Author Information: Karyn L. Freedman, University of Guelph, email@example.com
Freedman, Karyn L. “Group Accountability Versus Justified Belief: A Reply to Kukla.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 7 (2015): 6-12.
Please refer to:
- Freedman, Karyn L. “Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account.” Social Epistemology (2014): 1-19. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2014.884183.
- Kukla, Rebecca. “Commentary on Karyn Freedman, ‘Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 3, no. 11 (2014): 46-52.
Image credit: jpellgen, via flickr
I am grateful to Rebecca Kukla (2014) for her generous and fair reading of my “Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account”. My concern in that paper is with the central epistemic question regarding the normative requirements for beliefs based on testimony; that is, whether a hearer has an epistemic right to believe what she is told in the absence of any evidence about the reliability of a speaker. An interest-relative theory of justification is my answer to this question. I argue that beliefs based on testimony require evidence for justification, but how much evidence is needed, in any given case, depends on the hearer and the epistemic risk she takes in believing that p is true. In other words, the evidential burden that an individual must meet in order to be justified in believing that p depends on how important it is for her that p is true, given her interest in p. The more she cares about p, the more evidence needed to justify her belief that p. Continue Reading…