Author Information: Lyudmila A. Markova, Russian Academy of Sciences, markova.lyudmila2013@yandex.ru

Markova, Lyudmila A. “A Brief Reply to Maya Frodeman.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 9 (2014): 53-54.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1Br

Please refer to:

I would like to consider briefly three points in connection with issues raised by Maya Frodeman.

1. Academics’ approval or disapproval in transforming the knowledge production system in universities does not mean much. Certainly the majority of academics do not want such changes, but the main reason is not that they fear losing their position in the social structure of the university. Rather, a serious difficulty follows in recognizing and taking up new ideas. Many academics believe sincerely that new knowledge policies will destroy science. And they are right if science is considered by politicians, in the same way as by academics, and if the science policy does not take into consideration the changes outlined by Robert Frodeman. Philosophy offers the ability to see the current features of contemporary science that make it fundamentally different compared to classical science (which some scientists and philosophers perceive as the only possible one).  Continue Reading…

Author Information:Alexandra Hofmänner, University of Basel, alexandra.hofmaenner@unibas.ch

Hofmänner, Alexandra. “Response to Anderson and Khandekar.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 9 (2014): 44-52.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1Bd

Please refer to:

In their reviews, Anderson and Khandekar pronounce a heavy verdict on my paper “Science Studies Elsewhere: The Experimental Life and the Other Within”. They renounce its novelty and intellectual merit. They accuse the paper of disregarding what they consider to be the relevant body of literature, namely postcolonial science studies (PSS, Anderson) or postcolonial studies of technoscience (PST, Khandekar). In their view, this scholarly tradition has already provided the intellectual material that is merely repeated in the paper. The only analytical value they ascribe to the paper is its reproduction of a ‘postcolonial staple’ (Anderson, 2014, 51), its treading of ‘territory familiar to many Science Studies scholars’ (Khandekar, 2014, 9). On the basis of these considerations, they read the paper as an unwarranted critique of scholarship in the fields of PSS and PST.

In this response, I will try to show that Anderson and Khandekar fail to substantiate their judgement. Furthermore, I will argue that their comments exemplify some of the very obstacles the proposed Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere seeks to address. For this purpose, I will discuss the following issues: Anderson and Khandekar’s use of the word ‘Elsewhere’ (1. Research Design); their denial of the paper’s novelty and analytical potential (2. Trouillot’s Notion of Elsewhere: The Geography of Management and the Geography of Imagination); and their insistence on a particular scholarly tradition in Science Studies as conceptual and interpretive reference for the analysis (3. Postcolonial Technoscience).  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Stephen Turner, University of South Florida, turner@usf.edu

Turner, Stephen. “Thinking Epistemically about Experts and Publics: A Response to Selinger.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 9 (2014): 36-43.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1B3

Please refer to:

Evan Selinger’s review nicely captures the main concerns of my collection of essays, The Politics of Expertise. He raises an important question that is touched on in several essays but not fully developed: the problem of getting expert knowledge possessed by academics into something like public discussion or the public domain. This is of course only a part of the problem of expertise and the larger problem of knowledge in society. But it can be approached in more detail than was done in the book, in terms of the basic ideas of the book, and I will try to do that here. Much of what I will say deals with issues I have addressed in other places, so I will, rather tiresomely, cite myself, for those who wish more elaboration.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Stefano Bigliardi, Tec de Monterrey CSF, Mexico City; CMES Lund University, stefano.bigliardi@cme.lu.se

Bigliardi, Stefano. “Latour’s Sophistication, Science and the Qur’an as ‘Mere’ Historical Document: A Counter-Reply to Edis.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 9 (2014): 34-35.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1AP

Please refer to:

I read with great interest Taner Edis’ reply to my reply and self-criticism. As it often happens between us I agree with some of his observations, and disagree with others, and I think there are some potential misunderstandings to be cleared up.

I was quite surprised to see my attempt at showing how the notion of a “new generation” in the contemporary debate over Islam and science evolved and my invitation to pay attention to its nuances caricaturized as “breast-beating”. I meant it as an expression of accuracy as well as of respect towards my interlocutors with whom I might occasionally disagree but who, as Edis rightly points out, often differentiate among themselves by virtue of “details” achieved through an intellectual effort that I deeply admire. Such details can actually be of great significance, for good and bad. As to me, I will keep practicing this kind of “breast-beating” and recommending it to my students.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Maya Frodeman, Reed College, mfrodema@reed.edu

Frodeman, Maya. “A Challenge for Frodeman and Briggle.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 9 (2014): 30-33.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1Aw

Please refer to:

The introduction to Frodeman and Briggle’s forthcoming book, Socrates Untenured: Toward a 21st Century Philosophy, outlines a provocative critique of higher education and professional philosophy. Yet do the authors take their point far enough? I suggest that unless Frodeman and Briggle deepen their critique this book will fail to prompt the changes that our system of higher education needs.

There is a Catch-22 embedded in their introduction: a book challenging the traditions of academia written by two white, tenured males. The book will turn some heads. (Perhaps it cannot be any other way: you are either inside the system looking out, or outside looking in.) In fact, the book will likely upset academics who cherish the current system of knowledge production. However, there needs to be another voice in the book. Frodeman and Briggle need to add a perspective that will allow their book to speak to new audiences and ensure that their ideas in Socrates Untenured live past a weekend.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Robert Frodeman, University of North Texas, frodeman@unt.edu and Adam Briggle, University of North Texas, Adam.Briggle@unt.edu

Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1Ap

Editor’s Note: Bob Frodeman and Adam Briggle were kind enough to share a draft (further abridged) of the introduction to their proposed book Socrates Tenured: The Institutions of 21st Century Philosophy. The book is under consideration for publication in our “Collective Studies in Knowledge and Society” series. A reply to their Frodeman and Briggle’s introduction is forthcoming.

Introduction

There are nowadays professors of philosophy, but not philosophers. — Thoreau

Think of organic chemistry; I recognize its importance, but I am not curious about it, nor do I see why the layman should care about much of what concerns me in philosophy. — Quine

Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men. — Dewey

I.

In 1917 John Dewey published “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy.” This essay, a nearly 17,000 word reflection on the role of philosophy in early 20th century American life, expressed Dewey’s concern that philosophy had become antiquated, “sidetracked from the main currents of contemporary life,” too much the domain of professionals and adepts. While taking pains to note that the classic questions of philosophy make inestimable contributions to culture both past and present, Dewey felt that the topics being raised by professional philosophers were too often “discussed mainly because they have been discussed rather than because contemporary conditions of life suggest them.”  Continue Reading…

Author Information: John Williams, Singapore Management University, johnwilliams@smu.edu.sg

Williams, John. “True Succession and Inheritance of Traditions: Looking Back on the Debate.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 9 (2014): 15-29.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1A2

Please refer to:

Introduction

Starting with my (1988) and largely continued by David Ruben’s instructive (2013a), a lively debate has occurred over how one is to analyze the concepts of true succession and membership of a tradition in order to identify the source of the intractability typically found in disputes in which two groups each claim that it, but not its rival, is in the tradition of some earlier group.

This debate was initially between myself (2013a, 2013b) and Ruben (2013b, 2013c) but later involved Samuel Lebens (2013a, 2013b), Jonathan Payton (2013a, 2013b), Martin Beckstein (2014a, 2014b) and Ruben (2013d, 2014a, 2014b). The time seems ripe to summarize the main lines of the debate to try to draw some lessons from it as we go along and then indicate possible further lines of inquiry.  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Kwang-Kuo Hwang, National Taiwan University, kkhwang@ntu.edu.tw

Hwang, Kwang-Kuo. “Preserving Cultural Identity and Subjectivity for a Psychology of Multiculturalism.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 9 (2014): 7-14.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1zR

Please refer to:

Abstract

Language is the most important carrier of cultural heritage, but it is a common sense of social science that language doesn’t equal to culture. All cultural traditions that can be transmitted from generation to generation must serve some function of helping people in a certain situation of lifeworld. The construction of scientific microworld for culture-inclusive theories enables indigenous social scientists to recognize the cultural traditions in an objective way that may preserve cultural identity and subjectivity of non-Western countries in the context of multiculturalism.

I was preparing this rejoinder to Prof. Allwood’s article entitled “What type of culture will help indigenous psychologies and why?” when guest lecturing at a training seminar in Harbin, China, between July 20-27, 2014. This extraordinary experience helped me to answer and to clarify many questions raised in his article, which cited some of my sayings as the following:

Thus, he, to a large extent, seems to equate culture with the language spoken by the people in the cultural community, and thus to a large extent, for example, to equate Chinese culture with the Chinese language (Allwood 2014, 46).  Continue Reading…

Author Information: Sarah Sawyer, University of Sussex, s.a.sawyer@sussex.ac.uk

Sawyer, Sarah. “Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism: A Response to Aikin and Dabay.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 9 (2014): 1-6.

The PDF of the article gives specific page numbers. Shortlink: http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1zz

Please refer to:

Introduction

In “Contrastive Self-Knowledge” (2014), I develop an account of self-knowledge as contrastive. According to that account, apparently non-contrastive statements of the form:

S knows that she ψs that p

are elliptical for explicitly contrastive statements of the form:

S knows that [she ψs that p] rather than that S* φs that q.

In this formulation, S* marks out a contrast in the subject of the first-order attitude, φ marks out a contrast in the attitude taken towards the proposition, and q marks out a contrast in the proposition to which that attitude is taken. Self-knowledge, then, is contrastive along three dimensions. The square brackets are simply a device for indicating the element of the statement that represents the content of the self-knowledge ascribed. This serves to highlight the fact that the contrastivity of self-knowledge lies not in the content of self-knowledge but in the subject’s state of self-knowledge. When Jack knows that she believes that the negative representation of women in the media perpetuates sexism, the content of her self-knowledge is simply: I believe that the negative representation of women in the media perpetuates sexism. But Jack’s state of self-knowledge is determined not by her standing in relation to that proposition in isolation, but by her standing in relation to that proposition relative to a set of contrasting propositions. The contrast class that serves to individuate Jack’s state of self-knowledge need not itself be represented by her in thought—only the content of her thought will be represented by her. Nonetheless, the contrast class will be determined by her conceptual capacities. Since subjects can differ in their conceptual capacities, different subjects can each know that they believe that the negative representation of women in the media perpetuates sexism while nonetheless being in different states of self-knowledge.  Continue Reading…

The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (SERRC) announces “Future Fundamentals of Social Epistemology” a conference to be held from 25 July to 1 August 2014 at Virginia Tech (http://www.collier.sts.vt.edu/ffse/).

We will raise, examine, and set forth a vital intellectual agenda for conducting a comprehensive social epistemology.

Steve Fuller, the Auguste Comte Chair in Social Epistemology at the University of Warwick, will give the keynote presentation, “Social Epistemology: The Future of an Unfulfilled Promise”, on Tuesday, July 29.

Neil Harbission, co-founder of the Cyborg Foundation, will give a special presentation “Life in the Age of New Body Parts and Extra Senses” on Friday, August 1.

Live tweeting can be found at, or through, @ReplyCollective.

Conference sessions will be streamed at the following addresses (http://www.collier.sts.vt.edu/ffse/program.htm).

Pre-Conference (25 July):
Event page: https://plus.google.com/events/cu6hc3cogpp8v1aq4is1r8ep6g8
Youtube page: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2iI2p8PmcG4

Day 1 (28 July):
Event Page: https://plus.google.com/events/cgk7kmaoj3lbpj7jofau3puv87s
YouTube Page: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15t09rFDuj8

Day 2 (29 July):
Event Page: https://plus.google.com/events/cfo8c4b4d5jgevt6k9hrm038va0
YouTube Page: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGbXVnCnhS8

Day 3 (30 July):
Event Page: https://plus.google.com/events/c9viv17dladg5meae04a6f79d6c
YouTube Page: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vdBZoc090oc

Day 4 (31 July):
Event Page: https://plus.google.com/events/c78rl2t8t85vl0fg8g6uc02onto
YouTube Page: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=StlExM75Q1Y

Day 5 (1 Aug):
Event Page: https://plus.google.com/events/c44dohpg9gn4du3tiedprhhi8js
YouTube Page: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_aXRFS1r28

Please direct questions to Jim Collier (jim.collier@vt.edu).