Author Information: Doran Smolkin, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Doran.Smolkin@kpu.ca
Smolkin, Doran. “Clarifying the Dependence Condition: A Reply to Benjamin McCraw’s, ‘The Nature of Epistemic Trust’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no 10 (2015): 10-13.
Please refer to:
- McCraw, Benjamin W. “The Nature of Epistemic Trust.” Social Epistemology (2015): 1-18. do: 10.1080/02691728.2014.971907.
- Combes, Richard E. “McCraw on the Nature of Epistemic Trust.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 8 (2015):76-78.
Image credit: Pao, via flickr
Much of what we come to believe is based on trusting the communication of others. It would, therefore, be helpful to better understand the nature of this sort of trust. Benjamin McCraw offers one very clear and well-argued account in his, “The Nature of Epistemic Trust.” McCraw claims that a hearer or audience (H) places epistemic trust (ET) in a person or speaker (S) that some proposition (p) is true if and only if:
1. H believes that p;
2. H takes S to communicate that p;
3. H depends upon S’s (perceived) communication for H’s belief that p; and
4. H sees S as epistemically well-placed with respect to p. (McCraw, 13).