I am very grateful to Ann-Sophie Barwich for taking the time to comment on my work in her paper ‘Between Electrical Light Switches and Panpsychism: Scientism and the Responsibilities of the Humanities in the Twenty-First Century’ (2022; unless otherwise stated… Read More ›
Volume 12, Issue 6, 1-75, June 2023 ❧ Thalos, Mariam. 2023. “Public Sentiment and Its Powers.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (6): 1-20. ❧ Atkins, J. Spencer. 2023. “Defending Wokeness: A Response to Davidson.” Social Epistemology Review and… Read More ›
3. Sentiment Analysis For those who are concerned about selection bias in the results of the 2009 and 2020 PhilPapers Surveys, there is another way to gauge the disagreement about progress in academic philosophy among academic philosophers, namely, to study… Read More ›
Abstract Mizrahi (2017a) advances an argument in support of Weak Scientism, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the best (but not the only) knowledge we have, according to which Weak Scientism follows from the premises that scientific knowledge… Read More ›
A few months into the pandemic, and I was surprised so many people explicitly rejected expert advice. Mostly, I was shocked by their arguments: they said that scientists keep changing their minds; that not all scientists agree on what we… Read More ›
As Moti Mizrahi’s editorial introduction points out, For and Against Scientism ‘arises from an exchange between several scholars over the pages of the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective’ (Mizrahi 2022, 18) in response to Mizrahi (2019). Mizrahi (2019) defended… Read More ›
Abstract In a reply to Mizrahi (2019), Bryant (2020) raises several methodological concerns regarding my attempt to test hypotheses about the observation that academic philosophers tend to find “scientism” threatening empirically using quantitative, corpus-based methods. Chief among her methodological concerns… Read More ›
“The Scientism Debate” in Summary In his article “The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?” (2019), Moti Mizrahi sets out to empirically test two hypotheses that putatively explain why philosophers find scientism threatening. The hypotheses are: H1:… Read More ›
In these days of the COVID-19 pandemic it makes sense to recall Max Weber, who died from an epidemic virus 100 years ago, in order both to reflect on the practical value of scientific methods and the possibility of science… Read More ›
Moti Mizrahi, in his 2019 “The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?” argues that the perceived threat of scientism to philosophy hinges upon a confluence of two distinct, but overlapping, phenomena. The first of these phenomena is… Read More ›