The Death of the “Book Review”? Stephen T. Casper

Jim Collier —  May 19, 2013 — Leave a comment

Author Information: Stephen T. Casper, Clarkson University, scasper@clarkson.edu

Reposted with the author’s permission from The Neuro Times, www.dictionaryofneurology.com/2013/05/the-death-of-book-review.html, 15 May 2013

Casper, Stephen T. 2013. “The Death of the ‘Book Review’?” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (6) 23-27.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-Nd

The book review has died. It lives. But it is dead. It is an anachronistic zombie. Let me explain.

Perhaps some of you are employed in universities that use Digital Measures? I’m sure you are at least savvy enough to imagine precisely the aims of this wondrous digital panopticon. If you have not yet discovered Digital Measures, then rest assured someone, somewhere, is plotting to bring it your university soon enough. In any case, it is software that promises to measure and value everything you do. And should you have dared to publish a book review, then it will measure it in a way that values it least of all. Continue Reading…

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Response to Ginev, “Scrutinizing Scientism from a Hermeneutic Point of View”, Robert P. Crease

Jim Collier —  May 15, 2013 — Leave a comment

Author Information: Robert P. Crease, Stony Brook University, robert.crease@stonybrook.edu

Crease, Robert P. 2013. “Response to Ginev, ‘Scrutinizing Scientism from a Hermeneutic Point of View’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (6): 18-22.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-MJ

Please refer to: Ginev, Dimitri. 2013. “Scrutinizing Scientism from a Hermeneutic Point of View.” Social Epistemology 27 (1): 68-89.

Dimitri Ginev describes scientism, prima facie, as “the postulation of the natural sciences’ norms, standards, and criteria of objectivity as an absolute system of reference in recognizing and resolving global social problems” (73). Scientism has been under ferocious attack for a long time at the hands of philosophers of science including Rorty, Habermas, and Heidegger. Yet, Ginev argues, these attacks are defective because of their ‘essentialism;’ that is, they assume, though in different ways, “invariant norms of theorizing, methodological devices, cognitive aims, goals, and values” (68). Continue Reading…

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The Origin and Prospect of a Principled Future: An Interview with Steve Fuller, Ryan Cochrane

Jim Collier —  May 12, 2013 — Leave a comment

Author Information: Ryan Cochrane, Ryan.Cochrane001@umb.edu

Fuller, Steve. 2013. “The Origin and Prospect of a Principled Future: An Interview with Steve Fuller, Ryan Cochrane.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (6): 12-17, 12 May 2013.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-Md

The SERRC thanks Denyse O’Leary, Ryan Cochrane and Steve Fuller for permission to post this slightly expanded version of “TBS interviews sociologist who studies ID—and he isn’t what you might think” from TheBestSchools.Org Blog. [1]

Ryan Cochrane (RC): Why does Darwinism pose a much greater threat to the future of humanity than religion? Isn’t this the exact opposite of what people like Richard Dawkins and the late Christopher Hitchens are saying?

Steve Fuller (SF): Yes, it is the exact opposite. Dawkins and Hitchens betray a remarkable sociological ignorance. They treat ‘religion’ as if it were some sort of anti- or pre-scientific ideology, when in fact it is simply the generic name for any complex social organization that is held together over large expanses of space and time without depending on the existence of the nation-state. Not surprisingly, ‘religion’ in this properly broad sense has been responsible for enormous good and evil in the course of history. Once this is kept in mind, it should be clear that there is no specifically ‘religious’ gene or bit of the brain to be found (which then one might treat as a pathology in need of cure).

In particular, religions do not require belief in a deity, let alone one that is transcendent of the natural world. To be sure, belief in a transcendent deity is an interesting thing to explain, and may have an important basis in our genes and brains. However, this belief is not specifically ‘religious’ but is also common to modern science, especially in its quest to acquire what Thomas Nagel has called ‘the view from nowhere’, which is a fair characterisation of the Newtonian project and all its subsequent revisions in the history of physics. Continue Reading…

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Anthropology as multi-natural ontology? A response to Marianne de Laet’s “Anthropology as social epistemology”, Helene Ratner

Jim Collier —  May 5, 2013 — Leave a comment

Author Information: Helene Ratner, Copenhagen Business School, hr.lpf@cbs.dk

Ratner, Helene. 2013. “Anthropology as multi-natural ontology? A response to Marianne de Laet’s ‘Anthropology as social epistemology’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (6): 5-11.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-M4

Please refer to: de Laet, Marianne. 2012. “Anthropology as social epistemology?” Social Epistemology 26 (3-4): 419-33.

Introduction

As her title indicates, Marianne de Laet suggests that social epistemology could be thought of as anthropology, in terms of how this mode of knowing has helped flesh out the social dimensions of scientific knowledge. She does so firstly, by accounting for how anthropological methods and concepts have contributed to science and technology studies (STS) by providing an alternative to “believing the natives” i.e., scientists, hence challenging positivist and objectivist accounts of science.  She then specifies selected analytical insights of anthropology. The concepts ‘culture’ and ‘practice’, she argues, enable us to learn how “knowledge is social in an epistemic sense” (2012, 421). She concludes her argument by questioning the distinction between epistemology and ontology, maintaining that anthropology is social epistemology. Continue Reading…

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Review of Engineers for Change: Competing Visions of Technology in 1960s America, Matthew Wisnioski, Stephen H. Unger

Jim Collier —  May 1, 2013 — Leave a comment

Author Information: Stephen H. Unger, Professor Emeritus, Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, Columbia University, unger@cs.columbia.edu

Unger, Stephen H. 2013. “Review of Engineers for Change: Competing Visions of Technology in 1960s America, Matthew Wisnioski.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (6): 1-4.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-LS

Matthew Wisnioski, Engineers for Change: Competing Visions of Technology in 1960s America, MIT Press, 2012, 296 pp.

As one of the engineers mentioned in Professor Wisnioski’s book as actively advocating change, I have first-hand knowledge concerning many of the topics treated. Rather than discuss the book in its entirety, I will focus on what I am most familiar with, elaborating on, and updating, what the author has presented.

During the sixties and seventies, there were at least three general issues that motivated many engineers to make waves. The first was the Vietnam War, the cold war, and weapons of mass destruction. The second was growing concern over environmental issues, such as air and water pollution, and energy — particularly nuclear energy. The third involved all too many situations where the professional judgments of engineers on matters such as safety were overridden by managers, usually for short-term financial reasons. Continue Reading…

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Reputation and Social Mechanisms : A Comment on Origgi’s “A Social Epistemology of Reputation”, Gianluca Manzo

Jim Collier —  April 26, 2013 — Leave a comment

Author Information: Gianluca Manzo, GEMASS–CNRS and University of Paris-Sorbonne, glmanzo@msh-paris.fr

Manzo, Gianluca. 2013. “Reputation and Social Mechanisms: A Comment on Origgi’s ‘A Social Epistemology of Reputation’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (5): 45-50.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-LG

Please refer to: Origgi, Gloria. 2012. “A Social Epistemology of Reputation.” Social Epistemology 26 (3-4): 399-418.

Origgi’s penetrating outlook on social life, combined with her deep knowledge of several streams of literature in economics, sociology and philosophy makes “A Social Epistemology of Reputation” a brilliant piece of work. Origgi’s article develops a general theoretical framework for studying the emergence and function of reputational hierarchies and dynamics in complex societies. Continue Reading…

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Exchange on Holbrook and Briggle’s “Knowing and Acting”, Briggle, Fuller, Holbrook and Lipinska

Jim Collier —  April 18, 2013 — 5 Comments

Author Information: Adam Briggle, University of North Texas, adam.briggle@unt.edu; Steve Fuller, University of Warwick, Auguste Comte Chair in Social Epistemology, S.W.Fuller@warwick.ac.uk; J. Britt Holbrook, University of North Texas, britt.holbrook@unt.edu; Veronika Lipinska, Lund University, Sweden, SERRC, veronika.lipinska@googlemail.com

Briggle, Adam, Steve Fuller, Britt Holbrook and Veronika Lipinska. 2013. “Exchange on Holbrook and Briggle’s ‘Knowing and Acting’”. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (5) 38-44.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-Li

Please refer to: Holbrook, J. Britt and Adam Briggle. 2013. “Knowing and acting: The precautionary and proactionary principles in relation to policy making.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (5): 15.

Editor’s Note: The following e-mail exchange on Holbrook and Briggle’s “Knowing and Acting” (published on the SERRC as a pre-print on 16 April 2013) took place from 20 to 22 March 2013. The participants are J. Britt Holbrook, Adam Briggle, Veronika Lipinska and Steve Fuller.

Lipinska (20 March): You make a strong case for similarities between the proactionary and precautionary principle with regards to deployment of risk assessment strategies and avoidance of recklessness and try to give the precautionary principle a proactionary spin. In a way, what you are saying is that unless precautionaries go completely ballistic and push every proposal to undergo extensive and time consuming risk evaluations, the precautionary principle can well be proactionary in practice. However, I think it strongly undermines the precautionary principle as a principle and reshapes it into merely a tool for inquiry. It is one thing to say that we should evaluate risks before we proceed with action (which is what both proactionaries and precautionaries agree on and which I call “risk assessment”) and quite another thing to engage in active decision making, which should be understood as risk management. Continue Reading…

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Knowing and acting: The precautionary and proactionary principles in relation to policy making, J. Britt Holbrook and Adam Briggle

Jim Collier —  April 16, 2013 — 5 Comments

Author Information: J. Britt Holbrook, Britt.Holbrook@unt.edu, and Adam Briggle, Adam.Briggle@unt.edu, University of North Texas

Holbrook, J. Britt and Adam Briggle. 2013. “Knowing and acting: The precautionary and proactionary principles in relation to policy making.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (5): 15-37.

The PDF of the pre-print gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-KQ

This essay explores the relationship between knowledge (in the form of scientific risk assessment) and action (in the form of technological innovation) as they come together in policy, which itself is both a kind of knowing and acting. It first illustrates the dilemma of timely action in the face of uncertain unintended consequences. It then introduces the precautionary and proactionary principles as different alignments of knowledge and action within the policymaking process. The essay next considers a cynical and a hopeful reading of the role of these principles in public policy debates. We argue that the two principles, despite initial appearances, are not all that different when it comes to formulating public policy. We also suggest that principles in general can be used either to guide our actions, or to determine them for us. We argue that allowing principles to predetermine our actions undermines the sense of autonomy necessary for true action.

Keywords: Precautionary Principle; Proactionary Principle; Policy; Decision Procedure

Knowledge kills action. (Nietzsche)[1]

1. Knowing and acting

How are knowledge and action related? This question is asked less often than another: When do we know enough to justify taking action? In the context of making science and technology policy, the question assumes yet a different form: When do we have sufficient scientific risk assessments about a new technological activity to warrant promoting that activity and embedding it in society? In this paper, we explore how the relation between knowledge and action should be structured in policymaking. Continue Reading…

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A Further Reply to Rockmore, Ilya Kasavin

Jim Collier —  April 6, 2013 — Leave a comment

Author Information: Ilya Kasavin, Russian Academy of Sciences itkasavin@gmail.com

Kasavin, Ilya. 2013. “A Further Reply to Rockmore.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (5) 12-14.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-JZ

Please refer to:

It is my pleasure to turn once more to the exchange with Tom Rockmore. I appreciate his critical remarks as they have forced me to express my position more radically.

We agree on a number of points. We both wish to avoid an overly simplistic appeal to a contextual understanding of meaning. But when Rockmore wants to make a stronger claim that context functions not only to understand meaning, but also to justify truth claims, is this really offering a stronger position? Is it reasonable to separate definitively meaning from truth clams? Don’t truth claims have meaning? Continue Reading…

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The Role of Culture and Understanding in Research, Carl Martin Allwood

Jim Collier —  April 3, 2013 — Leave a comment

Author Information: Carl Martin Allwood, University of Gothenburg, Sweden cma@psy.gu.se

Allwood, Carl Martin. 2013. “The Role of Culture and Understanding in Research.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (5) 1-11.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-JL

Please refer to: Hwang, Kwang-Kuo. 2013. “Linking science to culture: Challenge to psychologists.” Social Epistemology 27 (1): 105-122.

The generation of scientific knowledge is a central issue in the social epistemology of knowledge. How then, can the generation of scientific knowledge best be described? In the sociology of knowledge, science tends to be seen as closely linked to society at large and it is usually seen as the central task of the sociology of knowledge to investigate and analyze this relationship (Yearley 2005). Therefore it is of interest to read the article “Linking Science to Culture: Challenge to Psychologists” in Social Epistemology (Hwang 2013) where Professor Hwang claims that scientific knowledge is, or at least should be, constructed in a process whereby researchers create microworlds which he argues are completely separated from what he calls their “lifeworlds”. In this rejoinder I will scrutinize this and other claims and also answer some of the criticisms that he levels against my article on the culture concept used in the Indigenous Psychologies (Allwood 2011a, b; Hwang 2011). The indigenous psychologies (IPs) are psychology research programs that aim for the approach to be scientific but that see mainstream psychology as too Western, and specifically too US, in its cultural foundation. Instead the psychology developed should be rooted in the culture of the society being investigated. Continue Reading…

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