Author Information: Rebecca Kukla, Georgetown University, firstname.lastname@example.org
Kukla, Rebecca. “Commentary on Karyn Freedman, ‘Testimony and Risk: The Dependence Account’” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 11 (2014): 46-52.
Please refer to:
- Freedman, Karyn L. “Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account.” Social Epistemology 3 March 2014, published online. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2014.884183.
Image credit: Mike Kniec, via flickr
In “Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account,” Karyn Freedman argues that in the case of testimonial knowledge, “Justification is an interest-relative relation” (4). Specifically, the more ‘epistemic risk’ an agent takes on in believing a report that p, the more evidence she needs in order for the belief to be justified, where her epistemic risk depends on how much it matters, given her interests, values, and needs, if she is wrong. The less an agent has at stake in something being true, the lower the evidence bar for justification. Thus “Justification depends on evidence and how much evidence is needed, in each case, depends on the interests of the hearer” (14). Indeed, Freedman argues that all beliefs work this way, whether or not they are testimonially derived; testimonial evidence just offers more opportunities for epistemic risk than usual. Continue Reading…