Author Information: Lyudmila Markova, Russian Academy of Science, markova.lyudmila2013@yandex.ru

Markova, Lyudmila. “A New Look at Known Issues.”[1] Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 7 (2015): 1-5.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-29J

Please refer to:

  • Riggio, Adam and Steve Fuller. Knowing Knowledge Part VIII: Knowing Necessary Possibilities.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, May 4, 2015. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-23w.
  • Riggio, Adam and Steve Fuller. “Knowing Knowledge Part VII: Making It Politically Explicit.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, April 21, 2015. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-22H.
  • Riggio, Adam and Steve Fuller. “Knowing Knowledge Part VI: Threats to Public Knowledge.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, April 21, 2015. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-22s.
  • Riggio, Adam and Steve Fuller. “Knowing Knowledge Part V: Refuse Simplicity and the Status Quo.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, April 17, 2015. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-22f.
  • Riggio, Adam and Steve Fuller. “Knowing Knowledge lV: Honesty as Anarchy.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, April 14, 2015. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-21Q.
  • Riggio, Adam and Steve Fuller. “Knowing Knowledge III.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, April 12, 2015. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-21c.
  • Riggio, Adam and Steve Fuller. “Knowing Knowledge II: The God Behind Problems of Knowledge.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, April 7, 2015. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-20P.
  • Riggio, Adam and Steve Fuller. “Knowing Knowledge I: Knowledge Is a Historical Process.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, April 4, 2015. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-20l.

science_is_ok

Image credit: Jeff Few , via flickr

Adam Riggio and Steve Fuller’s discussion—over Fuller’s Knowledge: The Philosophical Quest in History (2014)—involves us in the process of forming a new system of philosophical notions. Notions that, until recently, were perceived as basic and unchangeable, acquire quite different meanings and even get removed. During the discussion, many important ideas become problematic—which helps us understand the peculiarities of current thinking.

Fuller defends his views by relying on social epistemology (of which he is the founder). Indeed, an understanding of what it means for knowledge to be social allows us to see the main characteristics of Fuller’s thinking. I will allow myself to dwell briefly on the turn in thinking about scientific knowledge over the past few decades, which finds expression in a new interpretation of knowledge and important features, discussed by Riggio and Fuller. I am more familiar with Fuller’s ideas, so I find it easier to understand his position in this debate.  Continue Reading…

Author Information:Crispin Sartwell, Dickinson College, crispinsartwell@gmail.com

Sartwell, Crispin. “Anti-Social Epistemology.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 6 (2015): 62-75.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-29w

Please refer to:

arguing

Image credit: Raul Lieberwirth, via flickr

On Saturday, January 8, 2011, Jared Loughner shot Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and a number of other people in a grocery story parking lot in Tucson, Arizona. By the next morning and over the next several days many pundits and politicians on the left connected the shootings—often in a tone of complete certainty—to the angry rhetoric of the right, in particular to that of Sarah Palin. The pundits and politicians on the right, as one would expect, denied these claims vehemently.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Axel Gelfert, National University of Singapore, axel@gelfert.net

Gelfert, Axel. “Symbol Systems as Collective Representational Resources: Mary Hesse, Nelson Goodman, and the Problem of Scientific Representation.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 6 (2015): 52-61.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-29f

feynman_diagrams

Image credit: John Kannenberg, via flickr

This short paper grew out of an observation—made in the course of a larger research project—of a surprising convergence between, on the one hand, certain themes in the work of Mary Hesse and Nelson Goodman in the 1950/60s and, on the other hand, recent work on the representational resources of science, in particular regarding model-based representation. When it comes to scientific models, a number of recent authors have emphasized their status as ‘concrete artefacts, which are built by various representational means’ (Knuuttila 2011, 267), the importance of ‘mature mathematical formalisms’ which encompass ‘locally applicable rules for the manipulation of [their] notation’ (Gelfert 2011, 272), and model users’ reliance on other ways ‘to alleviate the cognitive load and increase the reliability of [their] inferences’ (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2014, 7).  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Matthew J. Brown, University of Texas at Dallas, mattbrown@utdallas.edu

Brown, Matthew J. “A Critical Appreciation of Ronald N. Giere’s ‘Distributed Cognition without Distributed Knowing’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 6 (2015): 45-51.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-28R

Please refer to:

Author’s Note:

    This material is partially based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1338735. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

hubble_test

Image credit: NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, via flickr

Ron Giere’s “Distributed Cognition without Distributed Knowing” (Giere 2007) is a relatively short but nonetheless significant paper. Giere has, since 2002, been defending the use of distributed cognition (dcog) theory as the best theoretical framework for the cognitive science of science (Giere 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2004; 2006a; 2006b; 2009; 2012; Giere and Moffatt 2003). In his work, he has mainly defended the dcog approach theoretically and applied it as a framework for reinterpreting existing case studies (e.g., by Knorr-Cetina and Latour). Giere’s work is a complement to the empirical work by Nancy Nersessian and her collaborators, who apply dcog in their mixed-methods empirical laboratory studies (N. J. Nersessian, Kurz-Milcke, et al. 2003; N. J. Nersessian, Newstetter, et al. 2003; Nersessian 2005; Osbeck et al. 2011).  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Melanie White, University of New South Wales, melanie.white@unsw.edu.au

White, Melanie. “Bergson and Bergsonism: A Reply to Riggio.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 6 (2015): 40-44.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-28C

Please refer to:

bergson

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Adam Riggio gives us an interesting insight into a science war avant la lettre between two iconic twentieth century figures in philosophy and physics, Henri Bergson (1859-1940) and Albert Einstein (1879-1955). Bergson was once a household name, but now almost forgotten, and Einstein’s name has become almost unforgettable. Bergson was arguably one of the most important philosophers of the early twentieth century, and even then, one of philosophy’s most controversial figures.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Daniel P. Miller, Virginia Tech, millerdp@vt.edu

Miller, Daniel P. “SIREN 2015 Lecture Review: The Unthinkable Organization.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 6 (2015): 35-39.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-28p

Please refer to:

fukushima

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The fourth lecture, “Fukushima Accident Recovery, Decommissioning and Decontamination”, in the Seminar on Interdisciplinary Research and Education in Nuclear Emergency Response (SIREN) was presented by Dr. Douglas M. Chapin on 28 April 2015 at the Virginia Tech Research Center in Arlington, Virginia. Dr. Sonja Schmid of Virginia Tech hosted the talk as part of a National Science Foundation (NSF) CAREER grant that provides a venue for nuclear power experts to share their expertise and experience related to nuclear system accidents.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Tauseef Ahmad Parray [1], Aligarh Muslim University, tauseef.parray21@gmail.com

Parray, Tauseef Ahmad. “Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) on Taqlid, Ijtihad, and Science-Religion Compatibility.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 6 (2015): 19-34.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-286

Editor’s Note:

    Please find below the footnotes articles in the exchange on Islam and science appearing on the SERRC. [a]

syed_ahmed_khan

Image credit: Wikipedia Commons

Contextualizing the Discourse

‘Modernism’—a movement to reconcile Islamic faith with modern values such as democracy, rights, nationalism, rationality, science, equality, and progress—emerged in the middle of the 19th century as a response to European colonialism, which pitched the Muslim world into crisis. Islamic modernism generated a series of novel institutions, including schools that combined Islamic education with modern subjects and pedagogies; newspapers that carried modernist Islamic ideas across continents; constitutions that sought to limit state power; and social welfare agencies that brought state power into even more sectors of social life. Thus, Islamic modernism began as a response of Muslim intellectuals to European modernity, who argued that Islam, science and progress, revelation and reason, were indeed compatible. They did not simply wish to restore the beliefs and practices of the past; rather they asserted the need to ‘reinterpret and reapply’ the principles and ideals of Islam to formulate new responses to the political, scientific, and cultural challenges of the west and of modern life.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Steve Fuller, University of Warwick, S.W.Fuller@warwick.ac.uk

The PDF of this article exists for purposes of readability and portability. Please see the 13 May 2015 edition of Research Professional for citation. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-27U

Author’s Note:

    This article originally appeared in the 13 May 2015 edition of Research Professional, a UK-based website associated with Research Fortnight, the main newsletter for British academic researchers. It is based upon work supported by the US National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1445121. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation (NSF).

research

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In this article, I write as the UK partner of an exploratory project funded by the US National Science Foundation to critically evaluate current approaches to the broader ‘impacts’ of research. Our aim is to develop an agenda for understanding both the ‘how’ and ‘how much’ of the impact that humanistic, scientific and technical research has on societal well-being.  By the time of our capstone Washington workshop in February 2016, we should be able to address systematically the bottom-line question of all research funding policy: What counts as ‘value for money’?  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Jesse Butler, University of Central Arkansas, jbutler@uca.edu

Butler, Jesse. “Phenomenal Knowledge, Dualism, and Dreams.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 6 (2015): 12-18.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-27C

Please refer to:

dreaming

Image credit: Riccardo Cuppini, via flickr

Dwight Holbrook (2015b) expresses misgivings that phenomenal knowledge can be regarded as both an objectless kind of knowledge and an objective feature of the world. He attributes a problematic dualism to my account of phenomenal knowledge, suggesting that my treatment of phenomenal knowledge as a kind of objectless knowledge sets it apart from the objective world, creating a dualistic divide between phenomenal knowledge and the objective world of which I claim it is a part.  Continue Reading…

Joan Leach, of the SERRC and former Editor of Social Epistemology, will become the next Director of the Australian National Centre for the Public Awareness of Science on 1 January 2016. We wish Joan all the best! http://cpas.anu.edu.au/news-events/cpas-welcome-professor-joan-leach-new-director-2016.