Critical Replies are engagements with articles recently published in Social Epistemology.
Racial policing is one of the most controversial police practices. Proponents typically argue that racial profiling is an important tool if the police is to use its resources efficiently in the interest of deterring and detecting crime. Critics typically argue… Read More ›
1. Agreements or Quasi-Agreements I am grateful for Shannon Brick’s (2021) perceptive and stimulating critical commentary on my characterization of the phenomenon of ‘testimonial void’ (TV): a newly identified kind of testimonial injustice (TI) according to which “a speaker withholds… Read More ›
Alexander William Morales’s (2021) shoe in this review was once on the other foot, mine. As an early-career scholar I wrote a review of Alan G. Gross’s groundbreaking (1990) The Rhetoric of Science. Gross responded with extraordinary grace, which, very… Read More ›
Intelligence Collection—like tax collection, courts, Law enforcement, environmental regulation, etc.—is an exercise of government power.[1] Like other exercises of authority, Intelligence Collection must work within constraints (at least in countries bound by the rule of Law). Intelligence Collection is also—alongside… Read More ›
1. Introduction When you expect something bad to happen, you take action to avoid it. That is the principle of action that underlies J. Y. Lee’s recent paper (2021), which presents a new form of epistemic injustice that arises from… Read More ›
There are many ways that technologies influence our thinking, behaviors, and perceptions. A lock on a door may prevent us from entering. A pot holder or oven mitt enables us to grab hold of a hot baking dish. The empty… Read More ›
Our article (Parviainen, Koski, and Torkkola 2021) has sparked debate about epistemic humility in a crisis when political decision-making requires evidence-based knowledge but scientific experts have no answers. Alena Bleicher’s response (Bleicher 2021), published in the Social Epistemology Review and… Read More ›
Epistemic neglect is a kind of epistemic injustice that occurs when educators fail to extend, to their students, “hopeful epistemic trust” (Brick 2020). Hopeful epistemic trust (henceforth, simply ‘hopeful trust’), is trust that is extended not on the basis of… Read More ›
Nudges (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) are ways of changing people’s behavior by changing features of the context in which they choose, rather than by giving them explicit arguments and without removing or unduly burdening the options available to them. The… Read More ›
In “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging” (2021), Thomas Grundmann examines nudging as applied to doxastic attitudes. Grundmann argues that given the right presuppositions about knowledge, justified beliefs, and the relevant belief-forming processes, doxastic nudging can result in justified beliefs and… Read More ›