The year 2018 is coming to an end and I, frankly, could not be happier. A time of continuing upheaval, the year began with a durable pessimism, and its ending is tolerable to the democratically-minded only because of those few… Read More ›
scientism
SERRC: Volume 12, Issue 11, 1-100, November 2023
Volume 12, Issue 11, 1-100, November 2023 ❧ Mizrahi, Moti. 2023. “Why Everything You Think You Know about Scientism is Probably Wrong.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (11): 1–8. ❧ Hewitt, Des. 2023. “‘From Divinity to Bovinity’ and… Read More ›
Why Everything You Think You Know about Scientism is Probably Wrong, Moti Mizrahi
I would like to thank Renia Gasparatou, Philip Goff, and Andreas Vrahimis for contributing to the book symposium on For and Against Scientism: Science, Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022). I am grateful to James… Read More ›
Science vs. Scientism in Consciousness Research: A Reply to Ann-Sophie Barwich, Philip Goff
I am very grateful to Ann-Sophie Barwich for taking the time to comment on my work in her paper ‘Between Electrical Light Switches and Panpsychism: Scientism and the Responsibilities of the Humanities in the Twenty-First Century’ (2022; unless otherwise stated… Read More ›
SERRC: Volume 12, Issue 6, June 2023
Volume 12, Issue 6, 1-75, June 2023 ❧ Thalos, Mariam. 2023. “Public Sentiment and Its Powers.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (6): 1-20. ❧ Atkins, J. Spencer. 2023. “Defending Wokeness: A Response to Davidson.” Social Epistemology Review and… Read More ›
Scientism and Sentiments about Progress in Science and Academic Philosophy, Part II, Moti Mizrahi
3. Sentiment Analysis For those who are concerned about selection bias in the results of the 2009 and 2020 PhilPapers Surveys, there is another way to gauge the disagreement about progress in academic philosophy among academic philosophers, namely, to study… Read More ›
Scientism and Sentiments about Progress in Science and Academic Philosophy, Part I, Moti Mizrahi
Abstract Mizrahi (2017a) advances an argument in support of Weak Scientism, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the best (but not the only) knowledge we have, according to which Weak Scientism follows from the premises that scientific knowledge… Read More ›
On Scientism’s Merry-Go-Round, Renia Gasparatou
A few months into the pandemic, and I was surprised so many people explicitly rejected expert advice. Mostly, I was shocked by their arguments: they said that scientists keep changing their minds; that not all scientists agree on what we… Read More ›
Algorithmic Opinion Mining and the History of Philosophy: A Response to Mizrahi’s For and Against Scientism, Andreas Vrahimis
As Moti Mizrahi’s editorial introduction points out, For and Against Scientism ‘arises from an exchange between several scholars over the pages of the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective’ (Mizrahi 2022, 18) in response to Mizrahi (2019). Mizrahi (2019) defended… Read More ›
Philosophical Sentiments Toward Scientism: A Reply to Bryant, Moti Mizrahi
Abstract In a reply to Mizrahi (2019), Bryant (2020) raises several methodological concerns regarding my attempt to test hypotheses about the observation that academic philosophers tend to find “scientism” threatening empirically using quantitative, corpus-based methods. Chief among her methodological concerns… Read More ›