In their paper, Parviainen, Kosiki, and Torkkola (2021) take as their point of departure the epistemic paradox of the need for scientific knowledge for evidence-based political decision-making in situations when science has no answers. This ties in with the observation… Read More ›
epistemology
The Game and How to Play It: A Review of Fuller’s A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition, Darius Khor
What is striking as you turn the final page of Steve Fuller’s (2020) A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition: The Name of the Game, is the enormous ‘weight’ of the text despite its slim one-hundred and forty pages. Without… Read More ›
A Review of Steve Fuller’s A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition, Des Hewitt
When writing my last review of the prequel to this latest book by Steve Fuller, Post-Truth: Knowledge as a Power Game (2018), I was on the Greek Island of Zakynthos. I said what a surreal experience that was, as we… Read More ›
The Epistemic Challenge of Religious Disagreement: Responding to Matheson, John Pittard
I am grateful for Jonathan Matheson’s recent review (Matheson 2020) of my book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment (Pittard 2019). Matheson’s excellent summary reflects a very careful reading, and his critical commentary offers important objections that deserve reflection and response…. Read More ›
Google-Knowing From Within Google’s Political Economy: In Reply to Inna Kouper, Vicki Macknight
I extend thanks to Inna Kouper for her response to “(Google-) Knowing Economics”, which I co-authored with Fabien Medvekcy. The points she raises are fascinating and important, as is this whole area of study. How we come to know with… Read More ›
Googling as Research: A Response to “(Google)-Knowing Economics,” Inna Kouper
Vicki Macknight and Fabien Medvecky’s “(Google-)Knowing Economics” (Social Epistemology 34, 3) raises many interesting questions. What does it mean to know in the digital age? Or, more specifically, what does it mean to know when the main source of knowledge… Read More ›
Some Demarcations and a Dilemma: Comments On Mizrahi, Kyriaki Grammenou
Let us start by examining a couple of assumptions which, albeit not explicitly, seem to inform Mizrahi’s text. He writes that “many philosophers seem to think that scientism poses a threat to them as teachers” and also that “scientism is… Read More ›
Reconsidering Dismissive Incomprehension—Its Relation to Epistemic Injustices, Its Damaging Nature, and a Research Agenda: A Reply to Cull, Manuel Padilla Cruz
Matthew J. Cull (2019) has recently identified dismissive incomprehension and described it as an epistemically demolishing verbal action. It consists of a (fake) expression of ignorance or non-understanding of some information by a receiver who happens to be in a… Read More ›
Hawking vs. Philosophy: Has Science Killed Philosophy?
Stephen Hawking declared the death of philosophy. Was he right? Has science rendered philosophy obsolete? Should we be looking to science to answer the biggest questions, or are there areas of understanding that science cannot reach that philosophy can? What… Read More ›
Against Ideal Theory Ignorance, Susan Dieleman
Author Information: Susan Dieleman, University of Southern Illinois, Edwardsville, sdielem@siue.edu. Dieleman, Susan. “Against Ideal Theory Ignorance.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9, no. 5 (2019): 11-15. The pdf of the article gives specific page references. Shortlink: https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-48M Daniel… Read More ›