both of these overlapping pursuits, RoT and RoS, wanted to strike a new course in disciplinary terms, but neither apparently felt sturdy enough to go it on their own and they were pals anyway, so a new association was born, the (*American*) *Association for the Rhetoric of Science and Technology* (Harris 2018/1997, 19). Later an *M* for *Medicine* showed up (and the parochial *A* for *American* thankfully dropped out, making space for scholars like Pietrucci, Gruber, and me; they work out of Denmark, me out of Canada). But that *M* was added not because medicine couldn’t be framed in technoscientific terms, not because neither the *T*

nor the *S* nor their combination applied to medicine. It was, er, rhetorical, added simply to advertise that the association had a special welcome for such work. It doesn't signal some kind of splintering, as if neither technology or science is relevant. Nor would it if the ARSTM started tacking on other magiscules.

Pietrucci and Gruber (2022) use the term *ARSTM* a dozen times in their tandem articles, most frequently as the name of a field—there are “ARSTM scholars” (3, 9), “ARSTM theories” (9), and “ARSTM disciplinary conversations” (13), in “the ARSTM landscape” (22)—with only occasional indications that the string also names an academic association (11, 19). Gruber titles his contribution, in fact, like a promise to sketch out a new constitution for the association: “Rethinking ARSTM’s rhetorical adventure.”<sup>8</sup>

The Association for Rhetoric, Technology and Medicine is a very worthy society, one of my favourites. I regularly review proposals for its preconferences and have participated a half dozen times in them myself, including a delightful Old-dude/Young-dude session with Gruber (Gruber and Harris 2018). But the ARSTM is not the field. If it adds (or deletes) a letter here and there that does not signal an existential crisis.

### Where’s the Rhetoric?

Gruber and Pietrucci’s diffusionist schmooshness move, however, is not confined to just domains of interest (Science, Technology, Health and Medicine, Environmental Science, Etc.). They advocate a doubly diffusionist rhetorical study of science; or, rather, a doubly diffusionist ~~rhetorical study of science~~: not just a complete dissolution of the boundaries among the symbolic practices under study, but also of the disciplinary boundaries from whence come the methodologies of study. They aren’t even *boundaries* for Pietrucci and Gruber, which contain and define approaches. They are *barriers* (12-13) in their terms, whose purposes are to exclude and entrap.

My aim in the books was not to erect Trumpian border walls, certainly not to keep other science-study scholars out, nor even to pen rhetoricians in. But neither was it to randomly sample from the big wide world science studies that might somehow impinge upon persuasion or symbol use. My aim was to set up landmarks by which rhetoricians could chart their course; or, lay a foundation on which they could build their research; or, curate an exhibit of templates on which they could pattern in their work. Pick your metaphor. The definitional strategies I applied in the two volumes were exercises in circumscription, not entrapment or exclusion.

I have, in fact, spent most of my own career scrambling over boundaries and throwing stuff back over them that I can use, and leaving notes behind. *Rhetoric and Incommensurability* (Harris

---

<sup>8</sup> The confusion is quite rampant. “[T]he field only later adopted ‘Technology,’” they say, apparently meaning after the 1997 publication of *Case Studies*, “and then much later [adopted] ‘Health and Medicine’” (Pietrucci and Gruber 2022, 6). But RoT emerged coextensively with RoS, well before the book, and ground-breaking (landmark!) work in the Rhetoric of Health and Medicine was appearing before *Case Studies* (Smith and Pettegrew 1986, Schryer 1993, Segal 1994). It is the *Association* that put the T with the S and later added the M, not the ‘field.’

2005) is a direct and explicit engagement with issues that preoccupied much of late 20th century history, philosophy, and sociology of science, from a range of rhetorical perspectives. My current research programme (e.g., Harris 2020b, to appear) borrows significantly from cognitive neuroscience and computational modelling. I have published in linguistics, psychology, literary studies, technical communication, interaction design, and a couple of different rhetorical subfields. The last thing I would want these volumes to do is hold back scholars from integrating exogenous methods into their research. Several of the landmarks in both volumes in fact do just that—Condit's (2020/2008) and Mehlenbacher and Maddalena's (2020/2016) materialist incorporations, for instance, Myers's (2018/1985) use of social construction, Bazerman's (2018/1988) corpus methods, and Gross's (2020/2009) integration of dual-coding theory, among others. It's just that the hand at the tiller is always a distinctly rhetorical one.

It is important to note, however, that the second part of Pietrucci and Gruber's double diffusion, the diffusion of methods, can and sometimes does leave rhetoric behind, and one can end up with wouldn't-know-kairos-if-it-bit-them-on-the-ass sorts of articles flying the RoS flag. Research of this sort leads to Leah Ceccarelli's famous question, "Where's the rhetoric?" which Pietrucci and Gruber raise in order to dismiss in some ill-defined way:

We want to say something close to what Scott Graham (2020) says when he responds to fellow scholars asking him about his work with a snide, "Where's the rhetoric?" He says it is right there. For Graham, there is "a rhetorical core" that unifies, a thread in forms of inquiry concerned with diagnosing modern obsessions with substance, with overturning unreflective claims of objectivity, with looking around at environments and practices to notice the change and recursivity (2). We thus want to say, where is RoS today? Well, if it is rhetoric, then it's right there. To the point: *Landmark Essays* certainly shows us how much work has been done to establish the field area and allow rhetorical scholars to confidently deconstruct science, yet the volume[s] also appear ... right at the very moment that RoS, as itself a rhetoric, "bleeds," as Jenny Edbauer (2005) says, across all kinds of concerns and environments (Pietrucci and Gruber 2022, 22-23).

Edbauer's argument is lovely and compelling, that ecology is a revealing, productive analogy in which to frame the suasive episodes that came to be known, after Bitzer (1968) as *rhetorical situations*, though I have to say that Gruber and Pietrucci's image of bleeding methodologies right next to their "rhetorical core" image (replicating Graham's similar move) borders on the oxymoronic. Is there core anchoring RoS or is the field hemorrhaging?

Fifty years ago, Bitzer's model enriched the context of a linear, monologic conception of rhetoric (x persuades y of z), but it has become increasingly banal and far too rigid for the riot of genres, modes, platforms, agencies, and symbolic practices that characterize the rhetorical activities cascading out of some allegedly singular exigence in the contemporary world. As I read Edbauer's argument, the analogy is to help us stop the methodological bleeding she identifies; or, more specifically, to reframe situations, whose Bitzerian elements she diagnoses as hemorrhaging (2005, 9), in terms of delicate and balanced interdependence. I am with Pietrucci and Gruber that this is a good way to make sense of the RoS landscape. Where we diverge is in seeing how this compromises the *Landmark Essays* approach, in

which we can easily figure the categories I invoke (e.g., “Giants” and “Controversies,” “NeoClassical” and “NeoModern”) as niches in the RoS ecosystem, and the articles as biotic nodes.

As for Graham’s wonderful (2020) book, which is too rich to engage with meaningfully here, I would not slight it for a moment (I have put it on our comprehensive exam list; it is a text in one of my courses; much of it beats closely with my own heart). But “it’s right there” is an entirely insufficient answer to “Where’s the rhetoric?” The book does a very nice job of tracing intimations of New Materialism in Burke and Miller and Condit, and also of rhetoric’s fascination with computational methods, and it nicely articulates some new futures for rhetoric. But to point at something and say, ‘Lo, rhetoric is right there’ butters no parsnips. Of *course* rhetoric is right there. Of *course*, there is a rhetorical core wherever we look. That’s what McKeon and Burke were on about: all symbolic activity has a rhetorical quotient. In RoS, some of us still subscribe to the slogan Alan Gross abandoned, that science is rhetorical without remainder (Harris 2020a, 15).<sup>9</sup>

Just because rhetoric “is right there” does not mean one is performing a rhetorical analysis. One of my self-appointed roles on search committees as our department expanded in the early 2000s was to listen patiently to my literary colleagues outline how some applicant (inevitably out of a Cultural Studies mold) for an advertised position in rhetoric engaged with non-literary texts and peppered their work with citations to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and relentlessly deployed the word *trope*, and, look, they even put *rhetoric* in their title, ... to listen patiently and say, as you have probably guessed, “Yeah, but they wouldn’t know *kairos* if it bit them on the ass.” We got a lot of good hires out of those years and the department is now a rich and vibrant collection of faculty in literature, media theory, writing studies, and rhetoric. Each of them is strong in their areas and ecumenical in their embrace of one another’s research. Rhetoric is not ghettoized, as it once was, and our rhetoricians are rhetoricians.

For me, in other words, the rhetorical core that RoS needs is a (non-exclusive) methodological allegiance to the rhetorical tradition, not the fact that the symbolic practices of science all have suasive dimensions. “Where did the rhetoric of science go?” Gruber and Pietrucci want to know. If it has gone anywhere at all, a claim I don’t find wholly compelling, it has gone away in the work of scholars who can’t answer the bigger question, “Where’s the rhetoric?,” except by pointing at the generalized suasions of scientific symbolic practices.

### **Installment III**

In our previous installment we found RoS fractionation being resisted, in part by distinguishing RoS as an intellectual pursuit independent in principle from the interests and practices of an academic association, and in larger part by advocating a rhetorical core of methodology. In this, our third and final

---

<sup>9</sup> I have always taken the expression to mean not that science is nothing but rhetoric; rather, that there is no corner of science where rhetoric is eliminable. I really am not sure what Gross originally meant by it, possibly the former, which would indeed be a reason to abandon it.

installment, we encounter Alan G. Gross and return to Alex William Morales's question. Why *didn't* he pick a fight with me? Also, there is talk of sunsets.

### Once More around the Block with Alan G. Gross

In his second contribution to this exchange, Morales puts the spotlight back on Alan G. Gross; Pietrucci and Gruber mention him as well. Morales ponders his impact, parallels, distinctive scholarly trajectory, and his endemic controversiality; Gruber and Pietrucci to use him as a gauge for the representativeness of the *Landmark Essays* volumes and their vision of the RoS field.

Gross is, of course, all over both *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science*, with a case study in one volume, two articles in the other, extensive commentary in both introductions, and an utterly tenacious presence in the citations of all the other articles of both volumes. I did a very loose search of the books and his name occurs 341 times (as one might expect, 73 were in *Case Studies*, which has overwhelmingly the earlier articles, and 268 in *Issues and Methods*, which has many more articles downstream from, for instance, *The Rhetoric of Science*). No one else even comes close; not other established rhetoricians of science or rhetorical theorists, not even Aristotle, and Aristotle has his own adjective.<sup>10</sup>

It is hard to be definitive about this, because I'm not sophisticated enough to figure out something like an h-index or an i10 for Gross. Nor am I obsessive enough to build a corpus of RoS research and run some analyses (even then of course, as this discussion indicates, how would I identify RoS research in a way that satisfied everyone?), and we certainly have to face the complication that I am the one who curated the articles in the two books. But it's a good bet that the name *Gross* is so ubiquitous in the books because the scholar with that name was (and continues to be) so influential in the field. He is certainly among the most representative and trail-blazing of case-studies scholars. He was absolutely the most insistent radical-rhetoric-of-science voice. And he was definitely at the forefront of opening up visual RoS. That accounts for the three article inclusions, about which I have few reservations (I have *some* reservations about *every* inclusion, and about many exclusions). We can add the stage-managing of the Gaonkar affair to those reasons and get more fully at his massive citational presence.

Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, you may not know, wasn't just some random desperado who wandered past the RoS Corral and decided to throw down on the local constabulary. Gaonkar was well known for his efforts to put the skids on the rhetorical turn (1990a, 1990b), so Gross (and John Lyne) invited him to turn his gaze directly on RoS at the 1991 Annual National Communication Association Convention.<sup>11</sup> Then Gross invited him to

---

<sup>10</sup> By *loose*, I mean I didn't control for redundancy factors such as appearance in headers, nor for non-nominal references, such as dashes in Works Cited lists or pronominal references. As long as I have gathered the numbers to test Gross's presence/influence anyway, I might as well pass them along: Carolyn R. Miller was next, with 126 appearances; Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar had 72; Jeanne D. Fahnestock, 70; Celeste M. Condit, 47. Kenneth Burke had 45, Chaïm Perelman (with and without Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca) 34, Aristotle 84. I didn't run the numbers for folks like Thomas S. Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, or Bruno Latour.

<sup>11</sup> It was called the *Speech Communication Association* at the time, one of its several labels over the years (this one running from 1970 to 1996).

write up those arguments to be featured in a special RoS issue of the *Southern Speech Communication* journal (#4 of volume 58). Then Gross (and William Keith) gave those arguments the starring role in a book along with assorted RoS luminaries and invited Gaonkar to write another essay for that book refuting those luminaries. Oh, we might also mention his founding role in what has become known as the ARTSM, and I wouldn't want to count the number of panels and special sessions he engineered. I am convinced my curations have not skewed Gross's significance in any marked way.

So, Gross was influential and productive, and his portfolio was widely diversified in methods, objects of study, and theoretical frameworks. That doesn't mean his ubiquity might not *also* serve as a measuring stick for the shallowness of the books under discussion and/or the RoS pond. "I had the unshakable feeling," Gruber says about encountering Gross all over the place, "that RoS is ... shown to be quite small." He elaborates:

No one doubts that Gross contributed much, yet it is difficult to examine the volume[s] without seeing how narrow the field's marching band has been and how specific its concerns became (Gruber 2022, 5).

Gruber and Pietrucci have a point, not so much about Gross specifically, but about the cast of characters overall. There are other repeat appearances: Fahnestock has an article in each volume, Miller is a co-author in one volume, a full author in the other, Ashley Rose Mehlenbacher has two co-authorships, as does John Lyne, and Ceccarelli has an article in each. There are, as I have mentioned frequently enough to court tedium, other conditions that lead to inclusions than the sheer stardom of the authors and the brilliance of the essays (costs, coverage, themes, methods, category representation, and so on), but these *are* certainly our leading stars, and the essays *are* brilliant.<sup>12</sup>

Morales's discussion of Gross is fuller and more thoughtful. Morales is interested in the lessons he might take for himself from Gross's scholarly trajectory. After citing my observations about Gross's about-face in the later 1990s, the Radical Gross spinning on his heel to become the Conservative Gross, Morales asks "So, how might we explain this change?" noting that "Harris's response leaves me in suspense" (Morales 2022, 5). I don't know if I can relieve the suspense here, because I don't have an answer beyond what I said initially; namely, that Gross appears always to have felt that rhetoric was a thin discipline full of second-rate scholars and weak instruments (Harris 2021, 65). That's why he drew on philosophy and other disciplines so heavily. This suggests that the rallying cry of the Radical-RoS Gross was really some kind of Radical RoS+ rallying cry. Rhetoric was only epistemically potent when bolstered by other fields. This alone, by the way, might make him the patron saint of scholars like Gruber, Pietrucci, and Graham, who feel so strongly the methodological pull of other disciplines.

---

<sup>12</sup> Pietrucci and Gruber also suggest further repetitions in their armchair anthologizing, by the way: additional papers authored or co-authored by Fahnestock, Ceccarelli, and Walsh, as well as multiple papers authored or co-authored by Graham and by Pietrucci. I don't know if they were trying to reinforce their shallow-pool argument about the field with these repetitions, but of course that's just what they do, though it does mitigate their indictment of the volumes on that basis.

Gross was pushed to become ‘more rhetorical’ by the kind of prodding that I gave him with my acerbic review of *The Rhetoric of Science* (Harris 1991) and that Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar put on steroids (1997/1993), and Gross took that prodding to heart. He reexamined his RoS research project from the ground up and came to the conclusion that ‘more rhetorical’ entailed ‘more epistemically conservative.’ The lesson here for Morales’s scholarship, and mine—yours too, Dear Reader—is that we should follow our convictions, examine our own first principles when we are pushed, and never be afraid to break out of a groove if we find it to be a rut. Gross was flexible—not so much in the moment; he was dogmatically radical and then dogmatically conservative. But the fact that he could shift his values and his methods so completely is a remarkable testament to an openness that we should all emulate. Whatever else the future demands of us, it will demand flexibility.

Morales’s chief focus on Gross, however, after a thoughtful survey of his work on Newton, is summed up in the question he uses as one of his section headers, “What Does Alan Gross Teach Us About Controversy?” (Morales 2022, 5). My overview of the Gaonkar perturbations helps to answer that question, I think, but it only scratched the surface. Gross not only invited Gaonkar into the RoS Corral, he also made sure the RoS constabulary knew where he was, and he stirred up the RoS townsfolk, and then he took the show on the road. For the field, as John Angus Campbell noted, this was “clearly good for business ... so little are Gaonkar’s charges against us believed, and so useful are they in garnering us attention, that we boast of an impressive array of new recruits particularly among younger faculty and graduate students” (Campbell, 1999, 10 ; Harris 2018/1997, 18). In his own work, the episode was also highly generative. As much as I disagree with Gross’s late-career epistemic position and its stunted view of rhetoric, it is hard to dispute that his contributions in the 2000s, including his books with Joseph Harmon, are among his most valuable and lasting bequests to science studies.

Morales also makes the intriguing suggestion that Gross’s path was similar to David Hume’s, who might be viewed as “a radical skeptic” for his opposition to dogma and to socially conferred authority, including Church dogma and Church authority, an opposition especially apparent in his earlier writings. His later philosophy is notable on the other hand, Morales says, for a “moderate and restrained form of skepticism” (Morales 2022, 5-6). I don’t know Hume’s catalogue well enough to respond to this suggestion except in the most cursory way, and Morales didn’t have the time to lay out the comparison in much detail (he has a dissertation to write!). But on the surface, it doesn’t look to me like Hume flipped his position. Rather, he refined it, or possibly just clarified it. I have no doubt that Gross flipped his position (within the RoS+ parameters I outlined above). Gross was also much more of a showman than Hume. His Radical RoS arguments were meant to stir things up, not only in the emerging field (check out the exchange in *Issues and Methods*—Harris 2020, 101-122) but in Science Studies more broadly (check out Ravetz 1991, Durant 1991, or Agassis 1999 for some howling about *The Rhetoric of Science*). When he was de-radicalizing, Gross took his show on the road it, and implied the rest of us were a little slow for not also endorsing the ‘thinness’ of rhetoric; if the Goankar episode was a bit of a circus, there can be no doubt that Gross was the ringmaster.

That episode, which as I note in the *Case Studies* introduction preoccupied the decade (Harris 2018/1997, 18) and carried well into this century, was very largely Gross’s doing. In

retrospect, we can see that perhaps Gaonkar was saying out loud what Gross had worried about privately. Once it was out in the open, Gross dropped what must have been a kind of (unconscious?) epistemic bluster. But that rallying cry—most succinctly captured in the slogan that ‘science is rhetoric without remainder’—was an important and inspiring one for the growth of the field. “Both teachers and learners go to sleep at the post,” John Stuart Mill said, “as soon as there is no enemy in the field” (1867, 25). When Gross was in his hay days, he did everything he could to ensure that RoS was anything but a sleepy field. So, Gross’s trajectory was not particularly Hume-like in my understanding. But I will be an eager audience for Morales if he develops the comparison further at some point.

Speaking of Gross, Dear Reader, I beg your indulgence, please, as I digress briefly to unburden myself, and then we can get to our conclusion. I feel a bit like I’ve put on Alan G. Gross’s shoes in this response, or at least one pair of them. As I noted in my first SERRC response to Morales, the Good Doctor Gross was very gracious in his reception of my poke-in-the-nose review of his *Rhetoric of Science*, not only endorsing my complaints but adding some of his own in the bargain. *Those* aren’t the shoes. I haven’t been especially gracious to Pietrucci and Gruber, certainly not in the vein of Gross in any case. That’s not because I begrudge their efforts in any way, nor because I disagree with all of their critiques of the volumes, or their aspirations for the field. I appreciate Pamela Pietrucci and David R. Gruber hugely—as scholars but also as professional colleagues who took the time (during a f\*cking pandemic!) to pay so much attention to the *Landmark Essays* volumes and to use them in exactly the way they were intended, to further the RoS conversation and look toward its future.

I think they are wrong about some fundamental aspects of the field, and those are important aspects so I have been very clear about my take on them. But that does not diminish in any way my admiration for them or my deep gratitude for their arguments. (I have of course been gracious to Morales, to whom I am also hugely grateful, but Morales makes it easy to be gracious.)

No, not Gross’s *gracious* shoes. But anyone who knew Alan is familiar with his frank hostility about some colleagues and developments. *Those* shoes. Or, if not Alan’s shoes, then Richard Feynman’s shoes, the quantum theorist. “I have noticed when I was younger,” Feynman said,

that lots of old men in the field couldn’t understand new ideas very well, and resisted them with one method or another, and that they were very foolish in saying these ideas were wrong — such as Einstein not being able to take quantum mechanics. I’m an old man now, and these are new ideas [he’s talking about string theory—rah], and they look crazy to me, and they look like they’re on the wrong track. Now I know that other old men have been very foolish in saying things like this, and, therefore, I would be very foolish to say this is nonsense. I am going to be very foolish, because I do feel strongly that this is nonsense! ... I don’t like that they’re not calculating anything. I don’t like that they don’t check their ideas. I don’t like that for

anything that disagrees with an experiment, they cook up an explanation—a fix-up to say “Well, it still might be true” (Davies and Brown 1992, 193-194).

Feynman being Feynman, he embraced the opportunity to, as he put it, “entertain future historians” by railing against something that could later become orthodoxy. So, maybe that’s my role in this exchange. In many ways Rhetoric of Science Without the Rhetoric may already be orthodox (Pietrucci and Gruber’s title, after all, is “Where did the rhetoric of science go?”). So, perhaps my entertainment value does not await the future. Perhaps you’re chuckling at me right now.

Whether you’re chuckling or not, allow me to be clear about this one point: I don’t disparage these lines of research; lines that, for instance, deploy New Materialism in the absence of any relevant rhetorical methodologies (unlike, say Condit 2020/2008, which deploys them side by side). I don’t think such work is nonsense. I profit from much of it. As I mentioned, I have the great good fortune to review the ARSTM proposals. I do often find myself asking “Where’s the rhetoric?” and I will often make suggestions for links to Fahnestock or Segal or Hassian or Burke or Booth or Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. But if the work is good I certainly never reject it for a low rhetorical quotient, because it belongs at ARSTM.

I won’t name names here because I have already pissed off enough people, but it nevertheless does remain unclear to me (and, I confess, somewhat irritating as well) why scholars want to call their work *rhetoric* if they have no use for the tradition labelled by that word.

### **(Finally, the) Conclusion**

“Surely,” Morales muses about his guiding question (“Why *didn’t* I decide to pick a fight with Harris?”), “there was something in these two volumes worth my scorn” (Morales 2022, 1). There had to be something worth taking up the cudgels about! As we can see, Pietrucci and Gruber (2022) had no trouble finding targets for *their* cudgels in the two volumes, nor in wielding them frankly and forcefully. I said at the outset of the first installment that Gruber and Pietrucci put a thumb on the scale with the loaded question in their title, “Where did the rhetoric of science go?” It might be more accurate to say they put a thumb in my eye. They hold up my two volumes entitled *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science* and ask “Where did rhetoric of science go?,” implying that they are instant relics. But Pietrucci and Gruber do so with great generosity, not only recurrently complimenting my efforts but also acknowledging the inherent value of the articles and the role they have played in both defining the field and informing their own research. That’s how you argue, and arguing is important for a field, not just to ensure we don’t all fall asleep, but for refinement, calibration, and renewal.

If two or more positions are aligned against each other with strong and honest advocates, the outcome is surely going to be epistemically more robust than either position would be coming out of a simple, frictionless pipeline. Strong advocates force each other to buttress their claims and to accommodate the facts more rigorously; honest advocates force themselves to concede that the soft parts of their case are soft and to repudiate the mistaken or incompatible parts.

It is for you to decide if I met standards of strength and honesty here; I have certainly tried. I am however entirely confident that Pietrucci and Gruber meet these standards (and, while he is not fighting with anyone, Morales too has met those standards). I sincerely hope, Reader, that you have taken something of value from the exchange.

In one last quibble, I confess to not liking the movie analogy that Gruber and Pietrucci weave into their review article(s) (“[*Landmark Essays* is] a road trip movie,” Gruber begins, “about a hand-full of awkward scholars setting out on a rebellious adventure”), but it does set up a lovely closing by Pietrucci. If there is “an ending” to this road trip movie, she says, “then for us, it is the suspended no-end ending; nobody walks off into the sunset; everybody stands ready for the next adventure in a new world.” To be frank, the sunset is looking pretty sweet about now and I’m thinking seriously of slipping away as the credits role. But nothing could make that slipping away more welcome than knowing there are rhetoricians like Morales, Gruber, and Pietrucci standing ready to extend and reimagine the RoSEtc adventure.

## References

- Adams, Douglas. 2014/1987. *Dirk Gently’s Holistic Detective Agency*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Agassi, J. 1999. “Review of Allen [sic] G. Gross, *The Rhetoric of Science*.” *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 29: 329-35.
- Anderson, Wilda. 1989. “Scientific Nomenclature and Revolutionary Rhetoric.” *Rhetorica* 7 (1): 45–53. doi:10.1525/rh.1989.7.1.45.
- Bazerman, Charles. 2018/1988. “Reporting the Experiment: The Changing Account of Scientific Doings in the *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, 1665–1800.” In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies*, edited by Randy Allen Harris, Second edition, 263-279. London: Routledge.
- Bitzer, Lloyd. 1968. “The Rhetorical Situation.” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 (1): 1-14.
- Campbell, John Angus and Keith R. Benson. 1996. “Review Essay: The Rhetorical Turn in Science Studies.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 82 (1): 74-91. doi:10.1080/00335639609384141.
- Campbell, John Angus. 2005. “The ‘Anxiety of Influence’—Hermeneutic Rhetoric and the Triumph of Darwin’s Invention over Incommensurability.” In *Rhetoric and Incommensurability* edited by Randy Allen Harris, 334-390. West Lafayette: Parlor Press.
- Campbell, John Angus. 1999. “Response to Simons,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 85: 101–3. doi: 10.1080/00335639909384244.
- Ceccarelli, Leah. 2018/2011. “Manufactured Scientific Controversy: Science, Rhetoric, and Public Debate.” In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies* edited by Randy Allen Harris, Second edition, 160-184, London: Routledge.
- Ceccarelli, Leah. 1995. “A Rhetoric of Interdisciplinary Scientific Discourse: Textual Criticism of Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the Origin of Species.” *Social Epistemology* 9 (2): 91-111.
- Chavez, Leo R., Belinda Campos, Karina Corona, Daina Sanchez, and Catherine Belyeu Ruiz, 2019. “Words Hurt: Political Rhetoric, Emotions/Affect, and Psychological

- Well-Being among Mexican-Origin Youth.” *Social Science and Medicine* 228, 240-251. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2019.03.008.
- Clary-Lemon, Jennifer. 2019. “Persuasive Movement: The Rhetoricity of Things.” In *Planting the Anthropocene: Rhetorics of Natureculture*, 132–166. Denver: University Press of Colorado. doi: 10.7330/9781607328551
- Condit, Celeste M. 2020/2008. “Race and Genetics from a Modal Materialist Perspective.” In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies* edited by Randy Allen Harris, Second edition, 280-302. London: Routledge.
- Condit, Celeste M. 2013. “‘Mind the Gaps’: Hidden Purposes and Missing Internationalism in Scholarship on the Rhetoric of Science and Technology in Public Discourse.” *Poroi* 9 (1): Article 3. doi:10.13008/2151-2957.1150.
- Condit, Celeste M. 2008. “Feminist Biologies: Revising Feminist Strategies and Biological Science.” *Sex Roles: A Journal of Research* 59 (7-8): 492–503. doi:10.1007/s11199-008-9479-2.
- Condit, Celeste M. 1996. “How Bad Science Stays That Way: Brain Sex, Demarcation, and the Status of Truth in the Rhetoric of Science.” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 26 (4): 83–109.
- Crick, Nathan. 2004. “Conquering our Imagination: Thought Experiments and Enthymemes in Scientific Argument.” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 37 (1): 21-41. doi: 10.1353/par.2004.0009.
- Danisch, Robert, and Jessica Mudry. 2008. “Is it Safe to Eat That? Raw Oysters, Risk Assessment and the Rhetoric of Science.” *Social Epistemology* 22 (2): 129-143. doi: 10.1080/02691720802156268.
- Davies, P.C.W. and Julian Brown, eds. 1992. *Superstrings: A Theory of Everything?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Derkatch, Colleen. 2016. *Bounding Biomedicine: Evidence and Rhetoric in the New Science of Alternative Medicine*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. doi: 10.7208/chicago/9780226345987.001.0001.
- Derkatch, Colleen. 2008. “Method as Argument: Boundary Work in Evidence-Based Medicine.” *Social Epistemology* 22 (4): 371-388. doi:10.1080/02691720802559412.
- DeVasto, Danielle. 2020. “Exigency and Overflow in the L’Aquila Case.” *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 9 (1): 8-11. wp.me/p1Bfg0-4KL.
- Durant, John. 1991. “Is Science Only a Social Invention?” *Times Literary Supplement* (15 March): 19.
- Edbauer, Jenny. 2005. “Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to Rhetorical Ecologies.” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 35 (4): 5–24. doi: 10.1080/02773940509391320.
- Fabj, Valeria, and Matthew J. Sobnosky. 1995. “AIDS Activism and the Rejuvenation of the Public Sphere.” *Argumentation and Advocacy* 31 (4): 163-184. doi: 10.1080/00028533.1995.11951609.
- Fahnestock, Jeanne D. 2018/1989. “Arguing in Different Forums: The Bering Crossover Controversy.” *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies* edited by Randy Allen Harris, Second edition, 111-124. London: Routledge.
- Fahnestock, Jeanne D. 2005. “Rhetoric of Science: Enriching the Discipline,” *Technical Communication Quarterly* 14 (3): 277-286. doi: 10.1207/s15427625tcq1403\_5.

- Fahnestock, Jeanne D 2005. "Cell and Membrane: The Rhetorical Strategies of a Marginalized View." In *Rhetoric and Incommensurability* edited by Randy Allen Harris, 391-423. Parlor Press.
- Fahnestock, Jeanne D. 1998. "Accommodating Science: The Rhetorical Life of Scientific Facts." *Written Communication* 15 (3): 330-350. doi:10.1177/0741088386003003001.
- Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J. 2020. "Overflow, Expertise, and the L'Aquila Case." *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 9 (3): 25-33. [wp.me/p1Bfg0-4TD](https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-4TD).
- Gaonkar, Dilip Parameshwar. 1997/1993. "The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science." In *Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age of Science* edited by Alan G. Gross and William Keith, 25-85. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Gaonkar, Dilip Parameshwar. 1990a. "Rhetoric and Its Double." In *The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry* edited by Herbert S. Simons, 341-360. Chicago: Chicago: University of Chicago Press. doi: 10.7208/9780226759036-016.
- Gaonkar, Dilip Parameshwar. 1990b. "Object and Method in Rhetorical Criticism: From Wichelns to Leff and McGee." *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 54 (3): 290-316. doi: 10.1080/10570319009374344.
- Geiger, Don. 1958. "Rhetoric and Science: Notes for a Distinction." *The Speech Teacher* 7 (1): 54-60. doi: 10.1080/03634525809376922.
- Graham, S. Scott. 2020. *Where's the Rhetoric? Imagining a Unified Field*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. doi: 10.26818/9780814214534.
- Graham, S. Scott. 2015. *The Politics of Pain Medicine: A Rhetorical-Ontological Inquiry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. doi: 10.7208/chicago/9780226264196.001.0001.
- Graham, S. Scott and Carl G. Herndl. 2013. "Multiple Ontologies in Pain Management: Toward a Postplural Rhetoric of Science." *Technical Communication Quarterly* 22 (2): 103-125. doi: 10.1080/10572252.2013.733674.
- Graham, S. Scott and Carl G. Herndl. 2011. "Talking Off-Label: The Role of Stasis in Transforming the Discursive Formation of Pain Science." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 42 (2): 145-167. doi: 10.1080/02773945.2011.553764.
- Graham, S. Scott and Linda Walsh. 2019. "There's No Such Thing as a Scientific Controversy." *Technical Communication Quarterly* 28 (3): 192-206. doi: 10.1080/10572252.2019.1571243.
- Graves, Heather Brodie. 1995. "Rhetoric and Reality in the Process of Scientific Inquiry." *Rhetoric Review* 14 (1): 106-125.
- Gross, Alan G. 2020/2009. "Presence as a Consequence of Verbal-Visual Interaction: A Theoretical Approach." In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Issues and Methods* edited by Randy Allen Harris, 324-341. London: Routledge.
- Gross, Alan G. 1994. "Is a Rhetoric of Science Policy Possible?" *Social Epistemology* 8 (3): 273-280, doi: 10.1080/02691729408578752.
- Gross, Alan G. 1990. *The Rhetoric of Science*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Second edition, 1996).
- Gruber, David R. 2022. "Rethinking ARSTM's Rhetorical Adventure, on 'Issues and Methods'." *Poroi* 16 (2): 1-11. doi: 10.17077/2151-2957.31093.
- Gruber, David R., and Harris, RA. 2018. "Scientific Futures for a Rhetoric of Science: We Do This and They Do That?" *Poroi* 14 (2): Article 2. doi: 10.13008/2151-2957.1282.
- Harris, Randy Allen. To appear. "Rules are Rules: Rhetorical Figures as Algorithms." In *Logic and Algorithms in Computational Linguistics* (Studies in Computational Intelligence

- Series), edited by Roussanka Loukanova, Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine, and Reinhard Muskens. Berlin: Springer.
- Harris, Randy Allen. 2021. "X Marks the Spot: An Appreciative Response to Morales's Review of *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies and Issues and Methods*." *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 10 (9): 61-67. [wp.me/p1Bfg0-6bp](http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-6bp).
- Harris, Randy Allen, ed. 2020a. *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Issues and Methods*. London: Routledge.
- Harris, Randy Allen. 2020b. "Dementia, Rhetorical Schemes, and Cognitive Resilience." *Poroi* 15 (1): Article 2. doi: 10.13008/2151-2957.1301.
- Harris, Randy Allen, ed. 2018/1997. *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies*. London: Routledge.
- Harris, Randy Allen, ed. 2005. *Rhetoric and Incommensurability*. West Lafayette: Parlor Press.
- Harris, Randy Allen. 1991. "Review of Gross 1990." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 21 (4): 32-35. doi: 10.1080/02773949109390932.
- Harris, Randy Allen. 1990. "Assent, Dissent, and Rhetoric in Science." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 20 (1): 13-37. doi: 10.1080/02773949009390867.<sup>13</sup>
- Hasian, Marouf Jr. and Earl Croasmun. 1992. "The Legitimizing Function of Judicial Rhetoric in the Eugenics Controversy." *Argumentation and Advocacy* 28 (3): 123-134. doi: 10.1080/00028533.1992.11951538.
- Hasian, Marouf Jr. 2004. "Transnational Genome Debates and the Return of Eugenics. In *New Frontiers in International Communication Theory* edited by Mehdi Semati, 263-278. Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Hawhee, Debra. 2015. "Rhetoric's Sensorium." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 101 (1): 2-17. doi:10.1080/00335630.2015.995925.
- Heifferon, Barbara and Stuart C. Brown, eds. 2008. *Rhetoric of Healthcare: Essays Toward a New Disciplinary Inquiry*. New York: Hampton Press.
- Herndl, Carl G. 2016. "Doing and Knowing in the L'Aquila Case." *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 5 (6): 1-6. [wp.me/p1Bfg0-30p](http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-30p)
- Hunter, Lynette. 1991. "Rhetoric and Artificial Intelligence." *Rhetorica* 9 (4): 317-340. doi: 10.1525/rh.1991.9.4.317.
- Jack, Jordynn. 2009. "A Pedagogy of Sight: Microscopic Vision in Robert Hooke's *Micrographia*." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 95 (2): 192-209. doi: 10.1080/00335630902842079.
- Keeling, Diane Marie, Patricia Garza, Charisse Michelle Nartey, and Anne-Ruxandra Carvunis. 2020. "The Recalcitrance and Resilience of Scientific Function." *Poroi* 15 (1). doi: 10.13008/2151-2957.1299.
- Kelso, James A. 1980. "Science and the Rhetoric of Reality." *Central States Speech Journal* 31 (1): 17-29. doi: 10.1080/10510978009368036.
- Keränen, Lisa. 2010. *Scientific Characters: Rhetoric, Politics, and Trust in Breast Cancer Research*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Locke, Simon. 2013. "Colouring in the 'Black-Box': Alternative Renderings of Scientific Visualisations in Two Comic Book Cosmologies." *Public Understanding of Science* 22 (3): 304-320. doi: 10.1177/0963662511403877.

---

<sup>13</sup> Reprinted in *Humanistic Aspects of Technical Communication* (Paul Dombrowski, editor; Baywood, 1994), and in *Teaching Argument in the Composition Course: Background Readings* (Timothy Barnett, editor; Bedford/St.Martin's Press, 2002).

- Melonçon, Lisa, S. Scott Graham, Jenell Johnson, John A. Lynch, and Cynthia Ryan, eds. 2020. *Rhetoric of Health and Medicine As/Is: Theories and Approaches for the Field*. Dayton: The Ohio State University Press.
- Melonçon, Lisa and Blake Scott, eds. 2017. *Methodologies for the Rhetoric of Health and Medicine*. London: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
- Mehlenbacher, Ashley Rose and Carolyn R. Miller. 2018/2017. "Intersections: Scientific and Parascientific Communication on the Internet," In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies*, edited by Randy Allen Harris, Second edition, London: Routledge, 239-260.
- Mehlenbacher, Ashley Rose, and Kate Maddalena. 2020/2016. "Networks, Genres, and Complex Wholes: Citizen Science and How We Act Together Through Typified Text," In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Issues and Methods* edited by Randy Allen Harris, 342-358. London: Routledge.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1867. *On Liberty*. London: Longmans, Green, and Company,
- Miller, Carolyn R. 2020/1992. "Kairos in the Rhetoric of Science." In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies* edited by Randy Allen Harris, 184-202. London: Routledge.
- Miller, Carolyn R. 1994. "Opportunity, Opportunism, and Progress: Kairos in the Rhetoric of Technology." *Argumentation* 8 (1): 81-96.
- Mol, Annemarie. 2002. *The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Moriarty, Devon. 2019. "Building on Aggregate Ethos: A Response to Hartelius." *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 8 (12): 50-54. [wp.me/p1Bfg0-4Jf](https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-4Jf).
- Moriarty, Devon, and Ashley Rose Mehlenbacher. 2019. "The Coaxing Architecture of Reddit's r/science: Adopting Ethos-Assessment Heuristics to Evaluate Science Experts on the Internet." *Social Epistemology* 33 (6): 514-524. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2019.1637964
- Morales, Alex William. 2021. "An X Too Far: A Review of Randy Allen Harris's *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies* and *Issues and Methods*." *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 10 (5): 20-24. [wp.me/p1Bfg0-5Pu](https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5Pu).
- Morales, Alex William. 2022. "Why Didn't I Pick a Fight About X?: An Inquisitive Response to Harris." *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 11 (1): 1-6. [wp.me/p1Bfg0-6qv](https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-6qv).
- Myers, Greg. 2018/1985. "Text as Knowledge Claims: The Social Construction of Two Biology Articles," In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies*, edited by Randy Allen Harris, 280-306. London: Routledge.
- Northcut, Kathryn M. 2011. "Insights from Illustrators: The Rhetorical Invention of Paleontology Representations." *Technical Communication Quarterly* 20 (3): 303-326. doi: 10.1080/10572252.2011.578236.
- Ochs, Elinor and Sally Jacoby. 1997. "Down to the Wire: The Cultural Clock of Physicists and the Discourse of Consensus." *Language in Society* 26 (4): 479-505. doi: 10.1017/S0047404500021023.
- Pietrucci, Pamela. 2022. "Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies by Randy A. Harris and a Meditation on the Past, Present, and Future of RoS in the Public Sphere." *Poroi* 16 (2). 11-22. doi: 10.17077/2151-2957.31093.

- Pietrucci, Pamela. 2020. "Blasting for Science." In *Routledge Handbook of Language and Science* edited by David R. Gruber and Linda Olman, 319-332. London: London: Routledge. doi: 10.4324/9781351207836.
- Pietrucci, Pamela and Leah Ceccarelli. 2020. "What Did We Learn From L'Aquila? Scientist Citizens and Public Communication." *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 9 (7): 22-28. wp.me/p1Bfg0-5cZ.
- Pietrucci, Pamela and Leah Ceccarelli. 2019. "Scientist Citizens: Rhetoric and Responsibility in L'Aquila." *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 22 (1). 95-128. doi: 10.14321/rhetpublaffa.22.1.0095.
- Pietrucci, Pamela and David R. Gruber. 2022. "Where Did the Rhetoric of Science Go? A Double Review of *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science, Case Studies and Issues and Methods*, a two volume edited collection by Randy Harris." *Poroi* 16 (2): 1-26. doi: 10.17077/2151-2957.31093.
- Ravetz, Jerome R. 1991. "Just Words." *Nature* 350 (7 March): 30-31.
- Reeves, Carol. 2018/1992. "Owning a Virus: The Rhetoric of Scientific Discovery Accounts," In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies* edited by Randy Allen Harris, Second edition, 225-238. London: Routledge.
- Reeves, Carol. 2011. "Scientific Visuals, Language, and the Commercialization of a Scientific Idea: The Strange Case of the Prion." *Technical Communication Quarterly* 20 (3): 239-273. doi: 10.1080/10572252.2011.578237.
- Schryer, Catherine F. 1993. "Records as Genre." *Written Communication* 10 (2): 200-234. doi: 10.1177/0741088393010002003
- Schryer, Catherine F. 1999. "Genre Time/Space: Chronotopic Strategies in the Experimental Article." *JAC: A Journal of Composition Theory* 19 (1): 81-89.
- Scott, Blake, Judy Z. Segal, and Lisa Keränen. 2013. "Rhetoric of Health and Medicine: Inventional Possibilities for Scholarship and Engaged Practice." *Poroi* 9 (1): 1-6. doi: 10.13008/2151-2957.1157.
- Secor, Marie, and Linda Walsh. 2004. "A Rhetorical Perspective on the Sokal Hoax: Genre, Style, and Context." *Written Communication* 21 (1): 69-91. doi: 10.1177/0741088303261037.
- Segal, Judy Z. 2007. "Illness as Argumentation: A Prolegomenon to the Rhetorical Study of Contestable Complaints." *Health* 11 (2): 227-244. doi: 10.1177/1363459307074695.
- Segal, Judy Z. 2005. *Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Segal, Judy Z. 1994. "Patient Compliance, the Rhetoric of Rhetoric, and the Rhetoric of Persuasion." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 23 (3/4): 90-102. doi: 10.1080/02773949409390998.
- Simons, Herbert W., ed. 1990. *The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Skinner, Carolyn. 2009. "'She Will Have Science': Ethos and Audience in Mary Gove's *Lectures to Ladies*." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 39 (3): 240-259. doi: 10.1080/02773940902766730.
- Smith, David H. and Loyd S. Pettegrew, 1986. Mutual "Persuasion as a Mode for Doctor-Patient. Communication." *Theoretical Medicine: An International Journal for the Philosophy and Methodology of Medical Research and Practice* 7 (June): 127-146.
- Sullivan, Dale L. 1991. "The Epideictic Rhetoric of Science." *Journal of Business and Technical Communication* 5 (3): 229-245. doi: 10.1177/1050651991005003001.

- Waddell, Craig. 2018/1990. "The Role of Pathos in the Decision-Making Process: A Study in the Rhetoric of Science Policy." In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies* edited by Randy Allen Harris, Second edition, 203-224. London: Routledge.
- Wander, Philip C. and Dennis Jaehne. 2000. "Prospects for 'a Rhetoric of Science.'" *Social Epistemology* 14 (2-3): 211-233. doi: 10.1080/02691720050199243.
- Wanzer-Serrano, Darrel, ed. 2019a. "#RhetoricSoWhite [special issue]." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 105 (4).
- Wanzer-Serrano, Darrel. 2019b. "Rhetoric's Rac(e/ist) Problems," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 105 (4). 465-476.
- Weaver, Richard M. 2018/1953. "Dialectic and Rhetoric at Dayton, Tennessee." In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies* edited by Randy Allen Harris, Second edition, 187-202. London: Routledge.
- Zappen, James P. 1994. "The Rhetoric of Science and the Challenge of Post-Liberal Democracy." *Social Epistemology* 8 (3): 261-271. doi: 10.1080/02691729408578751.